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I 
ENGLISH SUMMARY 
This thesis investigates how Western crime control policies and models are exported 
to the Global South, and what the power implications are herein. More specifically, it 
explores crime control as European Union (EU) external policy, and the role of 
internal security issues in the EU’s relations with the Sahel region of West Africa. 
Travelling crime control is studied through various stages of empirical exploration 
and levels of analysis. 
Empirically, the most central contributions of this thesis are broadly threefold. First, 
the thesis constitutes the first mapping of EU aid to crime control and internal security 
across regions and over a period of 15 years. Second, based on fieldwork and 
interviews in Senegal, Mali, Niger and Brussels, it provides in-depth empirical 
knowledge about the micro-politics and practices of the EU’s export of its crime 
control models to West Africa. Third, it empirically documents the meeting point 
between European crime control models and Sahelian social realities, including 
resistance to Eurocentric forms of control. 
In terms of theory, the thesis makes contributions across Criminology and 
International Relations (IR): encompassing analyses of the constitutive as well as 
structural forms of power implicated in the EU’s export of crime control and border 
security to West Africa and the wider southern neighbourhood. In so doing, it 
simultaneously advances transnational criminological theory on the relationship 
between crime control/penal power and state/sovereignty. 
Article 1 (The External Dimension of the EU’s Fight against Transnational Crime: 
Transferring Political Rationalities of Crime Control), co-authored with Dr. A. Russo, 
constitutes the first comprehensive review of the EU’s export of crime control policies 
and ‘aid to internal security’ across regions and over time. Drawing on both 
International Relations and Criminology, it develops an analytical framework to 
identify the political rationalities and technologies of crime control that the EU 
attempts to transfer across the Eastern and Southern (extended) neighbourhoods. By 
scrutinizing 216 projects aimed at combating transnational crime beyond Europe’s 
borders, spanning law enforcement, border security, criminal justice and the 
penitentiary sector, the empirical analysis is geared towards detecting and 
systematizing the ways of thinking and doing crime control that the EU seeks to 
promote and export. Moreover, it investigates the ‘action at a distance’ whereby it 
does so. It is argued that in shaping third countries’ ability to criminalise, indict, 
convict and punish, the EU is simultaneously defining its own security actorness, 
specifically consolidating its role as a ‘global crime fighter’. 
Article 2 (The Rise of Crimefare Europe: Fighting Migrant Smuggling in West Africa) 
explores the incremental role of criminalization and crime control in European Union 
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(EU) foreign policy and external action. Protecting Europe from dangerous or 
unwanted mobility has come to drive the EU’s relations with Africa. Consequently, 
the EU’s liberal state-building agenda (promoting peace, democracy and human 
rights) seems to be increasingly accompanied or even sometimes supplanted by 
illiberal practices (criminalization, policing, surveillance, border security and 
militarization). Based on fieldwork in Niger, Mali and Senegal, the article investigates 
how West African countries’ internal security apparatuses and borders are 
increasingly becoming a main target sector for European assistance. Yet scrutinizing 
policy implementation reveals that some European crime definitions and control 
models are locally resisted and contribute to greater insecurity by upsetting fragile 
micro-political stability. As such, the article problematizes the compatibility of 
European and African security, and argues for a collaborative engagement between 
Criminology and International Relations (IR) in analysing the EU’s emerging global 
crime-fighting role. 
Article 3 (Borders as Penal Transplants: Reshaping Territory, Mobility, and Illegality 
in West Africa) investigates an increasingly significant trend in crime and mobility 
control that has yet received scant criminological attention, namely ‘border 
externalization’ and the export of western ‘penal aid’ to the global south. It draws on 
fieldwork scrutinizing land border security-building by western donors in Senegal, 
Mali, and Niger, and observes conflicting notions of crime, mobility, territory, and 
sovereignty. The article argues for conceptualizing borders both as ‘penal transplants’ 
and as ‘performativity,’ while incorporating theoretical insights from border and 
security studies, anthropology and African studies. In doing so, it broadens the 
geographical scope and spatial awareness of border criminology and advances its 
theoretical and empirical understanding of the relationship between borders, crime 
control, and the state. 
Article 4 (Neo-Colonial Penality? Travelling Penal Power and Contingent 
Sovereignty) explores the relevance of neo-colonial theory for criminology, and its 
contribution to understanding why and how penal policy and models travel from the 
Global North to the Global South. An empirical example is employed to review 
arguments for and against ‘penal neo-colonialism’ and to tease out the theory’s 
strengths and limitations; namely the European Union’s ‘penal aid’ to shape West 
African countries’ penal policies and practices so as to stop illicit and irregular 
mobility to Europe. The article further discusses neo-colonial theory’s concepts of 
agency, power and sovereignty by comparing them to similar poststructuralist 
perspectives on the ‘contingent sovereignty’ of ‘governance states’. Moreover, by 
drawing on a theoretical discussion on statehood in African studies, it looks at how 
the sovereignty of African states has been conceptualized as hollowed out ‘from 
above’ as well as ‘from below’. In doing so, the article contributes to a recent 
criminological debate that has problematized the relationship between (travelling) 
penal power and state sovereignty. 
III 
DANSK RESUME 
Denne Ph-.d-afhandling undersøger, hvordan vestlig kriminalitetspolitik og modeller 
for kriminalitetskontrol bliver eksporteret til det globale syd, og hvilke 
magtimplikationer der er heri. Mere specifikt udforsker afhandlingen den 
kriminalitetskontrol, som en del af den Europæiske Unions (EU) udenrigspolitik, samt 
indre sikkerhedsanliggender i EU’s relationer med Sahel-regionen i Vest Afrika. 
Rejsende kriminalitetskontrol bliver studeret gennem forskellige etaper samt på 
forskellige analyseniveauer.  
Afhandlingen indeholder tre centrale empiriske bidrag. For det første udgør 
afhandlingen den første kortlægning af EU’s bistand til kriminalitetskontrol og indre 
sikkerhed på tværs af regioner og over en 15 årig periode. For det andet giver 
afhandlingen, baseret på feltarbejde og interviews i Senegal, Mali, Niger og Bruxelles, 
dybtgående empirisk viden om mikropolitikker og praksisser i EU’s eksport af 
kriminalitetskontrolmodeller til Vest Afrika. For det tredje dokumenterer 
afhandlingen empirisk mødet mellem europæiske kriminalitetskontrolmodeller og 
sociale virkeligheder i Sahel-regionen, herunder modstand mod eurocentriske former 
for kontrol. 
Teorimæssigt udgør afhandlingen et bidrag på tværs af forskningsfelterne kriminologi 
og internationale relationer: omfattende analyser af produktive såvel som strukturelle 
former for magt impliceret i EU's eksport af kriminalitetskontrol og grænsesikkerhed 
til Vest Afrika og det udvidede sydlige nabolag. Derved bidrager afhandlingen 
samtidig til udviklingen af ny teori inden transnational kriminologi om forholdet 
mellem kriminalitetskontrol/straffemagt og stat/suverænitet. 
Forskningsartikel 1 (The External Dimension of the EU’s Fight against Transnational 
Crime: Transferring Political Rationalities of Crime Control), skrevet med Dr. A. 
Russo, udgør den første omfattende gennemgang af EU's eksport af 
kriminalitetspolitiker og ’bistand til indre sikkerhed’ på tværs af regioner og over 15 
år. På baggrund af teori fra både internationale relationer og kriminologi udvikles en 
analytisk ramme til at identificere de politiske rationaler og teknologier af 
kriminalitetskontrol, som EU forsøger at overføre til de udvidede østlige og sydlige 
nabolag. I artiklen er undersøgt EU 216 projekter, som har til formål at bekæmpe 
grænseoverskridende kriminalitet udenfor Europas grænser, spændende over politi, 
grænsesikkerhed, strafferet og fængsel. På baggrund heraf er den empiriske analyse 
rettet mod at opdage og systematisere de måder at anskue og udøve 
kriminalitetskontrol, som EU søger at fremme og eksportere, såvel som at identificere 
'handlinger på afstand', hvorigennem det sker. Det argumenteres for, at EU ved at 
præge tredjelandes evne til at kriminalisere, tiltale, dømme og straffe samtidig 
definerer sig selv som sikkerhedsaktør i internationale relationer og derved 
konsoliderer sin rolle som 'global kriminalitetskæmper'. 
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Forskningsartikel 2 (The Rise of Crimefare Europe: Fighting Migrant Smuggling in 
West Africa) udforsker den øgende rolle, som kriminalisering og kriminalitetskontrol 
spiller i den Europæiske Unions (EU) udenrigspolitik. Beskyttelse af Europa mod 
farlig eller uønsket mobilitet er kommet til at dominere EU's relationer med Afrika. 
Derfor synes EU's liberale model for statsbygning (ved at fremme fred, demokrati og 
menneskerettigheder) i stigende grad at blive ledsaget eller endda nogle gange 
fortrængt af, illiberale praksisser (kriminalisering, politi, overvågning, 
grænsesikkerhed og militarisering). Baseret på feltarbejde i Niger, Mali og Senegal 
undersøger artiklen, hvordan de vestafrikanske landenes indre sikkerhedsapparater og 
-grænser i stigende grad bliver en vigtig målsektor for europæisk bistand. Dog afslører 
en gennemgang af politikimplementeringen, at nogle europæiske 
kriminalitetsdefinitioner og kontrolmodeller møder stærk modstand lokalt og bidrager 
til større usikkerhed ved at forstyrre den skrøbelige mikropolitiske stabilitet. Derfor 
problematiserer artiklen foreneligheden mellem europæisk og afrikansk sikkerhed og 
argumenterer for at kombinere kriminologi og internationale relationer for at 
analysere EU's fremspirende rolle som 'global kriminalitetskæmper'. 
Forskningsartikel 3 (Borders as Penal Transplants: Reshaping Territory, Mobility, and 
Illegality in West Africa) undersøger en stadig mere betydelig tendens inden for 
kriminalitets og -mobilitetskontrol, der endnu kun har fået begrænset kriminologisk 
opmærksomhed; nemlig eksternalisering af grænser og eksport af vestlig 
'straffebistand' til det globale syd. Artiklen bygger på feltarbejde, der undersøger 
vestlige donorers opbygning af landegrænsesikkerhed i Senegal, Mali og Niger, og 
observerer modstridende forestillinger om kriminalitet, mobilitet, territorium og 
suverænitet. Artiklen argumenterer for at konceptualisere grænser både som 'pønale 
transplantationer' og som 'performativitet', mens den samtidig trækker ind teoretiske 
indsigter fra grænse- og sikkerhedsstudier, antropologi og afrikastudier. Dermed 
udvider artiklen ’grænsekriminologiens’ geografiske anvendelsesområde og rumlige 
bevidsthed, samt fremmer teoretisk og empirisk forståelse af forholdet mellem 
grænser, kriminalitetskontrol og stat. 
Forskningsartikel 4 (Neo-Colonial Penality? Travelling Penal Power and Contingent 
Sovereignty) udforsker relevansen af neo-kolonial teori indenfor kriminologien. 
Herunder den neo-koloniale teoris bidrag til at forstå, hvorfor og hvordan 
kriminalitetspolitik og kontrolmodeller rejser fra det globale nord til det globale syd. 
Et empirisk eksempel anvendes til at gennemgå argumenter for og imod 'pønal neo-
kolonialisme', og for at få frem teoriens styrker og begrænsninger; nemlig EU's 
’straffebistand’ til at forme vestafrikanske landes kriminalitetspolitik og -praksisser 
for at stoppe ulovlig og uregelmæssig mobilitet til Europa. Artiklen diskuterer 
yderligere den neo-koloniale teoriens begreber om agentur, magt og statssuverænitet 
ved at sammenligne dem med lignende poststrukturalistiske perspektiver på 
'kontingent statssuverænitet' og 'regeringsstater'. Ved at trække på en teoretisk 
diskussion om statslighed i afrikastudier ser artiklen desuden på, hvordan afrikanske 
staters suverænitet er blevet konceptualiseret som udhulet 'ovenfra' såvel som 
V 
'nedenfra'. Dermed bidrager artiklen til en kriminologisk debat, der har 
problematiseret forholdet mellem (rejsende) straffemagt og statssuverænitet. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 ‘The Sahel constitutes Europe’s southernmost geopolitical border: any instability 
here will automatically contaminate the European neighbourhood’ (Simon et al. 2012: 
5). This quote from a European Parliament report is highly illustrative for how the 
Sahel region of West Africa has come to be understood as a direct security threat to 
Europe. Transnational organized crime, terrorism and migrant smuggling, allegedly 
thriving due to porous borders and the states’ lack of capacity to police, prosecute and 
punish, have become seen as key challenges not only to African communities but also 
to Europe. The perception of a sovereignty-deficit with regard to territorial control 
and the fight against transnational crime has attracted the engagement of a myriad of 
European and other international actors to teach Africans how to fight crime and to 
improve West African states’ security and crime control capacities. This incursion of 
external actors (among them former colonial powers) into the heart of internal security 
of West African countries in the name of crime control is, in turn, meant to buttress 
their sovereignty.  
This thesis is about criminalization and crime control in international relations (c.f. 
Andreas and Nadelmann 2006), particularly in EU-West Africa relations. More 
specifically, it deals with how matters of internal security have come to shape the 
foreign policies and external action of Western countries – especially those of the EU 
– vis-à-vis countries in the Global South – especially the Sahel region of West Africa. 
An important part of this broader policy development is the growing export and 
transfer or crime definitions, policies and control models from Europe to West Africa. 
Thus, the dissertation aims to bring ‘the political’ to the centre of analyses of crime 
control at various levels of investigation. It does so by giving attention both to broader 
trends of ‘crime control as EU external policy’, meso-level crime policy export, as 
well as to micro-political agency, negotiations and ‘localization’. Moreover, it takes 
into account the social realities of extra-legality and conflict in the Sahel as well as 
policy-formulation in Brussels. 
1.1. BACKGROUND 
The background for this dissertation was the observation that the fight against 
transnational crime is increasingly permeating EU external relations. However, due to 
the ‘division of labour’ between criminology as a discipline of the ‘inside’ and 
International Relations (IR) as a discipline of ‘the external’ (Loader and Percy 2012), 
it had not yet been studied or conceptualized as a matter of crime policy and crime 
control. This PhD research therefore embarked on a criminological exploration of EU 
external policy.  
‘Crime control as EU external policy’ is a longstanding trend in line with a broader 
shift in Western countries’ foreign policies towards combating ‘new’ or 
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‘unconventional’ security challenges after the Cold War (Andreas 1997; Duffield 
2007; Abrahamsen 2016). The Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) area of EU policy has 
not only been among the fastest-growing areas of European integration, but it has also 
come to play a crucial role in the EU Enlargements as well as in the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and beyond. Cooperation has progressively intensified 
between EU, its neighbours and its neighbours’ neighbours on police, judicial and 
criminal matters as well as on border security (Wolff et al. 2009; Trauner and 
Carrapico 2012). Simultaneously, the EU has emerged as a global actor on security 
sector reform (SSR), in which the central idea is that reforming the criminal justice 
and internal security sector is crucial for peacebuilding and post-conflict 
reconstruction (Ioanniedes and Collantes-Celador 2011). Yet a few years before the 
commencement of this PhD research, two events took place that would come to 
accelerate the role of criminalization and crime control in EU external relations, thus 
forming the backdrop for this dissertation.   
2015 was a turbulent year for EU Justice and Home Affairs, as Europe would 
experience both what some have referred to as a ‘migration crisis’, as well as a large-
scale terrorist attack in Paris. The EU would seek to mitigate what it viewed as 
‘externally originating internal security threats’ through deepening third country 
cooperation, and several steps were taken to intensify and mainstream internal 
security issues in EU external policy. Notably, at the Valletta Summit between 
European and African heads of states in November 2015, an Emergency Trust Fund 
for Africa (EUTF) was launched to finance projects to halt migration to Europe, as 
well as bolstering the internal security and border capacities of third countries. At the 
moment of writing EUTF comprises €4,7 billion,1 most of it pooled from other EU 
instruments such as the European Development Fund (EDF), but also from the 
Member States, Norway and Switzerland (see Akkerman 2018). Its objective is ‘to 
address the root causes of instability, forced displacement and irregular migration and 
to contribute to better migration management’2 and to ‘build a comprehensive 
approach to support all aspects of stability, security and resilience’.3 In doing so, 
EUTF directly supports the EU’s new direction in foreign policy which became 
enshrined in the 2016 Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security 
Policy, consolidating stabilization as a main aim of EU foreign policy, cementing 
migration and terrorism as security priorities, and shifting the EU’s self-proclaimed 
‘normative power’ role (c.f. Manners 2002) towards one of ‘principled pragmatism’ 
(EUGS 2016).  
In the EU’s focus on halting migration and combating security threats, the Sahel 
region has come to receive much attention. The EU’s 2015 Sahel Regional Action 
                                                          
1 https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/index_en (Accessed 26.6.2020).  
2 https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/index_en (Accessed 6.6.2020). 
3 https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/trust-funds_en (Accessed 6.6.2020) 
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Plan identified four areas of action to be prioritized and reinforced – three of which 
directly reflect the EU’s Justice and Home Affairs agenda: 1) Preventing and 
countering radicalisation, 2) creating appropriate conditions for youth, 3) migration 
and mobility, 4) border management, fight against illicit trafficking and transnational 
organised crime (Council 2015: 5). Under the Partnership Framework for Migration,4  
launched in 2016, five sub-Saharan states were selected as EU foreign policy priority 
countries – of which the three that receive the highest amounts of funding through 
EUTF are found in the Sahel region: Senegal,5 Mali and Niger. This thesis explores 
how the EU’s crime control policies and models have travelled to these three 
countries. 
 
Image 1. Political Map of West Africa borrowed from the Nations Online Project.6 
Senegal constitutes an early case of Europe’s external fight against transnational 
crime. In the mid-2000s, it was discovered that cocaine trafficking routes from Latin 
                                                          
4 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_16_2072 (Accessed 26.2.2020). 
5 Senegal is sometimes and sometimes not considered as part of the Sahel region. It is not one 
of the countries that the EU’s Sahel Strategy and Regional Action Plan, which now covers the 
G5 Sahel countries Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. 
6 https://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/west-africa-map.htm (Accessed 29.6.2020). 
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America destined for European markets had been displaced into West African coastal 
countries to omit increased control on other routes (UNODC 2013; Vigh 2012). About 
the same time, Europe would experience its first ‘wave’ of West African boat 
migration to the Canary Islands and across the land borders of the Spanish enclaves 
of Ceuta and Melilla. The EU launched various projects to counter both drug 
trafficking as well as migration and ‘migrant smuggling’ from Senegal through 
bolstering Senegal’s internal security and border capabilities. Spain negotiated 
agreements with Senegal and Mauritania on co-patrolling of the coast and the training 
of border guards on land borders, and the EU deployed Frontex operation Hera in 
Senegalese waters in 2006 to intercept the boat of migrants and their facilitators 
(Carrera 2007; Van Criekinge 2009; Carling and Hernández-Carretero 2011; 
Andersson 2014; Frowd 2018). This cooperation has since both deepened and 
expanded.  
Mali is seen as the epicentre of the West African ‘Jihadi threat’, experiencing a 
multidimensional crisis since 2012 when the entire north of the country was swept by 
a Touareg rebellion, a subsequent coup d’état, and the emergence of a complex 
landscape of Islamist insurgent groups. International actors descended on Mali in 
2013 in the form of the French military Operation Serval (which later morphed into 
Operation Barkhane and spread into the other G5 Sahel countries as well) and a 
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission (MINUSMA). The 
EU deployed two Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions to train the 
military and police, in 2013 and 2015 respectively, with mission mandates to counter 
transnational organized crime and terrorism. In 2015, The Malian government and the 
Touareg rebels signed a peace agreement, and there has been a gradual attempt at co-
opting the Touareg combatants into regular security forces. However, at the same time 
the main conflict theatre moved to the Liptako Gourma region, also dubbed the Three 
Border Region as it comprises Mali’s borderlands with Niger and Burkina Faso, where 
Islamist armed groups were appropriating local conflicts over land rights and ethnic 
cleavages – particularly between the Fulani, Dogon and Bambara (Sandor 2017). Mali 
has now become a ‘laboratory’ for the EU’s comprehensive approach to security 
(Cold-Ravnkilde and Nissen, forthcoming), and a myriad of international actors are 
present with different kinds of security-focused projects. Still, security in Mali 
continues to deteriorate.  
Niger came to the European spotlight with the so-called ‘migration crisis’ in 2015, 
when it became widely known that hundreds of thousands of migrants were passing 
through this large desert country on their way northwards to Libya and Algeria and 
allegedly to Europe (Brachet 2018). An EU police training mission was already in 
place since 2012 with the mandate to fight transnational organized crime and 
terrorism. However, when Niger became labelled a crucial ‘transit country’ for 
migrants (Frowd 2019), President Issoufou would rise to the task to become one of 
the EU’s key partners in ‘breaking the business model of migrant smugglers’ against 
a substantial increase in aid (Molenaar et al. 2017; Raineri 2018; Stambøl 2019). Since 
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then, the country has become a target for a range of EU projects aimed at fighting 
mobility-related crime and other transnational security threats. 
1.2. THE EMPIRICAL AND CONCEPTUAL RESEARCH GAP: 
TRAVERSING DISCIPLINARY BOUNDARIES 
The topics of ‘crime control as external policy’ and particularly Europe’s export of 
crime control models to Africa, has escaped academic scrutiny to a large extent 
because the edges of this research gap are drawn up along the lines of disciplinary 
boundaries.  
Criminology is still very much a discipline focusing on the inside of nation-states in 
the Global North (predominantly North America and Europe), something which is 
reflected in criminological theory and epistemology (Aas 2012a; Carrington et al. 
2016; Fonesca 2018). An emerging sub-field of ‘global’ or ‘transnational’ 
criminology has emerged over the past decades, looking into topics such as the 
globalization of crime and crime control (Aas 2007; Sheptycki and Wardak 2005) 
including European and international police cooperation (Bowling and Sheptycki 
2012). Yet, criminologists have not researched EU foreign policy and external action 
(except for scattered case studies of particular EU interventions, typically on police 
training and more recently on borders in the Western Balkans, see e.g. Milivojevic 
2019). In other words, the broader policy trend of crime control becoming an 
increasingly salient component of EU external policy and action across regions has 
been overlooked by criminologists – probably because criminologists do generally not 
see foreign policy as their domain of study (c.f. Loader and Percy 2012).  
International Relations (IR) scholars have long been attentive to the tendency of 
internal security matters increasingly driving EU external policy (e.g. Wolff et al 
2009; Wichmann 2007; Bigo 2000; Trauner and Carrapico 2012). However, they have 
not conceptualized it in terms of crime and crime control, something that has made 
them miss out on empirical and analytical dimensions that criminologists would pay 
awareness to. For instance, the sub-discipline of critical security studies (CSS) has 
many parallels to criminology, yet the two scholarly traditions rarely speak to one 
another despite attempts from both sides at making them do so (see Special issue in 
Global Crime 13(4) 2012; Special issue in British Journal of Criminology 56(6) 2016; 
Special issue in Global Crime 18(3) 2017; Ardau and van Munster 2009). Studying 
criminalization and crime control translates into a slightly different research agenda 
than exploring securitization and security policy, although the ‘objects’ of research 
may sometimes be the same. This is because these analytical vocabularies are indebted 
to distinct intellectual debates and theoretical traditions (although there is a lot of 
overlap with both strands drawing strongly on Foucauldian and/or Bourdieausian 
sociology). Furthermore, the research gap on crime control as EU foreign policy and 
external action is reinforced by sub-disciplinary divisions within the discipline of IR 
itself, which very much mirror the fragmentation of different areas of EU policy. 
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Research on the ‘external dimension’ of EU Justice and Home Affairs (hereinafter 
ED-JHA) – meaning the processes by which internal security actors and issues are 
attaining increasingly important roles in EU external relations – has developed within 
a niche of EU studies that predominantly grew out of Justice and Home Affairs 
research in EU public policy scholarship (e.g. Wolff et al. 2009, Wichmann 2007, 
Trauner 2011a; Carrera 2007; Monar 2010; Cremona 2011; Mitsilegas 2007, 2010). 
This niche, dominated by legal scholars and institutionalist theorists, has focused on 
regulative, institutional and technocratic processes in Brussels and has not given much 
attention to how policies have transformed EU action on the ground in third countries. 
An exception is the growing interdisciplinary field of European border and migration 
studies, which is to some extent connected to the ED-JHA niche (e.g. Bigo and Guild 
2005; Carrera et al. 2019; Casas et al. 2010; Casas-Cortes et al. 2016) but which has 
focused almost exclusively on migration and not on crime. Notably, the above-
mentioned strands have only incidentally spoken to EU foreign policy studies, which 
have tended to focus on traditional power politics and EU Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP). When the latter have given attention to ‘internal’ security 
issues, crime and policing, these have usually been seen within the prism of the 
mandates of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions on security 
sector reform (SSR) (e.g. Schröder and Friesendorf 2009; Merlingen 2011; Merlingen 
and Ostrauskaite 2005, 2007; Ioannides and Colantes-Celador 2011). Another, rather 
separate field of study is EU development policy, where researchers (predominantly 
from development studies and political/development economy) have noticed that the 
European Commission’s agenda and development aid in Africa has changed from a 
focus on development to a focus on security (e.g. Gibert 2009; Keukeleire and Raube 
2013; Langan 2015, 2018). This area of research is often more connected to African 
studies, which again is more related to Peace and Conflict studies and anthropology 
(see e.g. Bøås 2015; Brachet 2018; Raineri and Strazzari 2019; Vigh 2019). In short, 
exploring ‘crime control as EU external policy and action’ has meant navigating and 
traversing this terrain between (sub)disciplinary divisions. The ambition of this 
dissertation is thus to bridge all these gaps between disciplinary boundaries and to 
make criminology and IR (and their relevant sub-strands) talk to one another. 
1.3. THE AIMS OF THE THESIS  
Empirically, the aim has been to trace the entire ‘chain’ of European crime control 
exported: From EU external crime policy formulation in Brussels, the processes and 
modalities by which crime control policies and models are exported to third countries, 
as well as the meeting point between policy implementation and social realities on the 
ground in the Sahel region of West Africa. As such, it has set out to capture both the 
broad ‘macro’ policy trends and structures as well as the micro-practices of 
implementation of crime control in third countries and their consequences. 
In terms of theory, the aim has been to make contributions across criminology and IR, 
exploring the productive as well as structural forms of power in the EU’s export of 
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crime control to West Africa. In doing so, it simultaneously seeks to advance 
criminological theory on the relationship between crime control/penal power and 
state/sovereignty. 
1.4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The overarching research question posed in all four articles is:  
• How are Western7  crime control policies and models8 exported to the Global 
South, and what are the power implications herein?  
The dissertation investigates especially, but not exclusively, how crime control 
models are exported by the EU to the Sahel region in West Africa. 
Sub-questions, which are not necessarily posed in all four articles but in at least one 
of them, aim to explore various stages and levels of the north-south travel of crime 
control models:  
1. How does the EU problematize ‘transnational (organized) crime’ as an object 
of governance in its (extended) neighbourhood, and how is this object 
rendered governable through particular political technologies of crime 
control? (Article 1)  
 
2. How are European crime definitions, policies and models exported to West 
Africa, and how are they transformed (or not) when intertwined with the 
logics and rationalities of foreign and development policy?  (Articles 2 and 
3)  
 
3. How are Western crime control models implemented on the ground in the 
Sahel, what happens in their meeting with local social realities, and what are 
the consequences of transplanted European models? (Articles 2 and 3)  
 
4. Within what (historical) structural power relations are North-South exports 
of crime control models embedded, and how can neo-colonial theory shed 
                                                          
7 The term ‘Western’, which is used interchangeably here with the ‘Global North,’ refers to 
Europe and North America. While not correct in terms of geography, Australia may fit into 
these categories as well.    
8 ‘Crime control model’ is defined in this dissertation, following Cohen (1988: 176), as ’the 
symbolic, ideological or theoretical way in which the control system might make sense of what 
it has done, is doing or intends to do’. Article 1 explores whether such a thing as an ‘EU crime 
control model’ can be discerned from empirical exploration. 
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light on the ways in which penal power travels and its relationship to state 
sovereignty? (Article 4) 
1.5. CLARIFICATION OF THE SCOPE 
This thesis takes a middle ground between two positions. On the one hand, it does 
deal to some extent with policy-making at EU level and particularly broader policy 
trends, but it does not explore the negotiations between the Member States or study 
in-depth the policy-making dynamics and processes in Brussels, which is typically the 
focus of EU studies. On the other hand, although the thesis analyses how EU crime 
policies are implemented in West Africa and controversies that arise in the local 
context, it does not include in-depth ethnographic explorations of whether or the 
extent to which European thinking and doing crime control is ‘translocated’ into local 
culture. This middle ground is thus aimed at attaining a broad overview by exploring 
the entire crime control export process to several countries. 
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CHAPTER 2. STATE OF THE ART 
This chapter serves the dual purpose of providing a more in-depth description of the 
field of research than that which is provided in the articles, as well as giving an 
overview of the research gaps and biases in the literature. As such, it accounts for both 
the developments in EU policy and in West Africa, as well as reviewing the existing 
scholarly literature.   
2.1. TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINOLOGY AND TRAVELLING CRIME 
CONTROL 
How crime policy and control models travel between countries and geographical 
regions has been subject to some criminological attention (Wacquant 1999; Karstedt 
2002, 2007; Aas 2011a; Melossi et al. 2011; Jones and Newburn 2007; Newburn and 
Sparks 2011; Newburn et al. 2018; Walklate and Fitz-Gibbon 2018; Blaustein 2015). 
Still, most contributions have tended to look at the transfer of policy and models from 
the USA to the UK, and only a few contributions have dealt with other directions of 
travel – such as the EU’s eastward expansion (Karstedt 2007), the Western Balkans 
(Blaustein 2015; Milivojevic 2019), or Latin America (Sozzo 2011; Blaustein 2016). 
Notably, Melossi et al. (2011) called for going beyond the typical Anglo-American 
criminological focus to explore how the ‘travels of the criminal question’ often take 
place along the lines of linguistic and cultural affinity – for instance, between Italy, 
Spain and Latin America.  
Globalization and the increased interconnection between countries and people from 
different parts of the world have accelerated the moving of crime control ideas, 
policies and models from one place to another (Aas 2007, 2013; Sheptycki and 
Wardak 2005). Also ‘the international’ has been identified as a key site of cross-border 
diffusion of crime definitions, control models and policies (Jakobi 2013; Andreas and 
Nadelmann 2006). Already in 1988, Stanley Cohen observed that the travel of 
Western crime control models to the Third World was often facilitated by 
international agencies and organizations such as the United Nations, with an aim to 
advance underdeveloped criminal justice systems in developing countries into 
effective and rational ones. Indeed, the emergence of ‘global prohibition regimes’, 
and the international ‘procedural regimes’ that support them have harmonized penal 
codes of countries across the world and facilitated cross-border operational 
cooperation in criminal matters (Andreas and Nadelmann 2006; Jakobi 2013). 
Simultaneously, a growing number of international organizations and bodies have 
become engaged in crime control at an international level, such as the International 
Police Organization (INTERPOL) since 1923, the United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC) since 1997, and Europol since 1998, to mention some. 
Transnational police cooperation has become an increasingly popular topic for 
criminological inquiry (e.g. Bowling and Sheptycki 2012; Andreas and Nadelmann 
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2006; O´Reilly 2010; Ellison and O´Reilly 2008). These authors have noted that 
developing countries in the Global South have been constructed as the ‘weak link’ in 
global crime control: due to their underdeveloped legal frameworks and lack of 
investigation and prosecution capacity, they are seen to provide safe havens to which 
transnational criminals from across the globe can flee to escape prosecution (Andreas 
and Nadelmann 2006). As such, incremental efforts have been put in place by Western 
countries and international crime control structures and organs to provide ‘penal aid’ 
to developing countries with allegedly ‘flawed’ criminal justice systems and security 
apparatuses (Brisson-Boivin and O’Connor 2013). This type of aid ‘uses rule of law 
theories and practices to develop credible criminal justice institutions and reform 
penal practices throughout the world,’ by providing penal and procedural norms, 
indicators and standards for accountability, understood to be essential for advancing 
transnational security (Brisson-Boivin and O’Connor, 2013: 516 and 521).  
The criminological literature that has explored the Northern export of crime control 
models to the Global South (or East) have almost exclusively focused on policing 
models and/or police reform, mostly in the context of post-conflict reconstruction 
(Ellison and Pino, 2012; Bowling and Sheptycki 2012; Blaustein, 2015; Goldsmith 
and Scheptycki, 2007; Pino and Wiatrowski, 2006; Brogden and Nijhar, 2005). These 
scholars have observed that security sector reform (SSR), police reform and the flow 
of crime control models and police expertise from the Global North to developing, 
post-authoritarian and transitional states has become a global industry comprising 
enormous sums of money, although evidence of efficacy is scarce (Ellison and Pino 
2012: 2, 70). In the ‘global marketplace’ of crime control models and policing 
expertise (Ellison 2007) the division between state and corporate interests is often 
blurred (O´Reilly 2010). Many Western police officers have created careers for 
themselves as transnational ‘policy entrepreneurs’ selling counter-terrorism and 
democratic policing experience as ‘best practices’ (Ellison and O´Reilly 2008). The 
policing models exported tend to be ‘one size fits all’ templates that often do not fit 
to the local context in which they are to be implemented, and are moreover often 
distorted in the implementation phase (Ellison and Pino 2012; Blaustein 2015). In fact, 
there is substantial controversy about the actual meaning of terms such as ‘community 
policing’ or ‘democratic policing’ (the types of policing frequently exported) (Ellison 
and Pino 2012; Blaustein 2015). It is generally disputed that Western crime control 
knowledge and models can simply be transplanted into different contexts, as is the 
instance of exporting democratic policing to non-democratic states (Ellison and Pino 
2012; Ellison and O´Reilly 2008; Blaustein 2015). Moreover, it is argued that the 
asymmetrical structures that characterize liberal interventions including externally-
driven, and often top-down, police reform in practice negate the possibility of 
establishing democratically responsive and locally accountable policing (Blaustein 
2015: 35). Still, none of these contributions has focused on the EU as an actor in police 
reform in the Global South – not even Blaustein 2015, despite writing about Western 
Balkans which was the birthplace of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP) police training and SSR missions (but see Milivojevic 2019 on EU border 
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security building in the Balkans). In general, the European Union and its crime control 
organs such as Europol, Eurojust and Frontex have only received attention from 
criminologists concerning their role in controlling crime within Europe and on the 
external borders (e.g. Aas 2011b; Aas and Gundhus 2015), while the EU’s emerging 
role as a ‘global crime fighter’ (meaning its activities to fight crime beyond Europe) 
has been ignored. Apart from the literatures on police cooperation and reform, 
international criminal justice or transitional justice, criminologists have rarely dealt 
with issues of foreign and external policy.  
In fact, the Global South generally and on Africa particularly have been meagerly 
represented in criminological literature, remaining outside the mainstream of the 
discipline. This omission of large swaths of the world has to some extent been 
remedied by a rather recent criminological interest in postcolonial theory and 
epistemologies from the South (Carrington et al. 2016; 2018; Fonesca 2018; Brown 
2016; Agozino 2004; Saleh-Hanna 2008). These contributions have criticized the 
discipline for reproducing northern hegemonic power structures, where most of the 
knowledge produced – and especially that which makes it to be published in top-level 
journals – come from the Global North (Aas 2012a). Calls have thus been made for 
de-centring and decolonizing criminology, manifested among other through the 
emergence of a ‘Southern Criminology’ (Carrington et al. 2016, 2018) and a brand 
new journal – Decolonization of Criminology and Justice in 2019. Yet, this new 
‘criminology of the Global South’ has till date had very few contributions on Africa 
(but see Agozino 2019, 2003, 2005; Saleh-Hanna 2008). While there exists an 
‘Africana criminology’, and an African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies, 
both with Biko Agozino as a driving force, these have remained on the fringes of the 
discipline. Still, specifically relevant with regard to this dissertation, the ‘Africana 
criminology’ has been very little concerned with the (new) interventions of Western 
countries, and there has been no contribution yet dealing with Africa-EU relations. 
Moreover, this strand of criminology seems more concerned with postcolonial critique 
and has not taken into account the scholarly debates in the Africanist literature on 
political organization and statehood that this dissertation draws on.   
To sum up, while a ‘transnational’ or ‘global’ criminology has emerged over the past 
decades, giving attention to issues of international crime control, transnational police 
cooperation and Western police reform in post-conflict societies, few contributions 
have touched upon the EU’s role as an actor in global crime control and its export of 
crime control as part of external policy. Moreover, while criminology has recently 
become interested in postcolonial theory and epistemologies from the Global South, 
and while a strand of ‘Africana criminology’ has also emerged, no criminologists have 
yet approached the issue of Africa-EU relations. To shed light on these topics, the 
literature review therefore turns to International Relations (IR) and EU studies in 
particular. 
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2.2. THE EXTERNAL DIMENSION OF EU JUSTICE AND HOME 
AFFAIRS (ED-JHA) 
In Europe, the policy area of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) – also referred to as the 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) – has been among the fastest-growing 
areas EU law and policy (Mitsilegas 2007, 2010; Wolff et al. 2009). Scholarship on 
JHA has been broad and interdisciplinary (including criminology, law, political 
science and IR). Criminologists have for instance given attention to the expanding 
number of databases and surveillance systems enacted at EU level – such as the 
Schengen Information System (SIS) and Eurodac (Aas 2011b), police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters, Europol and the European Arrest Warrant (Ugelvik 
2018), as well as the rise of Frontex as an agent of ‘humanitarian policing’ of the EU 
external borders (Aas and Gundhus 2015). They have also observed that there is a 
tendency in Europe (and at EU level) to treat (irregular) migration and mobility as 
crime: the blurring of immigration law and criminal law and the closing up of migrants 
in administrative forms of closed detention has been termed ‘crimmigration’ and 
‘crimes of mobility’ (Aas and Bosworth 2012; Aliverti 2013; Franko 2020). Scholars 
from critical security studies (CSS) have referred to the administrative/juridical co-
location of responses to very different ‘security threats’ such as terrorism, organized 
crime and irregular migration as a ‘security continuum’ (Bigo 2000). Indeed, the Area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice has come to prioritise security, thus in reality 
undermining freedom and justice (Balzacq and Carrera 2006). However, scholarly 
work on the ‘external dimension’ of JHA (hereinafter ED-JHA) has developed almost 
exclusively within a delimited niche of EU studies.  
Although drug trafficking and organized crime had been issues of EU external 
relations already since the late 1980s, the official beginning of ED-JHA is considered 
to be the 1999 Tampere European Council (Wolff et al. 2009, Balzacq 2009; Trauner 
and Carrapico 2012). Coinciding with a broader Western trend to make 
‘unconventional security issues’, such as transnational crime, ‘illegal’ migration and 
terrorism, matters of foreign policy after the Cold War (see e.g. Andreas 1997; 
Abrahamsen 2016), the EU progressively incorporated the fight against crime-related 
security threats into its external policy. The 2003 EU External Security Strategy 
crystalized the EU´s ambitions to become a global actor in the ‘new’ landscape of 
cross-border security, and two years later both the Commission (2005) and the 
Council (2005) followed up with Strategies for the JHA external dimension. Since 
then, the ED-JHA has been a recurrent theme in EU strategic and programmatic 
documents, such as the 2004 Hague and the 2009 Stockholm Programmes. The 
external dimension of the EU’s fight against organized crime came to be further 
institutionalized in the EU Policy Cycle on Serious and Organized Crime, adopted in 
2010, that tasked Europol with gathering and analyzing both internal and external 
crime threats in so-called ‘serious and organized crime threat assessments’ (SOCTAs) 
so that this knowledge and intelligence could form the basis for EU policy-making 
and action internally as well as externally (see e.g. Scherrer et al. 2011; Alegre et al. 
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2009). Also, the EU’s 2010 Internal Security Strategy contained an ‘external 
dimension’, and the EU’s Global Strategy (2016), which shifted the EU’s foreign 
policy focus towards stabilization, made migration and terrorism EU foreign policy 
priorities. Together with the CSDP  Compact  (Council 2018), these strategies 
reinforced the  ‘internal-external security nexus’  and called for enhancing cooperation 
between actors, alignment of processes and convergence of tools of Area of Freedom,  
Security and  Justice  (AFSJ) and Common  Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). 
The body of scholarly literature on ED-JHA has been organized along three 
dimensions: the vertical dimension (inter-institutional dynamics, decision-making), 
the sectoral dimension (policy areas), and the horizontal dimension (geographical 
foci, cooperation with third countries and regions) (Trauner and Carrapico 2012). The 
vertical dimension contains the most voluminous fraction of the ED-JHA literature, 
where predominantly legal and institutionalist EU public policy scholars have driven 
excavation into the legal, policy-making, institutional and bureaucratic processes of 
the ED-JHA expansion (e.g. Mitsilegas 2007, 2010; Cremona 2011; Monar 2012; 
Wichmann 2007; Carrera 2007; Wolff et al. 2009; Trauner 2011a). A main focus of 
this inquiry has been the notoriously complex legal basis of ED-JHA, as well as 
problems stemming from institutional silos – principally between the European 
Commission and the Council.9 Research questions have ranged from ontological 
debates on what the ED-JHA is – a policy universe, field, space or governance 
network (e.g. Smith 2009; Balzacq 2009); what legal, institutional and political 
conditions that have prompted its development (e.g. Wolff et al. 2009); its relations 
to and intertwining with EU Foreign Policy (CSFP and CSDP) (e.g. Argomaniz 2012; 
Mounier 2009); to what kinds of (security) governance and political leverage that the 
                                                          
9 Before the entry into force in 2009 of the Lisbon Treaty, the ED-JHA legal basis (Amsterdam 
Treaty) was fragmented across the three EU Pillars (particularly the second - Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) - and the third - Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal 
Matters (PJCCM) but also having links to the first Community Pillar) and scholars would refer 
to ED-JHA as an instance of ‘cross-pillarization’ (e.g. Wolff et al. 2009). Doing substantial 
alterations to the ED-JHA, however, the Lisbon Treaty abolished the pillar structure, 
communatarized the third pillar of JHA (but not the former second pillar of CFSP), provided 
the EU with a single legal personality (Article 47 TEU) and a single treaty-making procedure 
(Article 218 TEU). Other key changes included giving the European Parliament (EP) a role as 
co-legislator, changing the legislative procedure from unanimity to majority voting, and 
creating the EU External Action Service (EEAS) (c.f. Monar 2012; Cremona 2011). Still, the 
EU´s external activities in the field of internal security have not been attributed any legal basis 
in the Treaties: ‘actorness’ is conferred upon the EU by its Member States, and competences 
are implied based on internal objectives where external action is needed to achieve them 
(Article 216(1) TFEU). Among other due to this lack of a formal legal basis and problems of 
internal coordination, critics have attacked the ED-JHA for having developed in a haphazard 
way and resulting in lack of coherence and consistency with other EU policies and principles 
(e.g. Alegre et al. 2009; Carrapico 2013). 
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EU is exerting upon its surroundings (e.g. Lavenex and Wichmann 2009; Lavenex 
and Schimmelfennig 2012). The expansion of ED-JHA is attributed both to deliberate 
decisions as well as to unintended ‘spillover effects’ from other policy areas (Trauner 
and Carrapico 2012: 3; Pawlak 2012). While JHA pre-Lisbon was intergovernmental, 
and responsibility for ‘cross-pillar coordination’ and coherence was held by the 
Committee of Permanent Representatives, the gradual introduction of the Community 
method in the area of JHA increased the roles of supranational actors such as the 
European Commission and European Parliament (Trauner and Carrapico 2012). It 
also led to a multiplication of EU agencies and bodies dealing with JHA issues – 
termed by Trauner and Carrapico as an instance of ‘agentification’ of policy’ (2012: 
9). Also, the range of EU policy tools and instruments to deal with JHA matters in 
external relations (c.f. Balzacq 2008) has grown, including instruments of border 
management (Pawlak and Kurowska 2012; Léonard 2015; Carrera and Hernanz 2015) 
or surveillance technology and large-scale IT systems like criminal intelligence 
databases and passenger name records (Bellanova and Duez 2012, Pawlak 2012). The 
Ministers of Interior and Justice, as well as police and intelligence services, of the 
Member States, attained growing roles in the making and shaping of ED-JHA policy 
area. This happened to the extent that the European Parliament on several occasions 
voiced concerns that police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters with third 
countries was implemented at the expense of human rights and civil liberties, and that 
it lacked judicial scrutiny (Trauner and Carrapico 2012: 8). While the Lisbon Treaty 
enhanced parliamentary oversight over this notoriously secretive and little transparent 
area of policy-making, there are still accentuated critiques of the lack of democratic 
oversight and accountability (Alegre et al. 2009; Carrera et al. 2019). The emergence 
of the EU External Action Service (EEAS) was seen as a potentially important step 
towards the ‘routinization’ and ‘structuration’ of EU cooperation with third countries, 
including the EU’s capacity to act as a coherent actor in external relations (Trauner 
and Carrapico 2012: 10). Indeed, important issues in the ED-JHA literature have been 
the extent to which the ED-JHA is coherent and consistent with other EU policies – 
whether it be internal policies, other policy areas, or the core principles and values 
underpinning the Union. A related key issue has been the tension between security on 
the one hand and fundamental freedoms and human rights on the other (see e.g. 
Balzacq and Carrera 2006). 
In terms of the sectoral dimension, or policy areas, the literature has been dominated 
by the issue of (irregular) migration (see next section 2.3 on border externalization). 
Studies on counter-terrorism cooperation (especially with the Southern 
Neighbourhood) have been fewer but increased in recent years (see e.g. Argomaniz 
2012; Martins and Ferreira Perreira 2012; Durac 2018; Joffé 2008). Research on 
transnational (organized) crime is, however, remarkably scarce (except for Carrapico 
2013, Strazzari and Cotticchia 2012, Renard 2014, Longo 2003), something that this 
dissertation aims to remedy.  
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In terms of the horizontal dimension, or geographical foci, the regions closest to the 
EU have received the most attention, with scholarly interest decreasing in tandem with 
geographical distance. The external dimension of JHA first emerged in the context of 
the EU Enlargements of 200410 and 2007,11 as the post-communist candidate countries 
were seen as criminogenic sources of insecurity needing to deal with their crime 
problems before being allowed into the European common market (Mitsilegas 2007). 
As such, they had to implement the EU JHA acquis in its entirety and to remodel their 
institutions and mentality/culture in the criminal law sphere. EU criminal law and 
institutional structures were, however, constantly evolving and growing, leaving 
candidate countries with the difficult task of implementing a ‘moving target’ 
(Mitsilegas 2007: 461). Still, the membership prospective was a strong incentive for 
the adoption of EU criminal law and JHA policies: EU crime policy export was 
predominantly a coercive top-down process (Karstedt 2002; Grabbe 2003). For 
instance, in 2008 the EU blocked Bulgaria’s access to funds in order to sanction the 
country for its failure to contain organized crime (Anastasijevic 2010). However, seen 
as an overall success story of effective policy transfer (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 
2012), the EU went on to use the Enlargement template of external influence in the 
Western Balkans. 
The Western Balkans were seen by the EU as a major gateway of drugs (mainly heroin 
coming from Afghanistan through Turkey) and illegal immigrants into Europe, also 
connected to problems of porous borders, corruption, money laundering and terrorism 
(Trauner 2009). At a ministerial conference in London in 2002 organized crime in 
Southeastern Europe was framed as an ‘enemy’ and a ‘mega threat’ to the region as 
well as to the EU (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2005: 310). However, scholars note 
that the reiteration of organized crime as a key threat was hardly substantiated by any 
empirical data (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2005), and the data that did exist reflected 
perceptions and political interest rather than systematic empirical research (Schröder 
and Friesendorf 2009: 145). It was also in the context of the Western Balkans that 
organized crime was for the first time conceptualized by the EU in connection to 
conflict and post-conflict reconstruction in fragile and failed states, as both a spoiler 
of and objective for peace-building and state-building interventions (Strazzari and 
Coticchia 2012). The EU sought to counter ‘security threats’ in the Western Balkans 
mainly two ways: through integration on JHA law and policies (as with Enlargement), 
and through European Foreign and Security Policy (ESDP, now called CSDP) 
missions (on the latter, see section 2.4 in this chapter). Integration on JHA was an 
important component within the framework of the Stabilisation and Association 
Process (SAP) with (real or potential) candidate countries in the Western Balkans, 
having four JHA priorities for the region: 1) police, public order and organized crime, 
                                                          
10 Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, 
and Slovenia. 
11 Bulgaria and Romania. 
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2) integrated border management, 3) judicial reform; and 4) asylum and migration 
(Trauner 2007: 4). Most Western Balkan states were on the EU’s negative visa list, 
and the EU used cooperation on security issues, in particular on organized crime and 
illegal immigration (especially on readmission), as a main pre-condition for 
liberalization and facilitation of visa requirements (Trauner 2007). It is important to 
note that it was in the Western Balkans that the EU first moulded a role for itself as a 
foreign policy actor and a ‘global security provider’ (Ferreira Nunes 2010), including 
the development of foreign policy tools and instruments such as ESDP missions, and 
its experience here came to shape its policies towards other regions.  
In its Southern Neighbourhood, the EU has, since the Barcelona Process/Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) was initiated in 1995, set out to build an area of 
peace and stability around it. This meant progressively incorporating JHA objectives 
into external relations. The Common Strategy for the Mediterranean from 2000 
included a whole chapter on JHA, mentioning cooperation against crimes such as 
illegal immigration networks, trafficking in human beings, organized crime, drug 
trafficking and money laundering (Wolff 2012: 77). Yet 9/11 and several following 
terrorist attacks on European soil perpetrated by persons with links to the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA) accelerated the securitization of the EU’s relations with 
the region, and EU policy and discourse started linking terrorism to migration without 
basing this on empirical evidence (Joffé 2008). JHA cooperation with the Southern 
Neighbours took place on the level of subcommittees on ‘Justice and Security’ and 
‘Migration and Social Affairs,’ and negotiations and implementation happened 
through judicial and police expert networks rather than high-level officials – a 
depoliticization of JHA cooperation that continued under the subsequent framework 
of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) (Wolff 2012: 81). Since its inception 
in 2003, the Southern dimension of ENP had a two-pronged track: promoting 
democracy and human rights on the one hand, and fostering stability and security on 
the other (Wichmann 2007) – however, in practice favouring the latter (Durac 2018; 
Roccu and Voltolini 2018; Del Sarto and Steindler 2015; Joffé 2008; Wolff 2012). 
Negotiations on JHA matters within ENP have primarily taken place bilaterally 
around Association Agreements (AAs) and action plans containing detailed chapters 
on JHA followed by benchmarking. While Association Councils monitored the 
implementation of the action plans, the thematic subcommittees on Justice and 
Security were charged with implementing the JHA chapters of the AAs (Wolff 2012: 
84). As JHA cooperation with the southern neighbours has been a highly sensitive 
issue, relations also intensified bilaterally through EU Member States’ police and 
security services (Joffé 2008). Indeed, the EU’s cooperation with its southern 
neighbours, deemed in the 2007-2013 regional programming as a ‘common Euro-
Mediterranean area of justice, security and migration’, aimed at fostering a common 
understanding of security threats (Wolff 2012; Wichmann 2007). In the wake of the 
Arab Spring, the EU came up with a ‘more for more’ doctrine (more aid and assistance 
in return for more cooperation) to reward faster and deeper democratization processes. 
However, this mechanism was quickly hijacked to reward cooperation on security 
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concerns instead (Wolff and Pawlak 2018). Counter-terrorism/security experts were 
later deployed to EU Delegations in Algeria, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and 
Lebanon (European Commission 2017a: 21). It should be noted, however, that in 
terms of security cooperation with the southern neighbours, the EU was in fact 
knocking on an open door. Calling it ‘externalization in reverse,’ some argue that it 
was rather the southern neighbours who convinced the EU to abandon its normative 
aspirations in favour of a focus on security and the status quo (Durac 2018; Joffé 2008; 
see also Cassarino 2018). The EU’s pursuit of stability and geo-strategic interests, 
through strengthening the internal security apparatuses of authoritarian regimes to 
stop the potential spillover of ‘security threats’ into Europe, directly counteracted 
norms of democracy and human rights (Durac 2018; Roccu and Voltolini 2018; Del 
Sarto and Steindler 2015; Joffé 2008; Roy 2012; Wolff 2012). 
The EU’s cooperation on internal security issues with regions further away, such as 
West Africa, is of a more recent date. Indeed, EU cooperation with Sub-Saharan 
Africa had traditionally focused on development and trade. Security cooperation with 
these countries, which is less structured and institutionalized than with the immediate 
neighbours, has particularly intensified due to the EU’s growing concern with two 
issues: migration and terrorism. The literature on EU action against these issues will 
here be broadly subdivided into studies on EU border externalization, which 
predominantly focuses on migration management, or EU Foreign Policy, which 
focuses on the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and SSR more 
generally (each presented in the subsequent sections 2.3. and 2.4.). As we shall see, 
although these literatures deal with issues of crime and crime control, they have rarely 
been studied or conceptualized as such. 
2.3. EU BORDER EXTERNALIZATION, MIGRATION MANAGEMENT, 
AND THE SECURITIZATION OF DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN AFRICA 
The literature on EU border externalization has dealt with the multiple ways of 
outsourcing border control and migration management to Europe’s neighbours and 
neighbours’ neighbours. This outward projection of control has entailed the 
emergence of a ‘series of new border practices, border actors and institutional 
arrangements in these neighbouring countries: from detention centres; to funds for 
police training; to establishing programs of circular temporary labour migration’ 
(Casas et al. 2010: 77). Border externalization has been referred to as ‘policing at a 
distance’ and forms of ‘remote control’ (Bigo and Guild 2005):  
The key to the system of EU border control is not in the systematic 
checking of documents at borders, but in the methods of profiling and of 
identifying threats coming from foreign countries. The first step to 
identifying these threats and risks is profiling according to nationality with 
the imposition of obligatory visas on nationals of high risk countries. The 
second step is to identify individuals who do not constitute a threat among 
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individuals of a high risk nationality and to make sure that only these 
people will get visas. This is the task of national Ministries for Foreign 
Affairs and diplomatic and consular authorities on the spot (Bigo and Guild 
2005: 246). 
Border externalization practices often form part of larger EU policy frameworks, such 
as the above-mentioned European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and, since 2005, the 
Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM). The latter is a ‘complex and 
diversified matrix of policy, legal and financial instruments,’ including measures such 
as ‘readmission agreements, visa facilitation agreements, mobility partnerships and 
common agendas on migration and mobility, high-level dialogues, consultative 
processes, joint declarations and several financial frameworks’ (Carrera et al. 2019: 
8). Many of the new instruments invented and enacted, such as the EU-Turkey 
Statement and EU readmission agreements, are very different from ordinary 
international agreements, escape EU rule of law checks and balances (among them 
control by the European Parliament) and are at odds with EU general principles 
(Carrera et al. 2019: 11). Accountability is blurred as the agreement is implemented 
by the third country, making it unclear who is responsible for potential fundamental 
rights violations on the ground (Carrera et al. 2019: 12). In general, a trend towards 
informalization is observed with regard to such EU agreements and arrangements with 
third countries (Carrera et al. 2019). Casas et al. note that these multiple mechanisms 
of external migration control have ‘stretched the borderline’ away from the physical 
border: instead of patrolling the actual borderline, the monitoring and management of 
the ‘migration route’ are done through collaborating with third countries along the 
way, something which provides a ‘radica[lly] new spatialization of border control’ 
(2010: 80). 
There is an extensive literature on the various agreements and arrangements that the 
EU has made with African countries in terms of border externalization and migration 
control. This literature often focuses more on the discussions between EU member 
states, the decision-making processes within the EU, the EU’s formal policy 
frameworks, and the legal basis of the agreements than on the African country 
(Strange and Martins 2019). Yet contributions that focus on African countries’ 
agency, have given attention to power asymmetries, forms of conditionality and 
possibilities for resistance within the negotiations of such agreements (Van Criekinge 
2009; Chou and Gibert 2012; El Qadim 2014; Cassarino 2018; Adam and Trauner 
2019; Stock et al. 2019; Mouthaan 2019; Adepoju et al 2009). The EU holds out 
various promises of greater regional integration, development aid, trade facilitation, 
foreign investment, legal migration schemes and other advantages in exchange for 
cooperation on migration issues (Gaibazzi et al. 2017: 7). ‘Mobility Partnerships’ have 
been signed with some African countries, and there are specialized inter-state 
dialogues such as the Rabat Process focusing on Central and West Africa and the 
Khartoum Process focusing on East Africa (Adam and Trauner 2019). This has led 
scholars to discuss what room for agency and resistance that African countries have 
vis-à-vis the EU (Adam and Trauner 2019): some noting that policy is imposed on 
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them in an asymmetrical top-down relationship (Adepoju et al 2009) yet others 
arguing that migration has increased the bargaining power of countries labelled as 
‘origin’ or ‘transit’ countries vis-à-vis the EU (Van Criekinge 2009) – even calling it 
‘reversed conditionality’ (Cassarino 2018). Notably, African countries have 
cooperated on many aspects of EU migration policies but have often resisted 
cooperation on the issue of forced readmissions of their (and other countries’) 
nationals as this would make the government unpopular at home (Adam and Trauner 
2019). Some scholars have also seen such agreements and arrangements in a 
(post)colonial perspective (see e.g. Gaibazzi et al. 2017; El Qadim 2014; Brambilla 
2014; Pradella and Rad 2017; Langan 2018). 
Particularly relevant to this dissertation are the contributions that deal not only with 
migration control but that explicitly interrogate the illegalization and securitization of 
migration and mobility in Africa-EU relations. Several authors have focused on the 
various forms of EU security arrangements and practices, such as, for instance, 
Frontex deployments off the coast of Senegal (Carrera 2007; Carling and Hernández-
Carretero 2011; Andersson 2014), Libya (Brambilla 2014) or North and West Africa 
more broadly (Casas-Cortes et al. 2016). It has been observed that humanitarian 
reason is used to frame and market EU sea operations as the saving of migrants’ lives, 
yet in reality, these search and rescue operations, as well as broader policy frameworks 
such as the Rabat and Khartoum Processes, are ‘preemptive measures to deter or 
prevent their citizens from travelling (illegally) to Europe, and/or other nationals from 
doing so by transiting through their countries’ (Gaibazzi et al. 2017: 8). Ruben 
Andersson (2014) explored this multiplication of actors and practices of EU-induced 
migration securitization in Africa ethnographically, including Spanish internal 
security actors, Frontex, defence contractors, aid workers and even the activists and 
academics protesting against them, calling it an ‘illegality industry’ whose business it 
is to border Europe. Philippe Frowd took a slightly different approach in his excellent 
book Security at the Borders: Transnational Practices and Technologies in West 
Africa (2018), by exploring the ‘assemblages’ of border security-building and 
borderwork in Senegal and Mauritania that include not only humans but also socio-
technological actants such as ‘boats, satellites, concepts, tokens, idioms, and more in 
everyday border control practices such as knowledge transmission’ (2018: 95).  Still, 
while almost all these contributions focus on migration management or securitization 
and security, few have explored the EU’s transfer of formal penal legislation to sub-
Saharan countries, such as Julien Brachet (2018) who has detailed how Niger adopted 
a penal code criminalizing migrant smuggling due to EU pressure. 
Rising objectives of migration and border control have also led to a gradual 
securitization of EU development policy in Africa (Gibert 2009; Keukeleire and 
Raube 2013). The linking of migration and development aid started already in 2003 
when a migration paragraph including an obligation of readmission was included in 
the European Commission’s Cotonou Agreement with the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) countries (Adepoju et al. 2009: 61). In fact, in the negotiations the ACP 
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countries fought fiercely against the inclusion of a component within the Cotonou 
Agreement that obliged them to take back their nationals, but the EU ‘applied pure 
power politics’ to push it through (Adepoju et al. 2009: 65). Further accelerating the 
trend towards securitization of development policy was the 2015 Valletta Summit and 
launch of the EU Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), which has re-directed development 
funds towards the purposes of security and migration control (Akkerman 2018; 
CONCORD 2018): resulting in a ‘security-migration-development nexus’ in the Sahel 
region (Venturi 2017; Raineri and Rossi 2017). For instance, development aid is no 
longer distributed based on traditional needs assessments but rather on the 
identification of places seen as origin, transit and destination of irregular migrants 
(CONCORD 2018: 10).  
 
Image 2. Pirogues (wooden fishing vessels) in Senegal, similar to those that have been used to 
transport migrants to the Canary Islands (see e.g. Carling and Hernández-Carretero 2012). 
The criminalization and securitization of migration also have a range of different 
consequences for the migrants themselves, African communities and societies – as 
well as for crime and crime control in Africa. Several studies have focused on the 
lived experiences of migrants in the meeting with the new topology of EurAfrican 
borders, their strategies of circumvention, and practices of resistance ‘from below’ 
(e.g. Andersson 2014; Carling and Hernández-Carretero 2011; Richter 2019). One 
strategy of circumventing the mushrooming of borders and obstacles along the 
migratory routes is the increasing reliance on facilitators, which has also been 
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progressively criminalized in Africa due to EU pressure. Yet researchers have not 
tended to focus on the processes of criminalization and control but rather on the 
practices and routes of ‘smugglers’. For instance, Carling and Hernandez-Carretero 
(2011) argue that the rise in migration from Senegal to the Canary Islands in the mid-
2000s was in part a direct consequence of European trawlers having emptied 
Senegalese coastal waters of fish, something that deprived the many fishing 
communities of their livelihoods. In order to find an alternative source of income, 
fishermen would either migrate themselves or use their fishing vessels and navigation 
skills as facilitators. 
In the Sahel region, much focus has been on the facilitation of migration through 
Niger, which was criminalized in 2015 and effectively enforced after pressure from 
the EU (see Article 2 of this thesis). Researchers, as well as journalists, have 
documented the negative consequences of Nigerien crackdown on migrant smuggling. 
First, travel became much more dangerous for the migrants themselves, as smugglers 
would travel unknown routes to circumvent security controls – sometimes abandoning 
migrants in the desert to die out of fear of getting caught (Molenaar et al. 2017). 
Moreover, idle young men with guns, among them ex-combatants, have now 
reportedly taken to armed banditry to meet their immediate economic needs 
(Molenaar et al. 2017: 29). Various layers of ethnic tensions have also been 
aggravated. Some have even claimed that the frustrating situation has the potential to 
escalate into a new Touareg rebellion (Brachet 2018), or to provide a recruitment base 
for Islamist insurgent groups which are present in the region (Molenaar et al. 2017; 
Raineri 2018). Still, the consequences of the EU’s border externalization policies are 
probably most grave in Libya, where the ‘internal security actors’ that have received 
money from the EU and European countries to stop migrants have been linked to the 
running of detention centres for migrants famous for their human rights violations 
such as imprisonment, rape, mistreatment, torture and murder (see e.g. Brambilla 
2014; Pradella and Rad 2017; Tinti and Reitano 2016).  Still, it should be noted that 
none of these studies has focused on how the EU’s assistance has transformed the 
crime control of West African countries (but see Frowd 2018 and Andresson 2014 for 
relevant accounts) – something this dissertation seeks to remedy. 
To sum up, the extensive and rapidly burgeoning literature on EU border 
externalization to Africa has shed important light on EU security policy and practices, 
the processes of illegalizing mobility through Africa and the negative consequences 
that this has had for migrants as well as for local communities in Africa. However, 
with one exception (Brachet 2018) this literature has not focused on the processes of 
transfer of penal legislation to criminalize migration. Moreover, this literature has had 
a focus either on migration management or on security policy and practices, not on 
what border externalization means in terms of criminalization and crime control. In 
fact, the studies of EU border externalization, and border studies at large, are 
characterized by what I would call a ‘migration bias’: the border is almost exclusively 
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understood and conceptualized with regard to migration.12 Surprisingly, this is also 
the case for the emerging field of ‘border criminology’, which has explored ‘the 
growing convergence between criminal justice and immigration control’13 (Bosworth, 
2017a: 373). While recognizing that migration management is an important objective 
for European border externalization, it is not the only one. This dissertation goes 
beyond the ‘migration bias’ by taking a view that is primarily grounded in a 
criminological focus on what bordering means in terms of (also non-migration related) 
crime and crime control – i.e., border externalization as a ‘technology of crime 
control’. Indeed, the official objectives of border management are much broader than 
migration control, something that the literature on EU security sector reform and 
assistance to third countries’ Integrated Border Management (IBM) has been more 
attentive to. 
2.4. EU COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY (CSDP) AND 
SECURITY SECTOR REFORM (SSR) 
The JHA area of EU policy, but also the European Commission’s development and 
migration policies, have been topics rather separate from the EU’s inter-governmental 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The study of CFSP and CSDP has been 
dominated by a focus on the Member States’ power politics, decision-making in the 
Council, the turf wars between the Council and the Commission, and the potential for 
a defence and military Union. Still, one niche of this literature is very relevant for 
understanding the EU’s export of crime control models to the Global South, namely 
that on civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and security 
sector reform (SSR). This niche is, as we will see, connected to the broader SSR 
literature mainly stemming from security studies, where there has been a recent 
interest in the topic of ‘localization’ of security assistance.  
CSDP missions are tools of EU peacebuilding and crisis management, and have 
included missions on police reform, rule of law, assistance, planning, monitoring and 
border management. The birth of EU action in Foreign and Security Policy was neatly 
connected with the idea that good governance, rule of law, police and the criminal 
justice and the internal security sectors are key for peacebuilding and post-conflict 
reconstruction (Ioanniedes and Collantes-Celador 2011). As such, civilian CSDP 
                                                          
12 In terms of theory, the now widely used conceptualization of border as rhizomatic, dispersed 
and stretched across space tends to take the migrant as its point of departure for theorizing 
border. 
13 I would argue that the term ‘migration criminology’, or ‘criminology of mobility’ which has 
been used interchangeably, is better suited to this strand of research than ‘border criminology’ 
as it deals more with migration than with borders. It is almost impossible to find a contribution 
to border criminology that does not deal primarily with migration management (but for a bit 
more nuanced contributions see Milivojevic 2019 and Wonders 2006. 
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missions have aimed to reform criminal justice and security institutions (police, 
gendarmerie, border and customs, criminal courts and penitentiary) as well as regular 
and irregular security forces. They also co-locate experts inside beneficiaries’ 
Ministries of Justice and Interior to mentor and advise civil servants (Merlingen and 
Ostrauskaite 2007).  
The EU deployed CSDP missions (then called ESDP missions) for the first time in 
2003 in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM) and Macedonia (EUPOL Proxima and 
EUPAT) both of which were police reform missions. Yet scholars observed that 
despite the rhetorical linking of SSR with human rights, development and crisis 
management, it was in fact the fight against organized crime that came to take the 
centre stage in the ESDP missions, thus relegating good governance and democratic 
principles to a secondary place (Ioanniedes and Collantes-Celador 2011). EU member 
states’ internal security interests dominated the missions, leading to their 
securitization. The missions focused on ‘hard policing’ and the building of short-term 
crime-fighting capabilities such as intelligence gathering and information sharing, 
training, threat analysis, cooperation between JHA (Europol) and CSDP on strategic 
and intelligence levels, and the deployment of border guards and organised crime 
experts to block smuggling routes into Europe (Ioannides and Collantes-Celador 
2011: 424). Thus, the missions gave less priority to ‘soft’ policing, the fostering of 
inter-ethnic relations, respect for human rights and embeddedness in good governance 
(Ioanniedes and Collantes-Celador 2011). In practice, then, prioritizing a centralized, 
effective, intelligence-led, organized crime-fighting police hampered the bottom-up, 
conflict-sensitive building of a multi-ethnic and democratic police force, especially in 
the case of Bosnia (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2005).  
The EU has also deployed several CSDP missions in Africa with explicit crime control 
objectives: police training missions were deployed as far back as 2005 in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, as well as a police and justice reform mission in 
Guinea-Bissau in 2008 which among other emphasized building counter-narcotics 
capabilities within the police force (see Strazzari and Cottichia 2012). Also in 2008, 
a naval CSDP mission, EUNAVFOR Atalanta, was launched off the Somali coast to 
fight pirates (Gilmer 2017). Yet the mission that has generated the most attention and 
academic scrutiny has probably been EUNAVFOR MED Sophia (2015-2020), a naval 
mission aimed to ‘disrupt the business model of human smuggling and trafficking 
networks,’ mainly through identifying, capturing and disposing of vessels, as well as 
through training the Libyan coastguard (Losci, Raineri and Strazzari 2018; Losci and 
Russo 2020). Its mandate was also expanded in 2016 to implement the UN arms 
embargo on Libya, and in 2017 to fight oil smuggling. The simultaneous mission 
EUBAM Libya (since 2013) has been mandated with border security-building through 
SSR and Integrated Border Management (IBM) planning and capacity-building of 
Libyan police and border guards. These missions highlight the tendency towards 
intertwinement of EU crisis response instruments and internal security objectives. In 
comparison, the civilian CSDP missions that are at the centre of this dissertation, 
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EUCAP Sahel Niger (since 2012) and EUCAP Sahel Mali (since 2015), with 
objectives to fight transnational organized crime and terrorism, have generated a 
relatively small literature (see e.g. Bøås et al. 2018; Raineri and Baldaro 2019; 
Molenaar et al. 2017; Raineri and Strazzari 2019; Cold-Ravnkilde and Nissen 
forthcoming) 
While the controversial Sophia mission mobilized a truly interdisciplinary academic 
community, most studies on EU SSR and SSR more generally have remained limited 
in scope. Typically aims of studies have been to ‘evaluate the successes and failures 
of SSR by alignment with externally defined mission objectives and interests; and 
they continue to use the classical Weberian model of statehood as an exclusive 
template to measure the success and failure of external support’ (Schröder et al. 2014a: 
134; Abrahamsen 2016). As such, the SSR literature has tended to downplay the 
‘highly political and deeply contested processes’ of external intervention into the 
security sectors of recipient states – tensions and contradictions that tend to 
characterize the international community’s liberal peacebuilding more broadly 
(Schröder et al. 2014a: 133). In general ‘fine-grained, micro-focused empirical data, 
describing security from the bottom-up, has been largely absent from studies of SSR’ 
(Schröder et al. 2014a: 141). Particularly relevant for this dissertation, however, is a 
strand of SSR research that has focused on the meeting point between external 
intervention and promotion of Weberian security models on the one hand, and the 
local forms of security governance, agency and political systems on the other. Such 
studies of the complexity of ‘localization’ of security assistance have explored the 
rational bargaining situations between external and domestic actors, but also 
resistance and contestation (Schröder et al 2014a: 139-40; Cassarino 2017; Cold-
Ravnkilde and Nissen, forthcoming). The concept of ‘hybridity’ has often been 
utilised to make sense of local security governance beyond Weberian sovereignty – 
where the state is merely one player and security provider among competing non-state 
political actors (Schröder 2014b; Tholens 2017; Raineri 2016; Raineri and Strazzari 
2019).  
However, while it has been observed that ‘hybrid orders’ (Boege et al. 2008) and 
‘hybrid sovereignty’ (Tholens 2017) may also include extra-legal and criminal 
organizations (Raineri and Strazzari 2019), few studies have explored the role of 
crime and illicit activities in the context of post-conflict SSR (but see Schröder and 
Friesendorf 2009; Strazzari and Cottichia 2012). Most notably, the literature on EU 
SSR has almost exclusively understood this field through the prism of ‘security’ – 
while a (criminological) perspective on crime, criminal justice and crime control has 
been less present (but see Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2005).   
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2.5. TRANSNATIONAL (ORGANIZED) CRIME, CONFLICT AND EXTRA-
LEGAL GOVERNANCE IN THE SAHEL 
The last body of literature of direct relevance to this dissertation is that related to 
transnational (organized) crime in so-called ‘fragile’ and conflict-affected states, as 
most of the crime control models exported by the EU and other Western actors to the 
Global South are targeted to deal with this to some extent (at least in their stated 
objectives).14 Indeed, African studies and Peace and Conflict scholarship have long 
observed that (post)conflict settings are typically characterized by ‘criminalized 
economies’: warlords, insurgents, rebels and terrorist groups often draw revenues 
from criminal activities and collude with criminal groups (Cornell 2007; Reno 2011). 
This is thought to hamper peacemaking, state-building and development (Vorrath 
2014; Kemp et al. 2013; Cockayne and Lupel 2011). 
Transnational organized crime (TOC) has been conceptualized in the Peace & 
Conflict literature as a ‘spoiler’ for peace (Kemp et al. 2013), an ‘external stressor’ 
(Cockayne and Lupel 2011), or a ‘shadow state’ (Reno 2011), thriving in and even 
capturing states that are ‘fragile’ or ‘failed’ (see Strazzari 2014 for a critique). 
Cockayne and Lupel (2011) developed a typology of transnational criminal groups 
spanning ‘predatory,’ ‘parasitic’ and ‘symbiotic’, depending on their relationship to 
legal authorities. ‘Predatory’ groups prey on local authorities’ resources, ‘parasitic’ 
groups also extract rents from local populations through protection rackets, while 
‘symbiotic’ groups rather coexist with existing authority structures, including 
overlaps of membership, clandestine arrangements of reciprocity, collusion and joint 
venture arrangements (Cockayne and Lupel 2011: 7f). Responses to TOC, they 
suggest, should be moulded according to these ideal types (Cockayne and Lupel 
2011). International policy-makers and especially transnational law enforcement 
communities have been particularly receptive to this kind of research and policy 
recommendations: state capture by organized crime in Africa has been reiterated in 
alarmist calls for counter-crime action by the international community (see e.g. 
UNODC 2013; Aning and Pokoo 2014; Shaw and Reitano 2013). Such calls have 
                                                          
14 The literature on transnational organized crime in Africa has partly grown out of area studies 
(African studies), anthropology, peace and conflict studies, development studies, (critical) 
security studies and criminology. Moreover, much of the detailed empirical knowledge has been 
generated by NGOs and various types of commissioned consultancy reports that to a varying 
extent have vested interests, especially by the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized 
Crime (GI-TOC) and the related South Africa-based Institute for Security Studies (ISS) which 
have also won several large EU grants (‘ENACT’, funded under EUTF) to create evidence to 
support EU policy in Africa; International Alert, and International Crisis Group. There are also 
important contributions made by (collectives of) investigative journalists. Lastly, there are also 
reports by international bodies such as the UNODC and Frontex, which may provide some 
general knowledge but have a limited scientific value due to their strongly normative agendas 
as well as reliance on undisclosed sources. 
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translated into growing awareness of TOC at the international level, to the extent that 
‘combat[ing] all forms of organized crime’ has been explicitly included in the UN 
Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16, which is ‘fundamentally concerned with 
reducing the threat that crime and violence pose to sustainable development and 
enhancing the delivery of justice and security throughout the Global South’ (see 
Blaustein et al. 2018, 2020). Also, the UN Security Council has reiterated the need to 
combat TOC in order to promote peace, security and prosperity (see e.g. UN Security 
Council 2010). 
More critical scholars have questioned the usefulness and adequacy of such alarmist 
ideal-type ‘TOC-threats’ and rather voiced a need for exploring the micro-politics and 
phenomenology of extra-legal economies on their empirical terms – stressing that 
‘TOC’ is socially, politically and spatially embedded (Strazzari 2014) and endemic to 
the current state of globality (Vigh 2019). Some have questioned whether there is at 
all such a thing as ‘organized crime’ in Africa (Shaw and Ellis 2015). Anthropologists 
have observed that transport of all kinds of goods and humans through the Sahara 
desert is a historically ingrained way of social life (Scheele 2012). In the desert 
economy the boundaries between what is legal and illegal, legitimate and illegitimate, 
are blurred (Brachet 2018: 20; Raineri 2016; Scheele 2012; McDougall and Scheele 
2012). Cross-border trade in licit and illicit goods is interwoven in a complex political 
economy which involves non-state and state actors, but mostly actors somewhere in-
between (Bøås 2015): for instance, the same person can simultaneously have a formal 
position within the state apparatus, be a regional ‘big man’, rebel group member, and 
drug trafficker. Rather than being separate categories of activities and actors, there is 
a certain continuity ‘between different contours of criminality, coping, and resistance 
and the subsequent logic behind these activities’ (Bøås 2015: 300). 
Two important developments have affected the extra-legal economy in the Sahel: first, 
the emergence of hard drugs (notably cocaine) as a commodity to be trafficked and, 
second, post-Gaddafi repercussions. Cross-border smuggling of all kinds of goods 
(staples, foodstuffs, fuel, contraband cigarettes etc.) has been the backbone of the 
economy in the arid desert of northern Mali, made profitable by the subsidization of 
some of these goods (food and fuel) by Algeria (Scheele 2012; Raineri 2016; Brachet 
2018). In fact, without food and other goods smuggled illegally from Algeria, northern 
Mali would starve (Scheele 2012). The old customary tradition of droits de passage, 
which can be translated to ‘rights of passage,’ regulated and still regulates the uses of 
land and its resources in northern Mali and Niger where populations were partly 
nomadic, usually including a tribute paid to the local population for protection on 
‘their’ territory (see Raineri, 2016: 136). However, the trafficking of drugs, especially 
cocaine since the mid-2000s, substantially altered the revenues and the risks of the 
smuggling economy, leading to the incremental use of armed protection that has 
(para)militarized the trans-Saharan extra-legal trade (Raineri 2016; International 
Crisis Group 2018; Micallef et al. 2019). This has resulted in a growth in protection 
rackets, organized banditry (what my interviewees would refer to as ‘le grand 
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banditisme’) and violence, as well as the business of securing or intercepting drug 
convoys (Micallef et al. 2019). The drugs that pass through the Sahel are mainly 
cannabis resin trafficked from Morocco on its way eastwards, cocaine destined for 
Europe that enters West Africa through its seaports15  or sometimes by plane from 
Latin America to Mali,16 and more recently, yet travelling different routes than the 
former two, the trafficking of tramadol (Micallef et al. 2019). The amount of money 
generated by trafficking drugs, cocaine in particular, through the Sahara (as opposed 
to the ‘traditional’ contraband such as in fuel and foodstuffs) has reshaped societal 
structures and political life in northern Mali and Niger (Raineri 2016; International 
Crisis Group 2018). The sudden influx of cash has weakened traditional hierarchical 
structures and traditional power configurations of Touareg societies as drug traffickers 
with money are attaining higher positions, thus diminishing the authority of village 
elders and religious leaders (Bøås 2015; International Crisis Group 2018). It is 
important to note that the trafficking in drugs is often regarded a legitimate profession 
and a source of prestige, it offers a major source of economic opportunity in a region 
with high unemployment, and constitutes one of the only possibilities for upward 
social mobility (Reitano and Shaw 2014; International Crisis Group, 2018; Micallef 
et al. 2019; Raineri 2016). The collusion of government officials and drug traffickers, 
especially during the time of Mali’s former president Amadou Toumani Touré (2002-
2012) who allegedly rewarded loyalty by providing access to criminal markets, 
reinforced the role of criminals ‘from outcasts to role models’ (Micallef et al. 2019: 
13). 
                                                          
15 Three main hubs have been identified for receipt and redistribution of cocaine destined for 
Europe: the northern hub, transiting from Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, The Gambia, and Senegal; 
the southern hub, centered on Nigeria, Benin, Togo, and Ghana; and the eastern hub, based in 
Mali and parts of Mauretania (UNODC 2013). More recent studies (International Crisis Group 
2018) as well as my own research has observed that Mauritania is an important entry point for 
cocaine, which is then distributed through the Polisario Front in Western Sahara before making 
its way through to northern Mali and Niger. A recent report states that the trafficking of drugs 
(both cannabis resin and cocaine) through the region has declined recently (but not tramadol, 
which is rising), mainly due to two reasons: firstly, the rise in instability and conflict which is 
bad for business, and second, law enforcement activities and military presence driven by the 
US, France and the EU (Micallef et al. 2019). 
16 Famously known as the ‘Aïr Cocaine incident’, in 2009 a burnt-out plane allegedly 
transporting 10 tons of cocaine from Latin America was found in the desert north of Gao in 
Mali, bringing attention to this new cocaine route. See e.g. 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/15/malis-bad-trip/ (Accessed 22.6.2020). 
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Image 3.  Gaddafi was an important regional hegemon with substantial influence in Niger, Mali 
and other sub-Saharan countries. This photo shows that his legacy is still alive and well, 
depicting Colonel Gaddafi painted on the back of a bus in Bamako. 
The fall of Gaddafi in 2011, instigated by NATO’s bombing of Libya, significantly 
altered the security landscape in the Sahara-Sahel and was among the causes of the 
2012 Touareg rebellion in northern Mali (Bøås and Utas 2013). Touareg living in 
Libya, some of whom had served in Gaddafi’s army, returned to their old homeland 
of Azawad17 in northern Mali and Niger with armoured vehicles and heavy weaponry. 
The Touareg have a long history of rebelling against the (Bambara-dominated) central 
government in Bamako and the (now Hausa-dominated) government in Niamey, 
notably in 1962-64, 1990-95 and 2007-09. However, as opposed to earlier rebellions 
where combatants were poorly armed and easily overturned, the 2012 rebels were 
                                                          
17 Azawad is the Tamasheq name of a territory that stretches across northern Mali and Niger 
and southern Algeria, and which the Touareg rebellion of 2012 aimed for to become an 
autonomous region – at least its Malian parts. With regard to the Touareg originally being a 
nomadic people without a strict European-type conception of territoriality, it is curious how 
their movements have come to focus on territorial separation and autonomy (see Strazzari 2015 
and Raineri 2016 for interesting analyses). 
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armed to the teeth (Micallef et al. 2019). Indeed, Gaddafi’s large weapons arsenals 
were looted and distributed across the whole MENA and Sub-Saharan Africa and have 
played a key role in a number of conflicts and the weaponization of the Sahel region 
(Micallef et al. 2019). These weapons have also armed the complex landscape of 
Islamist insurgencies that have emerged in the Sahel, such as Al Qaeda in the Maghreb 
(AQIM), Ansar Eddine and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa 
(MUJAO) (see Bøås 2015) and later groups such as the Group for the Support of Islam 
and Muslims (GSIM) and the Macina Liberation Front. Some of these groups have 
also gathered revenues by kidnap for ransom of Westerners, something that, in 
addition to the Touareg rebellions, contributed to a decline of tourism to this region. 
Crucially, the civil war in Libya also opened up a route for migrants travelling to 
Europe that was previously tightly controlled by Gaddafi (see Pradella and Rad 2017; 
Brachet 2018). 
It is beyond the scope of this literature review to go into the details of the routes of 
various kinds of illicit goods or illegalized forms of mobility, nor the constantly 
changing groups with shifting allegiances that control them (for excellent accounts 
see Raineri 2016; International Crisis Group 2018; Reitano and Tinti 2016; Micallef 
et al. 2019; Bøås 2015; Sandor 2017). However, three aspects will be mentioned here 
because they directly disprove and problematize the European policy discourse that 
has legitimized intervention and export of crime control models. The European and 
international policy narrative has it that all these security threats are inter-connected, 
travel the same routes towards Europe, and are controlled by organized crime 
syndicates preying upon ungoverned spaces and porous borders (see e.g. Council 
2015; European Commission 2017b). First, European and international policy 
discourse frequently invoke the Sahel as a site of ‘crime-terror nexuses’ (Makarenko 
2004; Kfir 2018), where one voiced (yet often not practised) strategy to fight terrorist 
groups should be to cut them off from the drug trafficking that allegedly funds them 
(Vorrath and Zoppei 2018). However, some empirically-based literature states that 
there is little evidence of links between Islamist insurgent groups and drug trafficking 
in northern and central Mali. Islamist groups and key figures (such as AQIM and 
Mokhtar Belmokhtar, or Ansar Eddine and later GSIM and Iyad ag Ghali) have 
sometimes distanced themselves from drug traffickers or simply not engaged with 
them while others have had closer links, such as MUJAO with the Tilemsi Arabs 
(International Crisis Groups 2018: 11). Yet most often the relationship seems to be 
one of mutual tolerance (coexistence in the same geographical places) knowing that 
conflict is not beneficial but cooperation may sometimes be so (Ibid.). On the contrary, 
the literature suggests that repression of Islamist groups and sometimes of traffickers 
by (especially French) military presence has in fact led these two categories of actors 
closer together rather than the opposite (International Crisis Groups 2018; Micallef et 
al. 2019). On the other hand, there is lots of evidence that links the signatories of the 
Algiers Peace Agreement with the Malian government, the Coordination of Azawad 
Movements (CMA) and the Plateforme, with drug trafficking (International Crisis 
Groups 2018; Micallef et al. 2019). This, I would argue, complicates the compatibility 
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of (externally driven) anti-drugs operations and the peace process. Second, there is no 
evidence that it is the same groups that traffic drugs and facilitate the transport of 
migrants,18  nor that the latter is ran by ‘organized crime syndicates’, as the European 
Commission assumes (e.g. European Commission 2016). On the contrary, the 
facilitation and transport of migrants (especially through Niger) has typically been 
done by individual entrepreneurs that cooperate in rather loose and ad-hoc networks 
(Raineri 2018; Lucht 2013; see Richter 2019 on similar findings in the Maghreb), and 
it was the EU-instigated criminalization of and crackdown on ‘migrant smugglers’ 
that forced them to become more organized, clandestine and harmful (Brachet 2018). 
In other words, the two latter points suggest that it is the control responses of 
international actors that aggravate or even produce crime through negative 
‘unintended’ consequences, which are often based on a misguided image of the threat 
of transnational organized crime. Third, scholars have strongly contested the policy 
concept of the Sahel as an ‘ungoverned space’ simply because the central governments 
(especially of Mali) do not control the state’s entire territory, arguing rather for 
understanding the complexity of ‘hybrid security orders’ (more on this in theory 
section 3.4) (Raineri 2016; Bøås 2015). 
To conclude, there is a rich literature on the (constantly changing) micro-dynamics of 
transnational crime and conflict in the Sahel, which suggests that there is no 
unequivocally (or at all any) positive effect of externally-driven crime control 
interventions. However, it is important to note that these studies have had a focus on 
the phenomenology of illicit activities and their intertwinement with politics that have 
led to a ‘criminalization of the state in Africa’ (c.f. Bayart et al. 1999), and there has 
been very little attention to the crime control responses in and by themselves 
(especially from a criminological, crime control perspective) nor the systems of 
criminal and social control that are subject to external influences. This dissertation 
aims to bridge these gaps in the literature by providing a criminological exploration 
of how (predominantly European) crime control models are exported to and 
potentially transformed and localized in the Sahel region. As such, while 
criminologically-oriented anthropological research has employed ‘mobile 
methodologies’ to ‘follow the flows’ of illegalized activities on their way northwards 
to Europe (Vigh and Sausdal 2019; Vigh 2019; Richter 2019), this thesis rather 
focuses on the opposite direction of mobility, namely the flows of crime control 
policies, models and knowledges from Europe to Africa. 
  
                                                          
18 Except perhaps sometimes Nigerian groups and tramadol trafficked through Niger, but this 
is a different route than for cocaine and cannabis resin. Personal conversation with journalist 
from Jeune Afrique, Niamey, December 2017. 
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CHAPTER 3. THEORETICAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON POWER IN 
NORTH-SOUTH EXPORT OF CRIME 
CONTROL 
This chapter accounts for the various theoretical perspectives that are particularly 
relevant for understanding the power implications of the EU’s export of crime control 
models to the Sahel, as well as North-South travel of crime control models more 
broadly. It starts, in section 3.1., by reviewing theories on crime policy transfer, norm 
diffusion and security governance, as this is the theoretical paradigm typically 
employed (especially in IR but also in criminology) to understand transfer of (EU) 
crime control policies. The chapter then turns to neo-Marxist, critical theory and post-
colonial perspectives in section 3.2., and Foucauldian perspectives in section 3.3., 
which it argues should be combined in order to shed light on different aspects of how 
power operates. Still, to make better sense of the meeting point between European 
crime control models and African social realities, section 3.4. consults theories on 
African statehood, political power and social control. Section 3.5. outlines how the 
theories are used in this thesis. 
3.1. CRIME POLICY TRANSFER, NORM DIFFUSION AND EU 
EXTERNAL (SECURITY) GOVERNANCE: TRANSFER AGENTS OR 
THE POWER OF FUNCTIONALIST EXTENSION 
One of the first comprehensive criminological efforts to theorize the travelling of 
crime definitions, policies and models was done by Trevor Jones and Tim Newburn, 
mainly in their book Policy Transfer and Criminal Justice (2007), preceded by an 
edited collection by Newburn and Sparks (2004). In the book, they argued that 
criminological studies of cross-country crime policy convergence tended to generally 
overlook the processes whereby convergence happened. There was a gap in research 
on crime policy, they claimed, as criminologists merely looked at the content and 
impact of policy but mostly ignored policy-making and travelling processes while 
political scientists had generally given scant attention to the topic of crime policy 
(Jones and Newburn 2007: 20). Therefore, they called for more focus on political 
agency and entrepreneurship in the explaining why and how crime policy travels, and 
they propagated importing policy transfer theory from political science to 
criminology, mainly the theory of Dolowitz and Marsh (see e.g. 2000). Dolowitz and 
Marsh defined policy transfer and diffusion as ‘the process by which knowledge about 
policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political system 
(past or present) is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, 
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institutions and ideas in another political system’ (2000: 5). Furthermore, they 
developed a typology of policy transfer mechanisms on a continuum from voluntary 
(emulation, socialization) to coercive (conditionality, direct imposition) forms 
(Dolowitz and Marsh 2000: 13). Policy transfer and diffusion theory thus provides an 
analytical framework to disentangle the role of ‘transfer agents’ (be it states, 
organizations, epistemic communities or persons), transfer processes, or/and the 
implementation of the ‘travelling’ policy in a new context (Evans 2009). Yet only a 
handful of criminologists have since done research along the proposed lines (Karstedt 
2007; Walklate and Fitz-Gibbon 2018; Newburn et al. 2018; Blaustein 2015). 
Notably, two aspects which are at the centre of this dissertation were glaringly missing 
from Jones and Newburn’s accounts. First, the ‘international’ as a site of policy 
diffusion was not mentioned – despite Dolowitz and Marsh (2000: 11) themselves 
explicitly stating that international organizations (IOs) are crucial norm entrepreneurs 
in (also coercive forms of) global policy diffusion. Thus, Jones and Newburn left out 
(contrary to Dolowitz and Marsh) the whole topic of the impact of European 
integration on criminal law harmonization and crime policy diffusion in EU Member 
States and beyond. Second, and symptomatic to the discipline of criminology, both 
Jones and Newburn (2007) and Newburn et al. (2018) focused on the transfer of crime 
policy from the US to the UK – thus leaving out the north-south dimension of 
directions for policy mobilities. However, the novel concern in criminology with 
travelling crime policy seems to rather be connected with the discipline’s rather recent 
interest in globalization, transnational crime control and north-south relations (see 
particularly Méndez Beck and Jaffe 2018; Aas 2012a). Anglo-American criminology, 
it has been argued, has overlooked the dense crime policy exchange between non-
English speaking contexts, where crime policy has been transmitted along the lines of 
linguistic and cultural affinity (Melossi et al. 2011: 6) and postcolonial ties (Agozino 
2005). The latter contributions will recur in the following sub-sections on critical 
realist and poststructuralist approaches. However, before proceeding to these, the 
issue of policy transfer and diffusion deserves some more attention as it has been 
among the most central theoretical paradigms for understanding policy mobilities 
within IR.  
Having its roots in institutionalist public policy theory, policy transfer theory has been 
widely used in IR, both generally to understand transnationalization of policy-making 
and specifically to conceptualize the EU’s transfer of security policy and models to 
neighbouring countries and regions. Following Dolowitz and Marsh, policy transfer 
and diffusion has been theorized as an ‘intentional attempt to establish a specific set 
of norms and ideas, organizational structures or technical capacities in a new setting’ 
(Schröder et al. 2013: 384). The EU’s transfer of its JHA acquis and policies in the 
Enlargement process was predominantly a coercive top-down process (Karstedt 2002; 
Grabbe 2003). Encompassing both ‘hard transfer’ (rules, procedures, and policy 
paradigms) and ‘soft transfer’ (styles, ‘ways of doing things’, shared beliefs and 
norms), Grabbe (2003) identified five mechanisms whereby the EU has sought to 
induce changes in the domestic policy of Enlargement countries:  
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1) models (provision of legislative and institutional templates);  
2) money (aid and technical assistance); 
3) benchmarking and monitoring (evaluation of third countries’ performance on EU 
priorities); 
4) advice and twinning (secondment of civil servants from EU Member States in 
Ministries and public administration);  
5) gate-keeping (access for candidates to negotiations and further stages in the 
accession process). 
Theorists of EU external governance have built on policy transfer and norm diffusion 
theories to explore to what extent the EU effectively manages to integrate third 
countries into common systems of rule (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009). These 
scholars have criticized ‘traditional’ foreign policy conceptualizations of the EU as a 
unitary actor and argued for rather analysing EU external governance from an 
institutionalist perspective as a conglomerate of sectoral policies and independent 
policy fields that occupy functional spaces (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009; 
Lavenex 2014). Thus, they shifted the unit of analysis from a unified state actor model 
to systems of rule, which may be extended to third countries even unintentionally 
through different forms of power. Diffusion of EU norms, rules and institutions thus 
happens through hierarchical governance (with a focus on supranational legal 
competencies), networked governance (between equal, sovereign partners) or market 
(competition) (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009). ‘Governance by externalization’ 
is then explored through analysing rule selection (to what extent do EU rules 
constitute the normative point of reference of EU-third country relations), rule 
adoption (to what extent are EU rules are transposed in third country legislation), and 
rule application (to what extent are EU rules are acted upon in political and 
administrative practice) (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009: 800-801). Noticing that 
‘technocratic outreach’ in itself promotes rules export (Lavenex 2014: 896), external 
governance studies have also explored what types of governance that are most 
effective in transferring EU rules (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009). With regard 
to power, these studies have suggested that the EU has ‘structural power’ through its 
common market (Lavenex 2014), but also that dominative forms of power (through 
political conditionality) are more effective in transferring EU rules to third countries 
than ‘networked governance’ which works more through learning and socialization 
(Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009). EU Justice and Home Affairs and transnational 
crime governance has been seen predominantly as ‘networked’ forms of external 
governance happening through ‘transversal networks’ of law enforcement and judicial 
professionals rather than high-level officials and diplomats (Lavenex and Wichmann 
2009; Friesendorf 2007). 
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Extending Dolowitz and Marsh’ policy transfer theory also to externally-driven 
security sector reform (SSR) in post-conflict societies, Schröder et al. explored the 
typology of policy transfer mechanisms on a scale from ‘external imposition’ of crime 
policy and models to ‘locally-owned’ reform (2013: 384) spanning direct coercive 
imposition (by negative or positive incentives); socialization; persuasion, or domestic 
demand (2013: 385). They find empirical evidence across cases to support a tendency 
whereby SSR is most coercive and imposed at the beginning of external engagement, 
with domestic actors gradually more ‘owning’ the security models over time, and 
lastly even demanding security assistance themselves. Adding to the theory, this 
means that a case of SSR can in fact embody several different mechanisms of policy 
transfer over time or even simultaneously when different external actors and security 
models are involved. Following a complementary typology, security governance 
models can be adopted, adapted, resisted, or rejected by local recipients of security 
assistance (Schröder et al. 2014b).  
Interestingly, and specifically relevant for this thesis, IR scholars have problematized 
policy transfer and diffusion to ‘areas of limited statehood’: claiming that in such 
places the EU has less ‘transformative power’ (Börzel 2011; Börzel and Risse 2009) 
and its bargaining power is weaker (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009: 803). 
Drawing on the case of the Western Balkans, Börzel notices that ‘secessionist 
movements, unsettled borders, ethnic tensions, deficient state capacity and/or strong 
clientelistic networks have severely mitigated the transformative power of the EU’ 
(2011: 6). Conditionality seems less effective in such instances (Börzel and Risse 
2009:10). This is because these states lack the willingness and (institutional) capacity 
to go through the comprehensive reform processes that adopting EU law and 
institutions requires from them (Börzel 2011). As such, the EU’s efforts of state-
building are undermined by the very conditions of bad governance that make these 
countries requiring state-building in the first place (ibid).  
This thesis involves thinking along the lines of policy transfer and norm diffusion 
theories. While these theories provide useful tools for meso-level analysis, EU 
external governance theory also brings important attention to EU external action not 
always being unified, deliberate and intentional but may also be the effect of system-
internal, institutional dynamics. However, this thesis rather focuses on aspects that 
tend to be less pronounced in policy transfer research, thus departing from it on several 
accounts. First, it gives more consideration to the content of policy and models and 
struggles behind such content. This entails analysing the ways in which certain 
categories of crime are constructed as shared (or even universal) problems for the EU 
and third countries, or the fact that certain crime control models are selected for 
transfer while others are de-selected. Second, it argues for the need to see EU policy 
transfer also in the light of Europe’s colonial history, contemporary (post/neo-
colonial) power asymmetries and contestation (see Nikolaïdis 2015 for a critique of 
‘EUniveraslism’), something which neo-Marxist and critical realist theory have 
brought more attention to (see the following section). Third, as policy transfer theories 
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were mostly developed based on transfer between northern countries, they tend to not 
problematize the contested position of the third country political elites (often in post-
conflict settings) which adopt, adapt, resist or reject the policies and models on behalf 
of their country – and whether or not these elites are actually supported by and 
accountable to their constituencies. Fourth, this thesis has more focus than most policy 
transfer analyses on the resistance and contestation that travelling crime control 
policies meet, as well as on the potential (and long-term) negative and adverse effects 
of an imported policy (Börzel and Risse 2009: 11). These latter aspects are 
foregrounded by the following theoretical perspectives. 
3.2. CRITICAL REALIST, NEO-MARXIST AND (POST)COLONIAL 
THEORY: HEGEMONY, DEPENDENCY, AND IMPERIALISM 
Several scholars have invoked the concept of hegemony when analysing the global 
diffusion of crime control policies and models (e.g. Andreas and Nadelmann 2006; 
Karstedt 2002, 2007; Lavenex and Wichmann 2009). While often used without 
referring to a particular understanding or author, the concept of hegemony is usually 
associated with Antonio Gramsci, roughly referring to a ‘situation wherein a social 
group or class is ideologically dominant’ (Femia 1975: 29). This focus on the 
ideological and ideational aspects of domination, which is an added value with regard 
to more economic-material neo-Marxist theory, is probably why scholars of 
transnational crime control have found it to fit so well in conjunction with Howard 
Becker’s (1997 [1963]) concept of ‘moral entrepreneur’. Andreas and Nadelmann’s 
(2006) analysis of criminalization and crime control in international relations draws 
attention to the fact that although global prohibition regimes are purported as 
universal, they stem from the internationalization of the domestic legal frameworks 
of hegemonic states. It was the UK that acted as a ‘transnational moral entrepreneur’, 
pushing through and shaping the international abolition of slavery, and the USA that 
was the driving force behind the global drug prohibition regime and post-9/11 
counter-terrorism (Andreas and Nadelmann 2006; see also Findlay 2008). The EU has 
also had an active role in shaping transnational criminal law and control structures: 
The 2000 UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) was to 
some extent modelled after the EU 1998 Joint Action on Organized Crime (Mitsilegas, 
2010: 252); similarly, the 2000 UNTOC Protocol on Migrant Smuggling was 
proposed and drafted by Austria and Italy (Jakobi, 2013). It has been observed that 
the EU’s JHA cooperation with third countries has been characterized by EU 
domination rather than participatory governance: ‘the EU is contributing to exporting 
the founding pillars of the global drugs prohibition regime to neighbouring countries 
hegemonically’ (Lavenex and Wichmann 2009: 95). In short, it is the crime control 
models of hegemonic powers that travel best, often on a one-way road from 
industrialised countries (centre) to the Third World (periphery) (Karstedt 2002, 2007; 
see also Aas 2012b).  
EXTERNAL PROJECTION OF INTERNAL SECURITY 
36 
Western hegemony is not unique with regards to transnational crime control; indeed, 
the same goes for most international norms including liberal ‘global regimes’ such as 
those of trade and human rights as well. The export of some regimes (abolition of 
slavery, human rights) tends to be viewed as less problematic than others (drug 
prohibition regime, the war on terror). However, it has been noted that these liberal 
and illiberal regimes sometimes directly counteract each other, for example in the case 
of repressive drug laws, exported and propagated by the UN drug control organs, 
which produce human rights violations as their consequence (Bowling 2011; Stambøl 
2014).  
International crime control structures thus mirror the ideologies and interests of 
northern countries and reproduce overall Western domination. The guise of 
universality masks the power struggles behind definitions of crime and models of 
control. Illustrative of this position, Stanley Cohen noted that  
‘any social control system can be seen as ideological in two ways. First, its 
planning and structure are based on certain principles, ideas, beliefs, 
justifications, philosophies and theories. And second, a quite different 
sense, these stated justifications conceal the real interests, intentions and 
motives behind the system’ (1988: 176).  
In the case of the international crime control system, Stanley Cohen (1988) and Ellison 
and Pino (2012) observe that the ideology which has underpinned it is the same that 
has been central in shaping development policy, namely modernization theory – a 
remnant of the civilizing mission. This ideology saw crime as negative externalities 
of rapid societal change, development and modernization, and posited that 
development in crime control capacities should follow a unilinear trajectory towards 
the standards of Western nations; towards ‘rational, professional and effective 
criminal justice systems’ (Cohen 1988). While modernization theory as such lost 
traction many decades ago, its inherent thinking and ideology are still discernible in 
more neoliberal (and less state-centric) models of development (Ellison and Pino 
2012). Notably, this ‘benign transfer model’ is reflected in the mentalities and work 
of IOs such as the United Nations (see Cohen 1988 178-9), whose task it is to produce 
universal best practices in crime control and aid countries with ‘flawed penalities’ 
towards an alignment to such Western standards (Boivin and O’Connor, 2013). 
However, such unproblematic views of the expansion of global crime control have 
been rejected by critical criminologists for being voided of power perspectives 
(Ellison and Pino 2012). Rather, they argue, the flow of crime control models and 
criminological knowledges from the global north to the global south are infused with 
relations of power and global inequality (Aas 2011a). Also the discipline of 
criminology itself has been criticized for being an auxiliary discipline that supports 
Western-dominated imperialist structures by reproducing the dominance of western 
epistemologies and marginalizing knowledge and perspectives from the Global South 
(Agozino 2003; Carrington et al. 2016; Fonesca 2018). Penal cosmopolitanism is the 
globalization of specific types of penal theories arising in particular (Northern) 
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contexts – blurring the distinction between cosmopolitanism and imperialism (Aas 
2011a). Criminological postcolonial scholars have tended to view the crime control 
system as a repressive instrument of colonial rule and Western domination, or 
alternatively as a remnant of it (Agozino 2003, 2005).  
‘All modes of colonization – whether from missionary zeal; military, 
economic, or political imperatives; or liberal idealism – consciously 
intended to destroy or manipulate previous systems. And the creation of 
new offences – take such effects, still present, of slave law in the Caribbean 
– were intrinsic to colonialism. Legal control was built into the process 
from the outset, not tagged on afterwards, and law was a chosen mechanism 
to achieve particular social change’ (Cohen 1988: 183).  
Mark Brown (2016) has shown how these European colonial systems of penal control 
did not in fact get abolished after independence in India; rather some penal codes were 
retained and even innovated upon by new state leaders, meaning that postcolonies 
have retained ‘postcolonial penalities’. Also Agozino (2005) has argued that 
repressive colonial criminal justice systems turned out to be useful tools for new 
African state leaders that looked to consolidate their rule. Postcolonial systems of 
social and criminal control in places such as Nigeria has been understood by some as 
a continuation of ‘penal colonialism’ (Saleh-Hanna 2008). Yet also new forms of 
penal colonialism has been observed, and European attempts to shape the penal 
systems of former colonies (bolstered by the objective of migration control) has been 
seen as instances where the European ‘penal state’ radiates sovereign power well 
beyond the confines of the nation: seeking to regain control over former colonial 
territories to alleviate itself of unwanted migrants (Bosworth 2017b). Some scholars 
have also referred to the Western export of crime control models and the 
externalization of borders to countries in the Global South embedded in neo-colonial 
relations of power (e.g. Weber and McCulloch 2019; Aas 2011a; Ellison 2007; 
Fernández-Bessa and Brandariz García 2018). However, none of these authors have 
provided a definition of neo-colonialism, a reference to an author of neo-colonial 
theory, nor explained what neo-colonialism actually entails. Article 4 of this 
dissertation therefore delves into a discussion of Kwame Nkrumah’s original theory 
on neo-colonialism as well as its more recent proponents from IR (Langan 2018; 
Gegout 2017), specifically looking at the theory’s added value – but also its limitations 
– for criminology and the sociology of punishment: especially in terms of theorizing 
the relationship between (travelling) penal power and state sovereignty. 
Similar to neo-colonial theory, some criminologists have drawn on dependency 
theory, a central paradigm of international critical theory in the 1960s and 1970s, in a 
modified form to explain the flow of crime control policies and models from the 
Global North to the Global South (Cohen 1988; Ellison and Pino 2012). Dependency 
theory posited that peripheral countries are structurally dependent on dominant, core 
countries in the Global North in an interconnected system of world economy (c.f. 
Wallerstein 2004), that these core-periphery relations were essentially exploitative, 
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and that the level of development in the West could only be sustained through the 
persistence of underdevelopment in the periphery (Ellison and Pino, 2012: 45-46). In 
other words, development was seen as retarded by exogenous factors such as 
unfavourable trade terms and exploitation. Still, dependency theorists did not write 
much about crime (Cohen 1988). Ellison and Pino (2012) criticize dependency theory 
mainly for the solutions its proponents propagated: that countries in the Global South 
should ‘delink’ from the global economy. Yet, they argue that the analyses and 
critique of the ‘dependentistas’ are still very valuable for understanding the global 
diffusion of crime policies today, and they develop their analytical framework along 
similar but slightly modified lines.  
 
Image 4. Sculpture depicting freed slaves on Gorée Island outside Dakar, Senegal, which 
served as an important node in the transatlantic slave trade. The island has frequently changed 
hands, being owned at different times by the French, the British, the Portuguese and the Dutch. 
Ellison and Pino argue in their excellent book, Globalization, Police Reform and 
Development: Doing it the Western Way? (2012), that the modus operandi and 
dynamics of crime policy transfer processes need to take into account the role of 
human agents and policy entrepreneurs in the transfer process, but also the overall 
political economy of aid and development assistance. They criticize Andreas and 
Nadelmann (2006) for having an overly focus on the entrepreneurship of certain 
hegemonic states (hence being too state-centric), arguing that more attention needs to 
be given to international political economy and structural inequalities. Thus, crucial 
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to understanding contemporary Western security sector reform (SSR), police reform 
and police assistance to the Global South is the role of neoliberal globalization. 
Neoliberalism, they claim, is a hegemonic force in globalization that has replaced 
older forms of imperialism (2012: 12). It is fundamentally ideological and 
simultaneously illogical: while the state should be pulled back from virtually all areas 
of activity (aided among other by structural adjustment programmes of the World 
Bank and International Monetary Fund), in some areas the state is being reinforced 
regardless of economic costs – namely in the area of security. Ellison and Pino (2012) 
argue that his leads, on the one hand, to growing inequality and further 
marginalization and impoverishment of countries already at the bottom, and, on the 
other, a global environment shaped by Western strategic security imperatives to fight 
cross-border threats, such as transnational organized crime and terror. These 
imperatives, in turn, serve to further consolidating Western economic and security 
dominance. Their aim is to produce a ‘more effective empire’ (2012: 28). What they 
call an ‘aid complex’ involves a symbiosis of Western strategic (security) interests 
and private actors who have commercial interests and above all an interest in self-
sustainability. This ‘state-corporate symbiosis’ is among others visible in the lobby in 
Brussels. In other words, they argue, aid to development as well as to crime control is 
a promotion of Western interests ‘the back door’, through political pressure, often tied 
to strategic objectives through mechanisms of conditionality. Furthermore, the ‘one 
size fits all’ crime control models exported and transplanted embody Western notions 
of ‘democracy’, ‘rights’ and ‘stateness’ which do not take into account the local 
‘history, politics, culture, legal norms, the existence of a functioning state 
infrastructure and the presence of elite groups who are normatively committed to 
democratization’ (2012: 56). On the contrary, then, Western police reform and 
development assistance are often directed at the maintenance of social order and the 
protection of regimes rather than political liberalization and democratization: the aid 
often benefits the ruling elites in recipient nations but does not impact on processes of 
democratization and development. Ellison and Pino call this a ‘sovereignty gap’: the 
effects of global neoliberalism is growing discrepancy between the legal sovereignty 
of states in the Global South and their ability to provide basic services to their citizens 
(2012: 17). Importantly, this external imposition of misplaced models also leads to a 
range of adverse effects and collateral damage on the ground, including human rights 
violations, abuses against civilians, and insecurity. Moreover, the intelligence 
capabilities of recipient regimes enhanced by the West often lack accountability, thus 
directly counteracting the objective of promoting ‘democratic’ policing (2012: 26, 
35). Ellison and Pino thus conclude that ‘we are sceptical whether Western 
development strategies are really about development in the periphery at all, or whether 
they can be viewed more cynically as ultimately benefiting the interests of the donor 
nation’ (2012: 54).  
Cohen (1988), on the other hand, took a slightly different stance by proposing a 
position between ‘benign transfer’ and ‘malignant colonialism’ which he called 
‘paradoxical damage’. While he agreed with dependency theorists that ‘problems of 
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poverty, illness, crime, and exploitation should be seen as immanent and intrinsic to 
the historical and current relationships between the poor and rich countries’ (1988: 
190), he was much more sceptical than Ellison and Pino when it came to the question 
of intentions. Instead, he argues, what is at stake is that these crime control models – 
which are promoted by people with predominantly (but not exclusively) good 
intentions – create what he calls, drawing on Illich, ‘criminal iatrogenesis’: damaging 
unintended effects (see also Bowling 2011). Indeed, the crime control models 
exported did not have a history of success in the Global North, and there is no reason 
to think they will have it in the Global South either. Still, he asserts, the malignancy 
of the capitalist enterprise is often exaggerated in neo-Marxist accounts, and the 
structural imperialism model fails to pick up on certain middle-range issues; rather:  
‘In [the model of ‘paradoxical damage’], if the analogy between the Third 
World and Western “stages” of development is to be of any use at all, it 
lies in seeing how these same systems are being reproduced and imposed 
again. These modes of power and discipline, the essence of what Foucault 
calls “power-knowledge spiral,” cannot be evaluated in terms of cost 
effectiveness or success. They are systems of regulation, supervision, and 
classification. It is this discourse, this way of seeing and thinking about the 
world, that is being exported and that has to be resisted’ (Cohen 1988: 192).  
This dissertation shares and builds on Cohen’s perspective. It regards the international 
political economy and the asymmetrical structural power imbalance between the 
Global North and South as an indispensable aspect of analyses of travelling crime 
control models. At the same time, it finds the perspective of European export of crime 
control to the Global South as an intentional malignant machinery geared towards 
effective exploitation of the Global South as being overstated. Following Cohen, it 
finds it important to take seriously the self-perpetuating role of agencies and control 
systems as well as their system-internal logic (EU staff probably mostly have good 
intentions, but they usually also have a wish of advancing within the system), at the 
same time as the power of institutions of social control tend to ‘subvert the purposes 
for which they were originally intended and that they still profess’ (Cohen 1988: 190).  
Still, (critical) realist aspects and explanations should not be underestimated. In her 
ambitious book Why Europe Intervenes in Africa (2017), Catherine Gegout reviews, 
based on hypothesizing realism, constructivism and postcolonialism, the motives 
behind all European military interventions (both of the EU and key EU member states 
– notably France and the UK) in Africa since the late 1980s. As the second part of her 
title implies, she finds that the main motives for intervention were security, prestige 
and the legacy of colonialism. Security motives include the protection of military 
bases and European citizens living in Africa, protection from terrorism and migration, 
and removal of authoritarian leaders (Gegout 2017: 3). Motives of prestige refer to 
prestige in international relations which increases the intervener’s influence over other 
states (ibid). Postcolonialism, which she to a large extent conflates with neo-
colonialism, means that new interventions are conditioned by former colonial 
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relations, and France and the UK still act according to their zones of influence (2017: 
6). She also finds Eurocentrism, ‘the belief that European culture and history are the 
norm, and that all other cultures are peripheral’ (Gegout 2017: 5), to be at work in 
Europe-Africa relations, and that it is also often a motive for inaction. 
Humanitarianism has, counter to what has been professed, never been the main motive 
for the interventions of neither France, UK nor the EU, yet, it has sometimes been one 
among the other, more important, motives. Moreover, economic motives were also 
not a main reason for intervention, although interveners were always mindful not to 
hurt their own economic interests. In general, Gegout (2017) makes a strong case for 
the importance of (critical) realist theory when it comes to understanding European 
intervention in Africa; and although her theory is on military intervention, I find little 
reason to believe that motives behind European intervention into African countries’ 
internal security sectors should be extremely different.  
One of the main strengths and contributions of Marxist theory is the theorizing of 
power as forms of structural domination which is created and reproduced by 
international political economy. Moreover, power tends to be understood as 
something that is in the possession of certain actors and groups categorized as 
‘powerful’ which are opposed to the other binary category of ‘powerless’, allowing 
for counter-power (resistance) (Smith 2006). Some neo-Marxist strands have also 
gone beyond a ‘mechanical materialism’, such as Gramscian theory with an emphasis 
on ideological domination (Femia 1975), and postcolonial theory giving attention to 
how patterns of (historical) domination are also psychologically and culturally 
internalized (see e.g. Fanon 1965; Saleh-Hanna 2008). Still, this thesis also wishes to 
bring in perspectives on less dominative, more ‘middle-range’, and non-material 
forms of power. For this reason, it complements neo-Marxist perspectives on 
structural power with (neo-)Foucauldian perspectives providing theorizations of more 
nuanced, non-dominative, microphysical and productive forms of power. 
3.3. NEO-FOUCAULDIAN POSTSTRUCTURALIST APPROACHES: 
PRODUCTIVE POWER, GLOBAL GOVERNMENTALITY, AND POLICY 
TRANSLATION 
This section accounts for Foucauldian notions of power19 as they relate to travelling 
crime control policies – particularly in the context of ED-JHA and EU external action 
                                                          
19 Foucault identified three forms of power throughout his (sometimes divergent and hardly 
coherent) authorship, each of which emerged and played their main role at distinct points in 
time, surpassing each other yet also simultaneously co-existing: sovereignty, discipline and 
governmentality. Sovereignty was characterized by the absolute and direct rule of the king, a 
‘play between sovereign wills’, whose object of rule was territory, and obedience to the law 
was a goal in itself. Yet the other two forms of power would come to ‘cut off the king’s head’ 
(Foucault 1995[1977]), by working through dispersed microphysics instead of direct and 
hierarchical imposition. Discipline emerged with the modern institutions of the administrative 
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on crime control. I argue that criminological poststructuralist analyses of crime policy 
mobilities have tended to focus on a micro and at best meso level of analysis that 
could benefit from more analytical attention to global governmentality forwarded by 
IR scholars. Therefore, this account goes from macro, through meso, to micro-levels 
of governmentality analyses of (EU) crime control and security mobilities. With 
regard to north-south travelling crime control models, three ‘sets’ of neo-Foucauldian 
analyses are particularly relevant: first, IR scholars who have theorized global politics 
and north-south relations as ‘global governmentality’ (e.g. Neumann and Sending 
2010; Duffield 2007); second, IR researchers who have investigated EU external 
security governance as governmentality (Balzacq 2008; Merlingen 2011; Merlingen 
and Ostrauskaite 2005, 2007); and, third, criminologists who have researched 
travelling crime control policy as ‘translation’ and ‘translocation’ (Melossi et al. 2011; 
Blaustein 2015).  
Neumann and Sending (2010) extend Foucault’s analysis to explore the 
‘governmentalization of global politics’. In particular, they provide a Foucauldian 
reading of international organizations (IOs), noting that the expansion of systems of 
classification of states, measuring their performance through indicators and 
benchmarking, are indeed technologies through which these IOs govern states 
‘through freedom.’ States are also classified into categories as those who are able or 
not able to govern themselves responsibly – the latter termed ‘failed’ states or at the 
risk of becoming so, i.e. ‘fragile’. In order to receive loans and aid from IOs, states 
need to commit to certain policies and reforms and align their behaviour with 
international norms. Interestingly, Neumann and Sending (2010) note that 
governmentality studies tend to downplay the role of sovereignty – yet an important 
aspect of the governmentalization of global politics has been the ‘governmentalization 
of sovereignty’ in which ‘ownership’ and participatory processes function as indirect 
modes of control. In other words, ‘sovereignty is part of the episteme within which 
                                                          
state, such as schools and prisons and, working through constant classification and supervision 
that sought to discipline bodies and souls so as to make them productive. Governmentality 
emerged as a response to the discovery – through new forms of knowledge such as statistics, 
demography and epidemiology – of ‘the population’, ‘the society’ and ‘the economy’ as ‘new’ 
aspects or entities of reality to be governed. The key aspect that permits governmentality to 
operate is freedom and normalization, as subjects need to be free but simultaneously 
responsibilized. Power produces behaviour which is in accordance with the norm, and people 
are governed indirectly through ‘technologies of freedom’. Neo-Foucauldians also observed a 
new ‘stage’ of governmentality from the middle of the 20th century onwards which they called 
‘advanced liberal’ forms of governmentality (Rose 2000, Dean 1999). They asserted that the 
role of the state had changed from being from being a ‘guarantor and ultimate provider of 
security’ to be a facilitator and partner for multiple autonomous actors, where its role is to ‘steer 
and regulate rather than to row and provide’ (Rose 2000: 324). ‘Action at a distance’ depends 
upon alliances with a range of independent non-state actors who are responsibilized through 
‘techniques of accountability’ (Rose 2000). 
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IOs operate’ (2010: 145). Moreover, Neumann and Sending reflect on the distinction 
between liberal forms of governing and ‘police’ forms of governing (the latter implies 
reconfigured forms of discipline and sovereignty, see Dean 1999), noting that states 
which are classified as being unable or unwilling to govern themselves ‘responsibly’ 
are not only blamed and shamed but sometimes also subject to sanctions and direct 
intervention –  such as UN peace operations or intervention under the heading of 
‘Responsibility to Protect’.  
Also other scholars in international political sociology and what has come to be 
termed ‘Foucauldian Security Studies’ (FSS), have theorized Western liberal 
intervention and war as forms of biopower ‘going beyond the mere territorial (…) to 
transform and improve spaces and populations cast as developmentally backwards’ 
(Howell and Richter-Montpetit 2019: 3). One of the most prominent contributions of 
this literature is Mark Duffield’s book Development, Security and Unending War 
(2007), in which he builds an argument of development as being a liberal ‘technology 
of security’ by exerting moral and educative trusteeship over surplus life. He argues 
that development is not in fact intended at reducing the economic gap between rich 
and poor countries, but rather to ‘contain and manage underdevelopment’s 
destabilizing effects, especially its circulatory epiphenomena such as undocumented 
migrants, asylum seekers, transborder shadow economies or criminal networks’ 
(Duffield 2007: ix). Divided into ‘developed’ and ‘underdeveloped’ species-life, 
‘effective’ countries see it as their moral duty to better the lives of the ones living in 
‘fragile’ and ‘failed’ ones, thus improving international security. This has given birth 
to what Duffield calls ‘liberal imperialism’ and ‘humanitarian empire’ implemented 
by donor governments, UN agencies, militaries and NGOs (2007: 7-8). Thus, while 
old forms of colonialism were marked by sovereign forms of power, the ‘new 
imperialism’ is characterized by what Duffield calls, drawing on Harrison (2004), 
‘contingent sovereignty’:  
‘While respect for territorial integrity remains, sovereignty over life within 
ineffective states has become internationalized, negotiable and contingent 
(…). Contingent sovereignty constitutes a zone or frontier that is shaped 
by the interaction between national and international actors and institutions 
(…). It constitutes a contested post-interventionary political terrain. In 
consolidating this frontier the state has reoccupied the centre ground of 
Western development discourse’ (Duffield 2007: 28).  
With regards to crime, Duffield’s analysis makes an important contribution by 
highlighting how the danger of ‘transnational illicit flows’ has come to legitimate 
western intervention into states labelled as ‘fragile’ and ‘failed’. Yet his main focus, 
probably due to his background as a development scholar, is on development and the 
liberal, rather than the illiberal, aspects of biopolitical and governmental rationalities 
and technologies. Other FSS scholars have tended to explore illiberal practices too, 
yet almost always focusing on security as war and military intervention and not on 
crime and crime control (see e.g. Bachmann et al. 2014). With regard to the latter, 
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however, an important criminological contribution has been made by Brisson-Boivin 
and O’Connor (2013) who coined the term ‘penal aid’ to denote increasing 
international efforts to fix the ‘flawed penality’ of ‘fragile states’ so as to make them 
more effective in countering transnational security threats. According to Brisson-
Boivin and O’Connor, penal aid embodies specific logics and rationalities of control 
as well as the particular technologies deriving from them, for instance by providing 
certain ‘universal’ penal norms and rule-of-law indicators. While their text is a great 
step forward in theorizing global or international crime control as governmentality, 
criminologists applying a Foucauldian perspective have not theorized the transfer of 
crime control and security policies as a part of EU external relations – as opposed to 
critical security studies (CSS) and international political sociology.  
While the Copenhagen School’s Securitization Theory conceptualized securitization 
as an issue becoming a matter of security through a performative ‘speech act’ (thus 
focusing on securitizing discourse) (Buzan et al. 1998), the Paris School of CSS 
developed a sociologically-oriented understanding drawing on Bourdieusian and 
Foucauldian understanding of practices. Thierry Balzacq noted that security problems 
may sometimes even originate with little discursive design, arguing that securitization 
might best be understood by ‘focusing on the nature and functions of policy tools used 
by agents/agencies to cope with public problems, defined as threats’ (2011: 15).20  
Securitization tools, which are ‘empirical referents of policy’, embody a specific 
image of the threat and the practices through which it should be tackled, have their 
own political economy, and shape social relations in decisive ways (2011: 16). 
Further, Balzacq identified three broad types of policy instruments in the external 
dimension of EU Justice and Home Affairs: regulatory (e.g. action plans), incentive 
(e.g. development aid) and capacity instruments (e.g. information exchange) (Balzacq 
2008, 2011). Regulatory instruments work through ‘normalization’ of behaviour (e.g. 
through policy regulation, constitution), for instance by prohibiting certain activities 
which are turned into a menace (Balzacq 2011: 17, 2008). I find this perspective 
particularly interesting with regard to the power of EU Association Agreements (AAs) 
and action plans with the ENP countries, coined by some as an instance of ‘structural 
power Europe’ (SPE) – the power of the EU to impact the legal and regulatory 
mechanisms of third countries as ‘a sustainable effort of the European Union to shape 
the neighbourhood according to its own “template” (…)’ (Tyushka 2017: 48). 
Regulatory tools relate essentially to the processes of governmentality (Balzacq 2011: 
                                                          
20 Balzacq (2011: 3) defines securitization as ‘an articulated assemblage of practices whereby 
heuristic artefacts (metaphors, policy tools, image repertoires, analogies, stereotypes, emotions, 
etc.) are contextually mobilized by a securitizing actor, who works to prompt an audience to 
build a coherent network of implications (feelings, sensations, thoughts, and intuitions), about 
the critical vulnerability of a referent object, that concurs with the securitizing actor’s reasons 
for choices and actions, by investing the referent subject with such an aura of unprecedented 
threatening complexion that a customized policy must be undertaken immediately to block its 
development’. 
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17). Capacity tools, on the other hand, are specific modalities for imposing external 
discipline upon individuals and groups (Balzacq 2011: 15) and include, inter alia, 
‘information, training, force and other resources necessary to the attainment of policy 
purposes’ (Balzacq 2008: 82). Capacity tools are for instance EU databases, which 
‘are always under pressure to adopt new protocols and practices, to extend their 
functions and to mobilize new resources to attend to the transformations in what is 
perceived as a precarious environment’ (Balzacq 2008: 82). This thesis, however, 
focuses on the third type of instrument, namely incentive instruments such as 
development aid, which Balzacq granted relatively little attention.   
With regard to analyzing EU foreign policy and security sector reform as 
governmentality, brilliant contributions have also been made by Michael Merlingen – 
both alone (Merlingen 2011) and together with Rasa Ostrauskaite (Merlingen and 
Ostrauskaite 2005, 2007). Central their work have been the Foucauldian conceptions 
of ‘political rationalities’ and ‘political technologies’ on which this thesis also draws. 
‘Political rationalities’ which are logics of governing ‘underpinned by coherent 
systems of thought, [with] different kinds of calculations, strategies and tactics linked 
to each’ (Rose, 1999: 24) that delimit a field of governance in a practical, technical 
and programmatic way by ‘shap[ing] what is and is not thinkable, reasonable, 
practicable and doable’ (Merlingen, 2011: 152). Political technologies ‘translate the 
governmental ambitions embodied in political projects of improvement into the realm 
of action’ (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2007: 23); they are ‘the practices and devices 
through which political rationalities are operationalized and implemented in actual 
governance programmes and activities’ (Merlingen, 2011: 152). Merlingen and 
Ostrauskaite (2005; 2007) draw on both IR and criminology, and Garland’s work in 
particular, to develop their analysis of how police training in European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP, now CSDP) missions work simultaneously as ‘technologies 
of the other’ through external pressures, as well as ‘technologies of the self’ by which 
police in the post-conflict country are trained to work on themselves to create their 
own subjectivities. With regard to political rationalities, they note that ‘ESDP police 
missions promote punitive, sovereign technologies of policing in the context of their 
governmental project to cultivate post-conflict police forces that effectively and 
humanely control and protect citizens and public order’ (2007: 22). Yet, the missions 
are also themselves underpinned by specific political rationalities: 
‘Contemporary peacebuilding is underpinned by a rationality that joins, 
albeit uneasily, elements of both the pastorate and liberalism. It assembles 
heterogeneous programmes and technologies with a view to promoting 
liberty through practices of unfreedom. The underlying assumption is that 
a period of pastoral discipline and administration is needed to inculcate 
habits of responsible choice into natives and install institutional capacities 
for liberal peace in violently divided societies (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 
2007: 31). 
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Governmentality analyses’ attention to ‘the quotidian functioning of the micro-
physical power’, they argue, brings into focus how even small missions with limited 
budgets that ‘lack big sticks and juicy carrots, are able to mobilize non-sovereign 
forms of power that evade and undermine the material, juridical and diplomatic 
limitations placed on them’ (2007: 29). In this respect, Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 
identify a basic repertoire of technologies that ESDP missions employ to align the 
conduct of locals consistent with their objectives, the operation of which makes out a 
field of governmentality: co-location, professionalization and governmentalization 
(2007: 104). Co-location of EU experts along with senior local staff with strategic and 
tactical responsibilities in Ministries of Security or Interior as well as alongside 
officers in field headquarters and police stations that do monitoring, mentoring and 
advising, ‘manipulates relations of vision to regulate the conduct and subjectivity of 
local police officers’ (2007: 104).  Also a disciplinary technique, professionalization 
mobilizes ‘truth’ to reassemble individual selves through local police officers 
internalizing a series of Western-defined norms about police professionalism, 
whereby they subsequently subject themselves to self-scrutiny and self-evaluation in 
an effort to improve themselves. Governmentalization, on the other hand, refers to the 
transformation of public sector institutions of conflict-affected states to align them to 
neoliberal Western standards of bureaucratization and public sector competitiveness.  
In doing so, Merlingen and Ostrauskaite warn, peacebuilders hollow out local law- 
and rule-making powers, running the ‘risk of institutionalizing a concern with 
economic rationality in public organizations at the expense of alternative 
organizational principles, notably the democratic participation of citizens’ (2007: 
110). 
From a criminological point of view, Blaustein (2015) analyzed police reform (but 
that of other international actors such as United Nations Development Programme - 
UNDP, not the EU) in Bosnia and Herzegovina from a governmentality perspective, 
seeing it as an instance of ‘glocal policing’, where transnational crime control impacts 
on ‘low’ police-building locally. Similarly to Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, he is 
concerned with how the global models of policing are being ‘translated’ into local 
trainings and practices – noting that they are rather aiming at control than 
empowerment. However, instead of focusing on political technologies, he draws on 
the Latourian notion of translation, and role of mediators who ‘transform, translate, 
distort and modify the meaning or the elements that they are supposed to carry’ with 
the effect that ‘[t]heir input is never a good predictor of their output’ (Latour 2005: 39 
cited in Blaustein 2015: 83; see also Cold-Ravnkilde and Nissen, forthcoming, for a 
similar analysis of EU security policy in Mali). In doing this, Blaustein both leans on 
and further develops a long ongoing debate in the sociology of punishment on the 
cultural embeddedness of ‘penal transplants’ (Garland 2006; Melossi et al. 2011). The 
concept of ‘penal transplant’ (building on that of ‘legal transplant’ in legal 
scholarship) refers to travelling penal institutions, legal terms and criminological 
conceptions (Garland 2006). Melossi et al. 2011 argued that attention in analyses of 
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policy mobilities should be given to the processes of translation, trans-location and 
metamorphosis when the travelling penal object is transplanted to a new context. 
Analyses on how crime control models travel have almost exclusively focused on 
policing models and especially on ‘community policing’ (but see Milivojevic 2019). 
By focusing rather on the export of borders and their management as an increasingly 
central ‘technology of crime control’, this thesis (Article 3) also draws on (critical) 
border studies from both criminology and IR to theorize the border as a ‘penal 
transplant’ in West Africa. Theories on borders will, however, not be described at 
lengths here as this is done to some extent in Article 3.  
Foucauldian notions of power as productive are important contributions on which this 
thesis draws. Still, it should be mentioned that some have criticised Foucault’s 
genealogy of power for being selective and ahistorical due to its inherent 
Eurocentrism which ignored (or at least downplayed) the role of racism and 
colonialism – not only overlooking Europe’s exertion of (dominative forms of) power 
in the colonies but also colonialism’s constitutive role in the making of European 
modernity (Howell and Richter-Montpetit 2019). In the colonies, microphysical forms 
of power such as discipline and governmentality were not applied; rather, here 
Europeans would direct domination through physical violence and sovereign forms of 
power. Biopolitics, it has been argued, is based on an unspecified view of a 
Eurocentric ‘human’ (Howell and Richter-Montpetit 2019). In this regard, Achille 
Mbembe (2003) complemented Foucault by focusing on the role of racism and 
especially the violent character of sovereignty – which does not only entail the power 
to let live (biopolitics) but also the power to kill (necropolitics). Mbembe’s concept 
of necropower is especially relevant with regard to analysing both old and new forms 
of colonization. Power as domination is generally downplayed in Foucauldian theory 
(Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2007: 25). In other words, in their attempt to go beyond 
merely repressive forms of power to bring out its productivity, governmentality 
scholars often fall into the trap of subscribing to ‘an ethically vacuous and hence 
apolitical reading of liberal power’ (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2007: 25). Generally, 
Foucauldian analyses have tended to focus less on the role of the state and sovereignty 
(Tombs and Whyte 2003: 223; Aas 2011b: 332), which are concepts that this 
dissertation aims to bring to the forefront of analyses of crime control. Therefore, it 
complements neo-Foucauldian perspectives with neo-Marxist and (post)colonial 
ones. However, I also argue in this dissertation that there is a need to go beyond 
‘traditional’ Western theorizations (be it Foucault or Marx) of political power in order 
to understand and conceptualize what happens when European crime control models 
travel to Africa. 
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3.4. WESTERN CRIME CONTROL MODELS MEET AFRICAN 
STATEHOOD, POLITICAL POWER AND SOCIAL CONTROL 
This dissertation is not merely concerned with how crime control models travel from 
Europe to Africa, and the forms of power implicated in such travelling, but also what 
happens when these European policies and models meet African realities (or 
discourses, if we are to stick to Foucault). This is simultaneously a question of what 
happens to Western-conceived criminological theory when it meets African political 
orders and forms of social control. Can political power and crime control in Europe 
and Africa be conceptualized in the same way, using the same theoretical lenses – as 
sovereignty, discipline and governmentality, or as class struggle? What are the extents 
and limits of criminological theory (and social and political theory at large) when 
exploring crime and crime control in West Africa?  
Some scholars of SSR have criticized the Western efforts to export an ideal-type legal-
rational Weberian state to countries labelled as ‘fragile’ or ‘failed’ (e.g. Duffield 2007; 
Abrahamsen 2016; Ellison and Pino 2012). Security assistance is mainly directed at 
state actors, such as police, gendarmerie, intelligence services and Ministries of 
Interior and Justice – while non-state actors tend to be viewed as threatening and in 
opposition to the state (Abrahamsen 2016). Abrahamsen (2016) observes that Western 
donors, such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), which has had a leading role in defining SSR, have to some extent 
internalized the above critique about Eurocentricity, now also propagating 
‘networked’ forms of SSR where the state should be acting like a hub of control. In 
this new model, which is thought to be more fitting to the type of political regulation 
in post-conflict societies, the state should ‘steer and regulate rather than row and 
provide’ (Abrahamsen 2016: 289; c.f. Rose 2000), and Western SSR has become more 
willing to acknowledge that security and justice in (post-)conflict societies are often 
provided by non-state actors – as long as they act in accordance with the state. In fact, 
there seems to be a shift from comprehensive state-building based on norms and rules 
(i.e., good governance, rule of law, human rights) towards ‘state-building lite:’ 
pragmatic, technical and decentralised forms of security assistance aimed to build the 
capabilities of subnational security actors (Tholens, 2017). However, Abrahamsen 
argues that despite Western actors’ ability to learn, the new ‘networked state’ is 
nevertheless a new fixed model conception of state as a particular material form 
performing particular roles; reproducing the opposition between the weak/fragile state 
and the ideal state, and the binary between state and non-state actors (2016: 289). Such 
SSR discourses of statehood are deeply ahistorical, she asserts, as the postcolonial 
states were created in very different ways than European ones – namely out of 
European imperial competition. For this reason, Africanists and anthropologists have 
called for studying African statehood and political orders on their own empirical terms 
rather than deficiencies compared to Western states – exploring what statehood in 
Africa is rather than what it is not.  
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Jean-Francois Bayart (1993) argued that patrimonial state structures in Africa can be 
better termed a ‘rhizome state’ ‘equivalent to a tangled underground root system, 
which has no ‘central axis’, no unified point of origin, and no given direction or 
growth (Grosz 1994 in Ellison and Pino 2012: 37). De jure sovereign states, partly 
legacies of colonialism and partly attempted exported after de-colonization, have 
never been fully institutionalized and are seen by some scholars to provide ‘empty 
shells’ which are bad indicators for how (informal) political power actually operates 
(Chabal and Daloz 1999; Vigh 2012). Therefore, African studies scholars have argued 
for conceptualizing statehood as processes rather than a fixed entity (Abrahamsen 
2016; Hagmann and Péclard 2010; Solhjell 2020; Lund 2007). Analytical attention is 
then paid to how a range of actors – both those considered state, non-state, or in-
between – are ‘doing the state’ (Abrahamsen 2016): exploring ‘empirical statehood’ 
and the ways in which it is negotiated (Hagmann and Péclard, 2010).  The state, then, 
should be understood as an idea and a category of practices rather than a (pre-defined) 
category of analysis; and investigation should pay attention to how the state is 
performed and enacted thorough people’s experiences (Solhjell 2019: 10).  
It has been observed that political power in the Sahel and Africa more broadly has 
been expressed as control over people rather than land (McDougall and Scheele 2012: 
14; Bayart 2000: 34; Bøås 2015). Thus, political power in Africa has been theorized 
as patrimonial, informal and personalized, working through ‘instrumentalizing 
disorder’ (Chabal and Daloz 1999; Erdmann and Engel 2007). Terms such as ‘hybrid 
political orders’ (Boege et al., 2008), ‘Big Man networks’ (Utas, 2012), and 
‘heterarchy’ (Hüsken and Klute, 2015), have been conceived of in order to 
conceptualize the diversity and dynamics of non-state political orders parallel to or 
beyond state sovereignty. For instance, Hüsken and Klute (2015) argue that Libya and 
northern Mali are characterized by what they call ‘heterarchical’ forms of political 
organization (i.e., non-hierarchical, ‘fluctuating entangling and disentangling tribal, 
statelike, Islamist and jihadist, youth, civil, organized crime, and militia-like forms of 
political organization’) which have varying and changing relations to the central state: 
’In a heterarchical configuration, the state loses its predominant position 
and becomes one player (albeit often first among equals) among a number 
of political actors who negotiate the political order on a horizontal plane. 
For some authors, these processes stand for decline in statehood and 
political disintegration. For others, they mark a political reality that is 
shaped by the dissolving of clear demarcations between state and non-state 
actors. Shared sovereignty between state and non-state formations, 
between centres and peripheries, between the national and the local level, 
becomes a central feature of the ‘real practice of African governance’’ 
(Hüsken, 2017: 914). 
Such ‘real practices of African governance’ challenge Western-imposed security 
models focused on stabilization and stateness understood as territorial control 
(Abrahamsen 2016: 291). However, while some few African studies scholars have 
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given attention to crime, for instance, extra-legal governance by groups performing 
para-state or ‘shadow state’ functions (Reno 2011), this strand of theory has generally 
lacked conceptualizations of crime control. This is curious given that crime control, 
as one of the key functions of a legitimate monopoly of force, is so central to the 
Weberian state model that this strand of research has been so keen to contest. By 
drawing on theories on African statehood, this dissertation argues that Western 
criminological theory is challenged in central ways, which calls for a re-
conceptualization of the relationship between crime control, political power, and the 
state.  
3.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The dissertation draws on both critical theory (Articles 2 and 4) and Foucauldian 
poststructuralist theory (Articles 1 and 3). These two strands of theory are, however, 
intuitively ontologically and epistemologically incompatible. This has to do with their 
different conceptions of reality. For (neo-)Marxists there is an objectively real reality 
which tends to be masked and concealed by liberal discourses that hide real ideology 
and domination; while for (neo-)Foucauldians reality is discursively constructed can 
only be (subjectively) grasped through discourses, concepts and representations. This 
also has epistemological consequences: are we ‘unmasking’ reality or are we studying 
its discursive representations? My argument is that although these ontologies may be 
incompatible, there is a need to combine these two strands in order to provide a more 
holistic analysis of power with regard to travelling crime control. This means that 
analysis needs to have attention to both structural forms of power (with attention to 
how crime control export is embedded within the overall political economy) as well 
as to productive, de-centered and non-dominative forms of productive power. 
Moreover, the two perspectives are drawn on in this thesis at different ‘levels’ of 
analysis: one ‘uncovers’ the ‘real’ practices of crime policy export; the other gives a 
meta-perspective on articulations, understandings and discourses. Thus, rather than 
being in opposition, I argue that these perspectives should supplement and 
complement one another. 
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CHAPTER 4. RESEARCH DESIGN, 
METHODOLOGY, AND DATA 
The empirical ambition of this thesis has been to study the entire ‘chain’ of ‘crime 
control as external policy:’ from crime policy formulation in Brussels and broader EU 
policy trends, to ways in which policy and models are transferred and exported, the 
implementation of counter-crime projects in the Sahel and their consequences. This 
has been reflected in the research design, which followed three phases: moving from 
document review of broad EU policies over time – to fieldwork in West Africa – and 
back to interviews at EU institutions in Brussels. 
4.1. PHASE 1: EU POLICY REVIEW AND COMPILATION OF A 
DATABASE ON EU ‘INTERNAL SECURITY AID’ TO THE WIDER 
SOUTHERN NEIGHBOURHOOD THE PAST 15 YEARS 
Since the Tampere European Council in 1999, the EU has produced a range of official 
strategies highlighting its progressive wish to use external and foreign policy 
instruments to tackle crime-related security threats (e.g. European Council 1999; 
Council 2003, 2005, 2010; EUGS, 2016). The purpose of these official strategies was 
to call for common action between the Member States. Yet having studied a wide 
variety of EU official strategies, I argue that a deeper understanding of how the EU 
conceives of ‘transnational crime’ and the ways in which it should be controlled, is 
hard to attain from such reading. The fight against transnational crime most often 
figures as an ‘add on’ to a (changing) list of security threats, sometimes figuring by 
itself, and sometimes as a part of other ‘threats’ such as drug trafficking or human 
trafficking – very rarely accompanied by an explanatory note about what the term 
actually contains. Moreover, the discourse in these strategies is very much in line with 
a global consensual crime control discourse and multilaterally accepted frames 
(Jakobi 2013; Andreas and Nadelmann 2006), often along the following lines:  
‘Europe is a prime target for organised crime. This internal threat to our 
security has an important external dimension: cross-border trafficking in 
drugs, women, illegal migrants and weapons accounts for a large part of 
the activities of criminal gangs. It can have links with terrorism. Such 
criminal activities are often associated with weak or failing states’ 
(Council, 2003:32). 
Thus, the aim of this doctoral research has been to go beyond official EU strategies to 
also explore how this discourse has legitimated particular processes and practices – or 
what Focuauldians would refer to as the material/practical dimension of discourse. It 
has been argued that that the policy narrative of state fragility as a breeding ground 
for transnational organized crime and other security threats, and the view that these 
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external threats pose a direct threat to the West’s internal security (i.e., the internal-
external security nexus), have legitimized and fuelled Western intervention into 
countries in the Global South (Duffield 2007). In other words, the inability of 
countries to exercise their sovereignty in terms of controlling crime and violence on 
their territory legitimizes the incursion of external actors into their sovereign space 
for crime control purposes. This is the background why this thesis rather embarked on 
studying the ‘material’ or ‘practical’ dimension of EU external crime control policies 
– i.e., what the EU does rather than what it says (c.f. Smith 2005). 
In doing so, the dissertation aligns itself with the Paris School in critical security 
studies (CSS), which called for moving beyond the linguistic dimension of threat 
construction (i.e., securitization as speech act) to focus on security professionals, 
security practices, security tools and technologies (Bigo 2014, Balzacq 2011). Thierry 
Balzacq argued for studying securitization by exploring the ‘empirical referents of 
policy’ – i.e., ‘the policy tools and instruments that the EU utilizes to alleviate public 
problems defined as threats’ (2008: 76). Policy tools reveal how policy-makers 
translate intentions into concrete actions yet they may also come to ‘live lives of their 
own’ (indeed, mission creep is not uncommon). Also Lascoumes and Le Galès (2007) 
developed a compatible theory of policy instruments premised on two main 
arguments: 
(1) public policy instrumentation is a major issue in public policy, since it 
reveals a (fairly explicit) theorization of the relationship between the 
governing and the governed: every instrument constitutes a condensed 
form of knowledge about social control and ways of exercising it; and (2) 
instruments at work are not neutral devices: they produce specific effects, 
independently of the objective pursued (the aims ascribed to them), which 
structure public policy according to their own logic. (Lascoumes and Le 
Galès 2007: 1). 
Methodologically, then, attention needs to be paid to rationales behind policy tools as 
well as the knowledge that a tool provides about the nature of a threat (Balzacq 2008).  
Article 1, co-authored with Dr. Alessandra Russo, explores the broad policy trends of 
the EU’s fight against crime across regions over a period of 15 years. 
Methodologically, it looks at what Balzacq (2008) calls ‘incentive instruments,’ 
meaning that it scrutinizes the aid that the EU has spent on projects with objectives to 
fight transnational crime. One alternative way to study broader policy trends could 
have been to look at what Balzacq (2008) calls ‘regulatory instruments’ – through 
exploring the extent of transfer of the JHA acquis to third countries and the legal basis 
for external action scrutinizing Association Agreements (AAs) and action plans 
(APs), or for countries beyond  the European Neighbhourhood Policy (ENP) 
countries, bi-lateral agreements (which are, however, increasingly informalized and 
sometimes hard to obtain – see Carrera et al. 2019). This is also precisely what is 
typically done by EU scholars studying policy transfer and external governance 
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usually employing legal and institutionalist methods (e.g. Wolff 2012; Lavenex and 
Wichmann 2009, Wichmann 2007). However, this thesis has rather focused on the 
‘meso-level’ external policies (projects, missions), which it argues also have the 
power to shape structures (c.f. Merlingen 2011). 
The following two articles, Articles 2 and 3, rather take a criminological approach by 
looking at the meso and micro-level of how ‘penal transplants’ are transformed, 
‘translated’ or ‘translocated’ into the local context and distinct ‘penal cultures’ (cf. 
Melossi et al. 2011, Sozzo 2011; Garland 2001). However, I argue that only looking 
at this level would inhibit me from understanding the broader patterns of how the 
EU’s understanding of and responses to ‘transnational (organized) crime’ have 
changed across regions and over time. 
Therefore, Article 1 embarked on a methodology that allowed for a Foucauldian type 
of comparison – where the units of analysis and comparison are ‘political rationalities 
and technologies of crime control’ (c.f. Rose and Miller 1992). It is based, apart from 
a review of EU policies, on the compilation of a database on EU aid to fight 
transnational (organized) crime across the wider Eastern and Southern 
Neighbourhoods21 the past 15 years22  across different EU funding lines.23 In total, we 
compiled24 information about 216 projects; 67 in the East divided between 57 in 
Eastern Europe, 10 in Central Asia; and 149 in the South divided between 74 in North 
Africa and the Middle East (MENA), and 75 in Sahel/Lake Chad and the Horn of 
Africa (see Appendix C). We calculated that project aid to crime control objectives 
(leaving out CSDP missions) amounted to a total of almost €2.4 billion: €877,5 
million in the East, divided between €805 million in EaP area and €72.5 million in 
Central Asia; €1.5 billion in the South, divided between €925 million in MENA, €414 
                                                          
21 I compiled the database and wrote the part on the wider Southern neighbourhood, meaning 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Sahel/Lake Chad and Horn of Africa, and Alessandra 
Russo compiled and wrote the parts on the wider Eastern neighbourhood, meaning Eastern 
European countries and Central Asia. We collaborated on comparing and authoring the 
comparative parts. We chose to leave out the Western Balkans. The main reason for this is that 
the Balkans has generated the richest literature on ED-JHA (e.g. Trauner 2007; Ioannides and 
Colanter-Celador 2011; Merlingen 2011; Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2007; Milivojevic 2019). 
22 The timeframe of 15 years was chosen due to the fact that the earliest EU projects that we 
were able to find information about online started in 2005. 
23 This includes both intergovernmental CSDP, and the Commission-run external policy 
instruments: European Neighbourhood (Partnership) Instrument (ENPI/ENI), Development 
Cooperation Instrument (DCI), European Development Fund (EDF), Instrument contributing 
to Stability and Peace (IcSP), EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF). 
24 Compilation means that we collected as much information as possible about as many projects 
that we could possibly find through internet research. 
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million in Sahel/Lake Chad and €169 million in the Horn of Africa. However, these 
amounts constitute a minimum as for several projects the amount of aid could not be 
found. CSDP missions were compiled and reviewed but not added to the above 
numbers as they have annual running costs between €15-30 million – yet it is not 
always easy to find the exact amount for each year. It should be noted that the database 
is neither quantitative nor can it deliver a statistical representation of the EU’s fight 
against crime. Our main focus has not been on quantification but rather on tracing and 
systematizing broader patterns characterizing the EU’s external fight against 
transnational crime over time, although information is lacking to make it exhaustive. 
This approach assumes that action fiches and action documents are more revealing 
than official strategies in shedding light on how the EU renders ‘transnational 
(organized) crime’ governable in different contexts. Action fiches are 20-30 pages 
project documents comprising information about a project’s objective, funding line, 
timeframe, aid modality, context/country situation, complementary projects, 
description of the project’s actions and activities, expected results, and implementing 
partner. The database thus builds on the mining and review of several thousand pages 
of action fiches and action documents, and when these were lacking, website 
contents.25 It should thus be emphasized that the database does not include all the 
EU’s projects, missions or external action as much information was unobtainable – 
yet, we argue that we have managed to gather enough information about a sufficient 
amount of projects/missions so as to be able to say something about the broader 
patterns and trends of how the EU problematizes and seeks to govern crime across its 
extended neighbourhoods. All projects/missions gathered were coded as to whether 
they explicitly (i.e. sectors of intervention) and/or implicitly (i.e., objectives and 
activities) comprised elements on law enforcement/police, justice, prison, border 
security, or alternative development. This gave us a better comprehension of the 
evolving patterns in terms of what types of crime the EU prioritizes to combat, where, 
how and why. It should be mentioned that we through our mapping simultaneously 
constructed our own conception of ‘transnational organized crime’ as a research 
object. Therefore, we took a broad approach: for instance, as the EU regards terrorism 
as a crime and favours a criminal justice response to it (Argomaniz 2012) we also 
included projects on counter-terrorism (CT) and countering violent extremism (CVE) 
in our mapping. Projects on migration and border security were also included when 
                                                          
25 It should be noted that a serious problem with doing online research on EU projects and 
money is that information is outdated, incomplete and/or rapidly disappearing. The author 
recently discovered that the European Commission removes action fiches of EUTF projects 
from the Internet after the project is completed – something which means that it is difficult to 
have thorough information about a finished project. This poses problems for future uses of the 
database as it provides links to the action fiches/documents and only a part of the action fiches 
have been physically downloaded to the author’s computer. Luckily, this happened after the 
articles were written. I would argue this also poses serious problems to EU transparency. 
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they had components on crime (e.g. fighting illegal migration, migrant smuggling, 
human trafficking). 
4.2. PHASE 2: FIELDWORK IN SENEGAL, MALI AND NIGER 
The objective of the fieldwork was to uncover information that the above database 
could not provide, namely how EU crime policy was transferred and crime-fighting 
projects were actually implemented on the ground. In other words, it focused 
primarily on processes and practices of crime policy export, and views on those 
practices, as well as what happens in the meeting point between project 
implementation and local social realities. In addition, it had the exploratory aim of 
getting an overview of what other European (i.e., Member States bilaterally) and 
international actors did in these countries in terms of security and crime-fighting – 
meaning, what was the EU’s role in this crowded field compared to that of other 
actors. 
4.2.1. CHOICE OF COUNTRIES FOR FIELDWORK 
The units of research and analysis in this doctoral research are (types of) crime control 
policies, models and interventions. Fieldwork sites were thus chosen due to being the 
transnational locations most targeted by the EU’s external fight against transnational 
crime, and which constitute a wide breadth/variety of types of EU crime control 
interventions. Senegal, Mali and Niger are three out of five EU priority countries in 
Africa (the other being Nigeria and Ethiopia), and the three largest recipients of the 
security-focused EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF).26 While more EU 
funding to projects with crime control objectives goes to North African countries (see 
Article 1), these have also been more extensively studied when it comes to the ED-
JHA (see e.g. Durac 2018; Roccu and Voltolini 2018; Del Sarto and Steindler 2015; 
Joffé 2008; Roy 2012; Wolff 2012; Wichmann and Lavenex 2009; Cassarino 2017). 
The growing importance of ED-JHA in EU action in the Sahel is a more recent trend, 
which has accelerated with the 2015 ‘migration crisis’ and launch of the EUTF 
(Stambøl 2019). Another key reason for choosing the Sahel is also that it is, contrary 
to North Africa, home to three large CSDP missions27 – which are particularly 
interesting from a crime control perspective as they build internal security apparatuses 
                                                          
26 In 2017 EUTF had programmed for Niger 229,9 mill euro, for Mali 186,85 mill euro and for 
Senegal 161,8 mill euro. See EUTF progress report 2017: 
https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/euetfa/files/2017_tffa_en_web_lowres_final05.pdf  
Security and crime-related EU funding is much higher for these three countries than for Nigeria 
and Ethiopia. 
27 Although there is EUBAM Libya, which is based in Tunis as Libya is not only inaccessible 
for researchers but also for EU staff. 
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with mission mandates to fight transnational crime. Thus, the Sahel seems to be home 
to a larger variety of interventions despite lower amounts of total funding.  
Mali is particularly interesting, as it has provided a ‘test’ case and a ‘laboratory’, for 
the EU’s comprehensive approach – meaning the deployment of a whole variety of 
foreign and external policy instruments (Cold-Ravnkilde and Nissen, forthcoming), 
where the EU’s main objectives are to fight security threats such as terrorism, violent 
extremism and organized crime.  
Niger is especially interesting in terms of crime control due to the EU’s 
comprehensive efforts to enrol the country in its fight against transnational migrant 
smuggling. This has been done through deploying an extensive set of projects, 
including a CSDP mission, with crime control objectives.  
Senegal is both interesting in and by itself, as one of the first countries in West Africa 
that started intensively collaborating with Europe and the EU on internal security to 
stop ‘migrant smuggling’, but also because Dakar is the home to the regional 
headquarters of International Organizations (IOs) from where many of the region-
wide projects are being managed – including those of the EU, UNODC and IOM. 
Thus, this research is not a comparative case study of countries, rather it is a study of 
crime control interventions. Moreover, fieldwork sites were not chosen due to 
convenience of familiarity with the language – on the contrary, I learned French in 
order to be able to do the fieldwork.28 The first month of interviews in French (which 
started in Mali end of October after three weeks in Senegal), I mostly conducted 
together with other researchers. After about 3 weeks of interviews (and after having 
been about  1,5 months in Africa), I was able to conduct interviews in French alone 
(because I was by then able to formulate comprehensible questions spontaneously not 
just to understand the answer) and after three months I was able to conduct interviews 
in French without a voice recorder, just by taking notes – although I would still always 
prefer the recorder if the interviewee agreed, which they mostly did. With a few 
exceptions, all the French interviews were recorded and later transcribed by research 
assistants in Mali and Senegal. 
Going to three countries gave a wider variety and breadth of EU crime control 
interventions, and helped to discern what policies and action that constitutes a general 
trend that is driven by Brussels and European capitals, and what elements that are 
context-specific and deal with local challenges (bottom-up). Still, there are trade-offs 
                                                          
28 This was feasible because I speak Spanish and some Italian, and had French in school (which 
unfortunately did not leave a sufficiently deep and sustainable impact on me). I would learn 
French the three-four months prior to the fieldwork. 
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to conducting research in three countries, the most obvious of which is the lack of 
deeper and more thorough knowledge of one particular country context. 
4.2.2. MULTI-SITED FIELDWORK 
Fieldwork was conducted in Dakar, Bamako and Niamey29 for four months,30 from 1 
October 2017 to 1 February 2018, and one week in Dakar in January 2019. Most of 
the time was spent in Dakar (about 2 months in total), followed by Bamako (about 1,5 
months) and Niamey (about 4 weeks). The main source of data of this dissertation is 
typically categorized in the literature as ‘elite’ and/or ‘expert’ interviews (see section 
4.5. under for methodological reflections).   
The interviews 
The main reason for interviews being the primary data source is that it turned out to 
be most easily accessible (see the section on access under). Interviewees were selected 
because they held a role as practitioners and mediators, beneficiaries, or direct 
observers, of the crime control policy exported from Brussels to West Africa. They 
thus constituted both ‘policy exporters’ and ‘policy importers’. I conducted 89 
interviews across the three countries with a total of 115 people: 27 in Senegal, 39 in 
Mali and 23 in Niger. 
The interviews lasted between 45 minutes and three hours, but most interviews lasted 
around 1,5 hours and were semi-structured. 25 of the interviews were conducted 
together with other researchers: 18 in Mali, 7 in Niger, and none in Senegal. Two 
interviews were conducted by phone. A distinct interview guide was prepared for each 
interview (i.e., some 3-4 broad topics and/or 5-15 potential questions) based on 
background research of the person’s role/job, crime control policy/intervention and 
context (see Appendix A for interview guide sample questions). Still, the interviews 
tended to deviate from the research guide, typically rather following up on things that 
the interviewee said, often being more like conversations. The interview questions 
were geared at uncovering practices, as well as various actors’ views on these 
practices (more on this in section 4.5. on epistemological challenges).   
                                                          
29 Turning sick with malaria the day before departure unfortunately prevented me from going 
to Agadez in northern Niger, which is an important site with regard to the EU’s fight against 
migrant smuggling. Interviews with people in Agadez were therefore conducted by phone from 
Niamey. 
30 The length of the fieldwork was determined by teaching obligations at Aalborg University, 
which prevented me from staying longer in the field. 
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Category of 
interviewees 
Number of 
interviews 
Number of 
interviewees 
Number of 
individual/group 
interviews  
Interviews 
per country 
EU diplomats and staff 
(EU Delegations, 
CSDP missions, 
ECHO, project staff) 
 
19 
 
28 
 
1 interviewee: 13 
2 interviewees: 4 
Group interviews: 2 
Mali: 10 
Niger: 8 
Senegal: 1 
Diplomatic missions 
and in some cases their 
corresponding 
development 
cooperation agency 
(France, Germany, 
UK, Spain, 
Netherlands, Belgium, 
Denmark, USA)   
 
 
12 
 
 
15 1 interviewee: 9 
2 interviewees: 3 
Group interviews: 0 
 
Mali: 7 
Niger: 2 
Senegal: 3 
International 
Organizations 
(UNODC, IOM, 
Interpol, MINUSMA, 
AU) 
 
15 
 
14 
1 interviewee: 14 
2 interviewees: 0 
Group interviews: 0 
Mali: 5 
Niger: 1 
Senegal: 7 
INGOs (International 
Red Cross, 
International Crisis 
Group, Avocats Sans 
Frontieres) 
 
3 
 
3 1 interviewee: 3 
2 interviewees: 0 
Group interviews: 0 
Mali: 1 
Niger: 1 
Senegal: 1 
Local civil servants 
from Ministries of 
Justice, Interior and/or 
Foreign Affairs 
 
6 
 
15 
1 interviewee: 5 
2 interviewees: 0 
Group interviews: 1 
Mali: 3 
Niger: 1 
Senegal: 2 
Local criminal justice 
actors (police, 
gendarmerie, border 
police, customs, 
prosecutors, defence 
lawyers, judges, 
penitentiary 
authorities) 
 
 
14 
 
 
17 1 interviewee: 13 
2 interviewees: 0 
Group interviews: 1 
 
Mali: 6 
Niger: 2 
Senegal: 6 
 
Local civil society and 
human rights 
organizations 
 
12 
 
15 
1 interviewee: 10 
2 interviewees: 1 
Group interviews: 1 
Mali: 3 
Niger: 5 
Senegal: 4 
Touareg rebel group 
leaders 
2 2 1 interviewee: 2 Mali: 2 
Other (e.g. journalists, 
researchers) 
6 6 1 interviewee: 6  
Total 
89 115 1 interviewee: 75 
2 interviewees: 16 
Group interviews: 4 
Mali: 39 
Niger: 23 
Senegal: 27 
Table 1. Overview of interviews in West Africa. Group interviews included between 3 and 10 
persons. 
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Four interviews were conducted in ‘groups’ of between three and ten people, and some 
interviews were conducted together with other researchers. For instance, one group 
interview was conducted together with colleagues working on the Horizon 2020 
project EUNPACK, with the military personnel at the EU’s military training mission 
(EUTM Mali) in Bamako. In other instances, the group interview emerged rather 
unexpectedly and needed to be spontaneously stunted as more people came to the 
interview than expected. For instance, to one interview at a government office in 
Niamey, ten of the office staff (one of which was a high-ranking civil servant in the 
Ministry of Justice) unexpectedly showed up for the interview without any prior 
notification.  
Most interviews were conducted at the offices of the interviewees as this was the mode 
usually preferred and suggested by the interviewees. Some few interviews were also 
conducted in informal settings, like dinners and lunches. On two occasions I 
interviewed people twice.  
The interviews were partly recorded and partly written by note. 42 interviews were 
conducted in French and thus recorded, with a couple of exceptions where the 
interviewees did not want to be recorded. The rest of the interviews were conducted 
in English, except three interviews in Spanish and one in Swedish/Norwegian and 
these were mostly not recorded but written as notes. 
The choice of notes instead of recorder had an impact on the type of information 
obtained. There are trade-offs on both sides. When not using the voice recorder, one 
misses out on details which are important for interpretative types of interviews which 
focus on details in the narratives of the interviewees – meaning, focusing on how they 
say things. However, I was more interested in the information they could contribute: 
what they said (see section 4.5.). While at most times I could not know whether using 
a voice recorder or not would have inhibited interviewees from talking freely, in one 
case this became obvious. This was an interview where I did use the voice recorder as 
the interview was conducted in French. I was interviewing a top-ranking official in 
one of the countries’ penitentiary systems, and I tried to make him talk about the 
conditions in the prisons. The interview became utterly bizarre because the 
interviewee would say things like: ‘There are no human rights violations in prisons 
and all the prisoners get everything they need’. At the same time, he was finding 
classified reports in his bookshelf which he showed me and even lent me home to take 
a copy of, done by an NGOs about the terrible human rights situation in the prisons. 
While I asked him about the human rights violations that I saw highlighted in the 
reports that he showed me during the interview, he would just repeat: ‘there are no 
human rights violations in the prisons.’ It was only after the interview that I realized 
that this absurd situation had most probably been provoked by my voice recorder. This 
experience also made me more reluctant to use the voice recorder.  
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At some rare occasions, the interviewee would insist that the interview, or parts of it, 
be conducted according to Chatham House rules, but this mostly regards the 
interviews conducted in Brussels (following section). 
Other data 
Other data included written material that was handed to me by my interviewees, 
including pamphlets and reports by international organizations, government reports, 
and sheets/lists over training courses. Additionally, I have taken into account media 
articles, grey papers and NGO reports.  
 
Image 5. In a Bamako-taxi on the way to interviews. 
Not constituting direct data sources but rather background material, are the many 
experiences and non-written observations I had during my fieldwork and the many 
informal conversations with local people, expats, friends, journalists, other 
researchers and random people. Most of my time in Dakar, Bamako and Niamey was 
spent traversing various international offices, embassies and Sahelian Ministries, as 
well as in taxis to interviews, and in the waiting rooms of various diplomatic missions 
and Sahelian government agencies. For instance, I was a frequent visitor and spent 
hours wandering around and trying to find my way inside the Ministry of Justice in 
Niamey, the Ministry of Interior in Dakar, and cite administrative in Bamako. I would 
sit and drink tea with people in the waiting rooms (one interview was spontaneously 
conducted in the waiting room of a local human rights organization). 
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Much information would also be gained through informal conversations, which were 
not written down and thus do not constitute direct data. For instance, a conversation 
with drunk Spanish soldiers on a dancefloor in Les Almadines, Dakar, taught me that 
Spanish troops were assisting Operation Barkhane logistically; a conversation with 
guests at the neighbouring table at a restaurant in the same town made me understand 
the importance of paying attention to arms deals with regard to European involvement 
and military presence. That there is a problem of double hierarchical systems in the 
Malian army because European actors do not take into regard the traditional 
hierarchies in Malian society, I learned from a pizzeria owner in Bamako (who 
moreover had been a migrant in Europe, and whose pizzeria resulted from a European 
Commission-instigated resettlement deal). In all three fieldwork sites, but especially 
in Bamako, there is a vibrant cultural scene and expat life, and I would often meet my 
interviewees and other potential interviewees on various concerts, events or 
parties/bars. These constant conversations and observations constitute invaluable 
‘non-data’. Even unforeseen events such as getting the palu, malaria, and my 
subsequent one-week-hotel-confinement, turned out to provide an unexpected 
opportunity of insight into something I suspect researchers (and especially European 
policy-makers) rarely pay attention to: Nigerien television. I was very surprised to 
find out that, besides Mexican telenovelas which seem to be incredibly popular across 
West Africa, the TV was airing luxury travel documentaries about gastronomy in 
Europe. And this while I was in the country to research the millions of euro that the 
EU is spending on trying to discourage and dissuade people from travelling to Europe, 
including various types of information campaigns about the harsh conditions in 
Europe. 
On two occasions I did shorter observations from which I have field notes. First, I did 
a couple of hours of participatory observation at a cybercrime workshop at the EU-
funded Sahelian Security College in Bamako, which comprised five criminal justice 
actors from each of the five G5 Sahel countries. This was a valuable glimpse into the 
kind of shorter workshops for crime control professionals that are offered on a large 
scale by a range of external actors. The second observation included watching video 
footage from the IOM-organized theatre performances seeking to teach local 
communities in Senegal how borders are supposed to function, described in Article 3, 
that my interlocutors showed me.  
More ethnographic type of fieldwork was considered. However, in the first half of the 
fieldwork (which included the time in Mali which probably provided most access 
opportunities for fieldwork into e.g. training of internal security personnel), language 
barriers inhibited this. When learning a new language, there is a large difference 
between conducting a two hours interview in full concentration with a voice recorder 
(and, in the case of my initial interviews, a colleague) which allows for the interview 
to be re-consulted later on, and the full immersion into an ethnographic field site 
where attention needs to be paid to a multitude of things simultaneously. Moreover, 
the types of ethnographic observations that this research would have significantly 
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benefited from, such as trainings of internal security forces and their everyday work 
for instance in accessible border zones (e.g. Senegal-Mauritania border) and their 
interaction with local communities, are difficult to access.31 It was first towards the 
end of the fieldwork that I actually had the contacts that could enable this kind of 
access, and the language skills necessary in order to carry out ethnographic fieldwork. 
Fieldwork in border zones may also be more dangerous for women than for men, 
although there are great examples of women having done comprehensive fieldwork 
in the region (Scheele 2012; Richter 2019). Thus, I suggest ethnographic fieldwork to 
rather be one avenue of further research that could build on this thesis – which has 
focused more on attaining a broad overview of the field through talking to as many 
different actors as possible. 
Access 
Access to informants, both international and local, was surprisingly easy. In general, 
informants would be welcoming and accommodating and would be happy to talk also 
outside official narratives. While international actors would be contacted by email, 
local actors needed to be contacted by phone.32 Email addresses and phone numbers 
would be snowballed, or on some occasions received from other researchers. In Mali 
and Niger, I coincided with colleagues, something that would also facilitate my access 
to informants as well as knowledge about the local context.33 In Bamako, I also 
collaborated a lot with a Malian researcher who worked on the EUNPACK project, 
and we did several interviews together. In Niamey, I first met with other international 
researchers who were there for a workshop on borders in Africa, some of which were 
there conducting fieldwork as well. Here, I also collaborated with a local Touareg who 
took on the role as a driver and ‘fixer’ (i.e., facilitator of contacts) and became a friend. 
                                                          
31 I tried to gain access to do observation at the EU’s monthly donor coordination meetings on 
security projects in Mali, as well as a workshop for staff from several EU missions in the region, 
but was not granted it. Observations of trainings, or to follow European-trained internal security 
actors to their everyday work, would most probably necessitate gaining permission from the 
country’s Ministry of Interior. 
32 In Senegal I had to get a permission from the Ministry of Interior. 
33 In Bamako I collaborated with colleagues, especially with Morten Bøås, Luca Raineri and 
Aboubakar Diallo working on the Horizon 2020 project EUNPACK on EU crisis response in 
the neighbouhoods, on which I had previously worked as NUPI-researcher. While initially 
benefitting from the contacts and networks of my colleagues, I would later share most of my 
other Mali-interviews with the project – of course notifying the interviewees beforehand that 
the interviews were conducted for two projects simultaneously. This collaborative effort 
resulted in the report The EU, Security Sector Reform and Border Management in Mali. 
Working Paper on the Implementation of EU Crisis Response in Mali (Bøås et al. 2018), for 
which I among other authored the chapter on border management. In Niamey, I did several 
interviews together with Philippe Frowd. 
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Image 6. With West Africa’s last wild giraffes in the background, outside Niamey, Niger. 
4.3. PHASE 3: BRUSSELS 
The third phase of data collection took place in Brussels where I stayed for almost 
five months in the autumn of 2018. This data collection aimed to uncover how EU 
external crime policies and interventions had been decided upon and why, as well as 
the processes of how they had been designed (for instance, to what extent had West 
African actors been included in project formulation?). It was an important aspect of 
my research design to go to West Africa before Brussels because this would allow me 
to go beyond official narratives in interviews and to ask about real and concrete 
challenges that I myself had observed.34 I also went to Brussels to personally 
                                                          
34 Prior to the PhD I had for some time been doing research into the ‘external dimension’ of EU 
drugs policy, notably in Latin America and West Africa (see Stambøl 2016a, 2016b). I was 
puzzled to find that at a time when the international consensus on drug prohibition was cracking 
and it would be increasingly legitimate for governments across the world to pursue alternative 
and non-repressive approaches to deal with drug demand and supply, the EU (which had always 
been a bastion of progressive alternative drug policies) would in fact go the opposite way 
around in its external action: from a focus on (alternative) development it incrementally 
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understand, experience and unpack the ‘black box’ that I had been reading about in 
abstract scholarly articles. As such, ‘living the Brussels bubble’ provided an important 
glimpse into the EU structures from inside, providing a contrast to the fieldwork in 
West Africa.  
During the five months in Brussels, I was guest researcher jointly at the Institute for 
European Studies (IES) of Vrije Universiteit Brussels in the Migration, Diversity and 
Justice Cluster (focusing on ED-JHA), and at the Brussels School of International 
Studies (focusing on Peace and Conflict studies and the Sahel). This opened some 
doors for me in terms of network and contacts, especially to talk to other researchers 
working on similar topics, and to attend events and conferences with both researchers, 
policy-makers and professionals.  
During my time in Brussels, I also had several dinners and lunches with EU staff that 
were not official interview situations (and from which I do not have written data apart 
from keywords for myself to remember what we talked about), yet which have been 
equally valuable for me as the interviews in terms of understanding the ‘Brussels-side’ 
of EU’s crime policies outside Europe. 
The interviews 
In Brussels, I conducted 12 interviews with 18 people. All these interviews were 
conducted together with Enver Ferhatovic from Free University Berlin, who did a lot 
of the networking and contact finding for his own PhD project on EU SSR. 
                                                          
embarked on combating drugs trafficking through supporting the security, police, surveillance 
and repression in third countries from 2009 onwards (see Stambøl 2016b). This observation 
simply did not make any sense from a drugs policy perspective. The most convincing 
explanation I have come across till this date came to me in an informal chat with a former EU 
Commission staff at a conference in Amsterdam in 2014: Internal EU drug policy-making had 
simply been reorganized (due to the Lisbon Treaty), something which had unintended effects 
on EU external action. While decisions would before be taken by the Horizontal Drug Working 
Party (HDG), whose purpose it was to ensure a ‘balanced approach’ to drugs policy, main 
decision-making on internal and external drug policy were from 2009 moved to the Standing 
Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI) which is mandated to make 
decisions on ‘internal security threats’. In other words, from being seen as an own policy area 
balancing considerations of health and repression (by a group of people who had drugs policy 
as their expertise), drug policy came to be a part of internal security policy and intermingled 
with other Justice and Home Affairs issues – such as terrorism, transnational crime and 
migration. As there were no longer any people sitting in Brussels with decision-making power 
thinking holistically about drug policy in third countries but rather on internal security, the 
responses coming out of it were predominantly securitized. This is the backdrop why I decided 
to go first to observe potential contradictions in the implementation of policies in third countries 
before going to Brussels to see whether this could contribute to their explanation. 
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Category of interviewees 
 
Number of 
interviews 
Number of 
interviewees 
Number of 
individual/group 
interviews 
Council structures/European External 
Action Service (EEAS): Civilian 
Planning and Conduct Capability 
(CPCC)/Crisis Management and 
Planning Directorate 
(CMPD)/Prevention of Conflicts, 
Rule of Law and SSR, Integrated 
Approach, Stabilisation and 
Mediation (PRISM) 
Division/Committee for Civilian 
Aspects of Crisis Management 
(CivCom)/the Political and Security 
Committee (PSC). 
6 9 
1 interviewee:3  
2 interviewees: 1 
3 interviewees: 1 
European Commission (Directorate-
General for International Cooperation 
and Development (DG DEVCO); 
Secretariat Task Force Security 
Union. 
3 4 
1 interviewee: 3 
2 interviewees: 1 
3 interviewees: 0 
European Parliament (Committee on 
Foreign Affairs 
(AFET)/Subcommittee on Security 
and Defence (SEDE)); Researchers 
from the European Parliament 
Research Service. 
3 5 
1 interviewee: 2 
2 interviewees: 0 
3 interviewees: 1 
 
Total 
 
12 18 
1 interviewee: 8 
2 interviewees: 2 
Group 
interviews: 2 
Table 2. Overview of interviews in Brussels 
These interviews would typically last about one hour, in some instances 1,5 – 2 hours. 
They were conducted in the same manner as the interviews in West Africa. 
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4.4. ON POSITIONALITY: “VOUS ÊTES FRANÇAISE?” THE 
UNCOMFORTABLE BUT SOMETIMES USEFUL POSITION OF WHITE 
PRIVILEGE 
On too many occasions I had this same bizarre conversation with different taxi drivers 
in Bamako of which I have tried to make sense:  
Me: Pardon mon mauvais français, je suis en train d’apprendre.  
Taxi driver: D’accord. Vous êtes française?35 
As a white person in the Sahel, and more so in Bamako and Niamey than in Dakar, 
you tend to not only automatically taken for being French but it may even be hard for 
people to imagine you to be anything else than French. This has to do, of course, with 
the fact that most white people there are French. Which again has to do with the 
colonial history and the postcolonial continued profound influence and presence of 
France in its former colonies. In fact, the extent of the presence of France everywhere 
in the Sahel was one of my largest surprises during the fieldwork.36 Local people 
tended to lighten up when I told them I was Norwegian. Some would even say that 
they liked Scandinavia a lot because Scandinavians never had a problematic 
relationship with their country. Anti-colonial (and especially ‘anti-French’) 
sentiments have been growing the latest years across the Sahel and in Mali in 
particular – not least due to French military presence through Operation Barkhane 
which counts more than 5000 soldiers.37 This is something I could sometimes feel 
(more than see) during my fieldwork – although there were demonstrations outside 
the French embassy at the time I was in Bamako, and I told not to go close to it at 
those times. These anti-colonial sentiments, which were especially accentuated among 
                                                          
35 Me: I’m sorry for my bad French, I’m learning. Taxi driver: Ok. Are you French? 
36 This observation has stuck to my mind, and also constitutes the background for Article 4: 
When travelling with my Malian colleague on his motor bike through the streets of Bamako, 
we would often pass one of the biggest and most fortified compounds in the entire city with 
barbed wire, bomb-proof walls and security guards with weapons at the entrance, and I asked 
if it was one of the UN bases. My colleague said that no, that is a French company – Groupe 
Bolloré, which owns most of the ports in West Africa. 
37 See for example: ‘“À bas la France !” : enquête sur le sentiment anti-français en Afrique’, B. 
Roger, Jeune Afrique 03.12.2019, URL.: 
https://www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/863817/politique/a-bas-la-france-enquete-sur-le-
sentiment-anti-francais-en-afrique/ (accessed 28.05.20); ‘Pourquoi l’opinion publique 
malienne a une vision négative de l’opération Barkhane’, B. Haidara, The Conversation, 
10.02.2020, URL.: https://theconversation.com/pourquoi-lopinion-publique-malienne-a-une-
vision-negative-de-loperation-barkhane-
130640?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=footertwitterbutton (Accessed 28.05.2020). 
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my civil society interviewees, are the direct reason and inspiration for my decision to 
engage with neo-colonial theory (Article 4). 
 
Image 7. Espace Franz Fanon in Niamey, Niger. 
Ethnicity, class, gender, age, language skills and cultural competence play important 
roles in access to the field and the type of information obtained. As I mostly conducted 
interviews in embassies and Ministries, I would typically wear a shirt, elegant trousers 
and heels, even more amplifying an already obvious class difference from the rather 
poor surroundings that most parts of the three capitals are. However, this would make 
me blend more in with my interviewees (or, at least so I imagined). Yet I would have 
a strong feeling of unease when arriving in a taxi to a European embassy or 
international office (especially that of IOM), pass by the long lines of black people 
waiting (probably for their visa applications or similar issues), show my Norwegian 
passport and being welcomed straight into the embassy to see the high-ranking 
diplomats. I also cannot help thinking that similarity in terms of physical appearance 
facilitates the openness of informants and that this has to do with ethnicity or at least 
citizenship as well. It also made me very aware how mobility and access to a range of 
privileges are racialized, and how holding the citizenship of a rich European country 
opens a world of opportunities purely due to the luck of being born there. Several 
scholars have written about a global community or ‘transnational upper class’ of 
(predominantly western) humanitarian workers and academics – the ‘bona fide 
travellers’ – who are free to travel the world and benefit from globalization while most 
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people do not have this possibility (Bauman 1998; Aas 2011b). My fieldwork made 
me very aware that I belong to this class holding global privileges – both as a matter 
of citizenship, but also of social and economic capital, and, put bluntly, racialization. 
In the meeting with what some have termed the ‘immobilised global underclass’ 
(Pickering and Weber, 2006: 8), which comprises most people in Africa, one’s own 
opportunities and advantages get ever-more exposed. At the same time, I perceived 
that my whiteness and Europeanness would facilitate access and communication with 
my fellow European expat interviewees due to a range of commonalities: being white 
European expats in Africa and having a similar social background belonging to the 
highly educated European middle class. While being white and European seemed to 
generate familiarity and probably facilitated access with my European interviewees, 
my position as a young woman probably made me seem less of a threat, both in the 
eyes of European diplomats and local civil servants and practitioners. My 
interviewees were predominantly men (especially the Sahelian interviewees) and 
mostly older than me.  
Concerning my Sahelian interviewees, it is harder for me to assess the level of access, 
trust and openness. When contacted, Sahelian interviewees rarely refused to be 
interviewed, but I do not know if this can be attributed to my Europeanness. On the 
other hand, I am almost certain that the kind of information and knowledge they would 
share with me would be different, and differently formulated, than what they would 
have shared with a country(wo)man. For obvious reasons this is difficult for me to 
know for certain. In some instances, my Sahelian interviewees would reproduce the 
official European narrative (e.g. ‘transnational organized crime is a key security threat 
preying upon areas with porous borders and needs to be combated’). This is interesting 
as it can mean that they originally had the same conception of crime and crime control 
as in Europe (which I not only strongly doubt but I am quite certain is not the case), 
that they have internalized the European discourse, or that they were pretending to 
have internalized it due to strategic reasons. If one draws on Chabal and Daloz’s 
(1999) understanding of African political power as instrumentalization, and Bayart’s 
(1993, 2000) concept of ‘extraversion’, the reproduction of the European counter-
crime narrative could be understood as a strategy of aid and rent-seeking. From such 
a view, I, as a European researcher who will perhaps produce knowledge read by 
European policy-makers, should be served a story that reinforces the interviewees’ 
role as trustworthy beneficiaries of European security aid and assistance. Or, less 
strategically, they may have simply got used to paying lip service to the EU narrative 
when meeting Europeans. Yet other times interviewees were critical of European 
practices, detailing how for instance police training courses were a mismatch with 
what they wanted and needed (in case of criminal justice actors) or how counter-crime 
interventions were interfering with their way of life (in case of civil society 
organizations). 
My general impression, especially with European interviewees, is that the higher 
ranking the interviewee had, and, thus, the more comfortable he would be in his 
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position, the more freely he would talk beyond official narratives. This was perhaps 
especially the case with the diplomats and some of the bureaucrats in Brussels, where 
I on some occasions felt like a substitute psychologist in which they could finally 
confide their ailments and disappointments with how things were (not) working, 
enticed by the promise of anonymity. In this way, my gender and age probably 
facilitated openness. Still, on many occasions, I would do interviews with other 
researchers (mostly male), and I experienced these interviews to be neither very 
different in terms of dynamics nor to be generating any different data than the ones I 
conducted on my own (except, of course, that they would also answer the questions 
of my colleagues – sometimes making it difficult to follow up with ‘cues’ when 
interesting things were said). In any case, with ‘elite’ and ‘expert’ interviews, the most 
crucial thing for being taken seriously and for extracting interesting information 
beyond that which can already be found in official documents and websites is to be 
very well prepared and to show one’s level of knowledge through the questions posed. 
The questions need to be tailored to the specific role/project and go beyond the 
information that can be found through all other channels (see also Petintseva et al. 
2020). The above database on EU ‘internal security aid’ turned out to be invaluable 
for the preparation of interviews, not least due to the lack or very poor quality of the 
Internet connection in Mali and Niger which often inhibited proper preparation. In 
general, my experience is that if you can present a sufficient level of knowledge about 
the field of inquiry, the interviewee will open up and be happy to share and discuss 
details. The interviews then become more of conversations than strict questioning 
arising from a pre-made list of questions (see also Petintseva et al. 2020). 
4.5. ELITE AND EXPERT POWER/KNOWLEDGE AND 
EPISTEMOLOGICAL (IN)COMPATIBILITY 
The interviews that constitute the data of this thesis would typically fall into the 
category of what the methods literature refers to as ‘elite’ and/or ‘expert’ interviews. 
While the two are often conflated in the literature, there are differences between them, 
specifically because they pertain to distinct research traditions. ‘Elite’ interviews 
come from an Anglo-Saxon tradition, where elites are conceptualized as ‘having 
“power”, “authority” or “status”’ and are presumed to ‘have access to high levels of 
information, which makes them excellent targets to generate this information by using 
interviewing techniques’ (Donders and Van Audenhove in Petintseva et al. 2020: 13). 
While it is important to question information obtained through such interviews, they 
are nevertheless very useful for understanding ‘micro-politics of personal 
relationships and to relate them to a wider analysis of power’ (Petintseva et al. 2020: 
12). The discussion on ‘expert’ interviews, on the other hand, pertains to a European 
and specifically German research tradition, where the ‘expert’ is seen either as a 
‘source of specific knowledge about the study object’, a ‘person who is responsible 
for the development, implementation or control of solutions/strategies/policies’ or a 
‘person who has privileged access to information about groups of persons or decision 
processes’ (Donders and Van Audenhove in Petintseva et al. 2020: 14). The 
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interviewees of this dissertation may fall into both categories, as some were selected 
by virtue of their professional position or role (e.g. EU staff/diplomat, criminal justice 
professionals, civil society organizations), and some by the knowledge they possess 
(e.g. researchers, journalists).  
In criminology, the tradition of ‘studying up’ has often been referred to as researching 
‘the powerful’ (Petintseva et al. 2020; see also Bittle et al. 2018; Tombs and Whyte 
2003). Petintseva et al. 2020 note that ‘powerful’ not only refers to the social position 
of the interviewee vis-à-vis the researcher as is often the assumption in other 
disciplines but for criminological inquiries ‘very crucial is the combination of position 
(including power to define and to articulate which behaviours count as deviant or 
problematic) with talking about difficult, sensitive or secretive behaviours and 
situations’ (Petintseva et al. 2020: 16). As such, ‘powerful’ can also be understood 
through the ideal-typical category of the (transnational) ‘moral entrepreneur’ (c.f. 
Becker, 1997 [1963]; Andreas and Nadelmann 2006; Aas 2013):  
‘In this sense, powerful actors (including politicians, social movements, 
media) steer definitions of deviant behavior and the ways in which social 
control is exercised. Mostly, however, we are speaking of people in 
positions of (public) legitimacy and authority, who have power over others 
and have access to material, social and symbolic resources and articulation 
power. Yet, it is important to keep in mind that (…) who counts as powerful 
is subject to societal changes and it is very much a relational matter’ 
(Petintseva et al. 2020: 17). 
In order to reflect on what kind of knowledge that is generated through ‘elite’ and 
‘expert’ interviews, however, I would argue that it is essential to reflect not only on 
what kind of power that interviewees express and articulate (and how what they say 
is shaped by power), but also how power is conceptualized by the interviewer/analyst 
– not least if one takes as a point of departure that power and knowledge are 
inextricably interlinked. The fact that this dissertation employs both a Foucauldian 
poststructuralist perspective (Articles 1 and 3) and critical/neo-Marxist perspectives 
(Articles 2 and 4) complicates this matter. The theory chapter (section 3.4.) argued 
that these strands of theorizing are ontologically and epistemologically incompatible, 
yet need to complement one another for a more holistic analysis of power. So how 
does investigating ‘the powerful’ look like methodologically from these two 
epistemological perspectives, and how have they been combined in this dissertation? 
My argument is that focusing interviews on practices and interviewees’ views on 
those practices solves the problem of incompatible epistemologies, which becomes 
more of an issue in the post-hoc analysis – where a choice needs to be made whether 
to understand practices as ‘real materiality’ and discourse as (un)masking that reality, 
or both practices and narratives as ‘discourse’.   
In criminology, researching the ‘powerful’ stems particularly from a critical and neo-
Marxist tradition of investigating state and corporate crime, something which is often 
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fraught with methodological complications arising from the neo-liberal order itself 
protecting people in power from research (see e.g. Tombs and Whyte 2003; Bittle et 
al. 2018). This thesis, however, is not about ‘unmasking crimes of the powerful’ (c.f. 
Tombs and Whyte 2003); rather, it is to investigate decision-makers and practitioners 
in institutions and systems of social control (c.f. Petintseva et al. 2020). Kvale (1996: 
55-57) notes that interviews in the (neo-)Marxist traditions have typically had a 
purpose of studying dialectics – the contradictions that arise between the material and 
economic life and individual experiences – assuming that material conditions are the 
basis of social relations and consciousness. Thus, interviewees’ (individual) 
experiences are ‘systematically traced to the common economic and social conditions 
of their everyday world’ (1996: 7). When applying a critical realist/neo-Marxist 
perspective, this dissertation links interview data on micro-politics and practices to 
the broader political economy and (asymmetrical and historical) power relations 
between the Global North and South. For instance, my interviewees shared knowledge 
on what actors that had the power to shape West African penal legislation, what 
contradictions that arose in the projects’ implementation phase (including 
contradictions between official discourse, actual practices, and effects of those 
practices), and who had the power to shape the design and implementation of projects 
and policies (including the types of leverage that were used for pressuring the adoption 
of measures) – and who did not have such power. Power is thus viewed as something 
that certain actors hold as well as something that is reproduced by global structures 
and political economy, which can be countered by counter-power (resistance) of the 
more powerless.  
Conversely, poststructuralist epistemologies reject binary categorizations of 
‘powerful’ and ‘powerless’ and problematize the notions of ‘elite’ and ‘expert’ 
interviews altogether. Rather, power is produced in and through social relations and 
cannot be ‘possessed’ by individuals or organizations; simultaneously there is ample 
controversy about what constitutes the very categories of ‘elite’ and ‘expert’ (Smith 
2006). In other words, power is not a matter of hierarchy but a relational construction, 
and it cannot be assumed that power allegedly resulting from a person’s high social 
position is automatically transferrable onto the interview situation (Smith 2006). 
According to this understanding, the ‘elite’ interview cannot be seen as inherently 
distinct from a ‘non-elite’ interview. From a poststructuralist perspective, this 
dissertation gives attention to how certain professional knowledges shape discourses 
(including their ‘empirical’, practical and material dimension) about crime and crime 
control in certain ways. It concurs that it is difficult to rank the (categories of) 
interviewees according to degrees of ‘eliteness’ or ‘expertise’; rather, the interviewees 
have different professional titles and hold different forms of expertise/knowledge 
which they practice and act according to. In fact, with regard to the Sahelian 
interviewees, it can be discussed whether the above categorizations of ‘civil servants’, 
‘criminal justice professionals’ and ‘civil society’ make sense, as it has been 
repeatedly argued by Africanists that African state institutions tend to constitute 
‘empty shells’ and that formal positions are bad indicators of the ‘real’ workings of 
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political power (Chabal and Daloz’s 1999; Hüsken 2017; Vigh 2012; Bøås 2015). 
Perhaps in the African context, it is particularly true that ‘those who may first appear 
to the researcher to be in positions of authority (by virtue of their professional 
position) may in reality not exert as much influence as first perceived. There might 
also be other, perhaps more obscure, ‘elites’ who exert influence through personal 
networks’ (Smith 2006: 646). Some Foucauldian scholars have even questioned 
whether the research interview is at all an appropriate method for exploring ‘histories 
of the present’ because ‘discourse is not just in people’s reflective interpretation of 
‘events’ but most significantly constitutive of the events themselves’ (Fadyl and 
Nicholls 2013: 25). While I believe this to be a thought-provoking argument which 
encourages careful consideration of the compatibility of methods and research aims, 
I argue that this dissertation (which can hardly be characterized as a ‘history of the 
present’) is a case where interviews are the appropriate method for the aim of 
investigating how crime control models travel. Indeed, interviews (and observations 
– which are, however, not always possible) are sometimes the only way to know 
micro-practices of everyday life (which cannot be found in written text or symbols); 
thus being crucial methods for Foucauldian analyses of power that aim to go beyond 
abstract discursive deconstruction to empirically investigate the microphysical 
workings of power (c.f. Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2007).  
However, it should be noted that there are also limitations to interviews as the main 
data source when studying travelling crime control. One of them regards knowing 
whether and how crime control models are actually internalized in local practices and 
culture, or the microphysical forms of power in police and border guard trainings. In-
depth knowledge on these issues difficult to get solely from what people say, and may 
require more ethnographic type of observations. However, immersion into one field 
site would make it difficult to get the broader overview that research across four 
countries has given (unless, of course, one has a lot of time, resources and field access 
to do in-depth multi-sited ethnography). As the conclusion will argue and suggest, 
more ethnographic type of research could be a continuation of and build on this 
research to explore more in-depth the ‘localization’ and the extent of cultural 
embeddedness of European political rationalities and technologies of crime control in 
West Africa. 
4.6. DATA ANALYSIS 
The interview data were coded in NVivo (see list of codes in Appendix B). The codes 
were developed based on topics and curiosities arising from reading the interview 
transcripts and interview notes, and do not subscribe to either a critical or 
poststructuralist epistemology but can be used for analysis within both.  
One code is particularly worth mentioning here because it has direct relevance for one 
of the main arguments of this thesis. While the code ‘learning from Europe’ has many 
entrances, the pre-made code ‘learning from Africa’ has none. Or, it does have one 
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entrance, but the interview text coded in it deals with the lack of consultation with 
civil society in the Sahel countries in EU decision making processes, design of 
projects and allocation of funds. This is why I argue with some confidence that the 
crime control policies and models predominantly travel on a one-way-street from 
Europe to Africa. They do not travel the other way around. Philippe Frowd (2018) 
argues that security knowledge is not a one-way road, because African considerations 
are invited by the EU for instance at Euro-African conferences for security 
professionals. I do not find this argument entirely convincing. If the EU does some 
small adjustments of its predominantly top-down policies to better fit the local needs 
this can hardly be categorized as ‘learning from Africa’. 
The first analysis of the data was geared at finding patterns and contradictions in the 
data material. The article topics were then chosen based on, and/or built up around, 
particularly interesting findings, patterns and contradictions. Contradictions 
especially arise from the sometimes contrasting views and perceptions of international 
and local actors, or from their (at times incompatible) practices – including the 
unintended consequences of policies. Moreover, the analysis in each article is aimed 
at illuminating the issue at stake from different perspectives. Article 1 was geared 
towards finding patterns, and new particularly interesting tendencies, in the database 
on EU ‘internal security aid’. Article 2 was built up around, first, documenting how 
internal security objectives practically play out in the practices of EU actors on the 
ground in the Sahel. Second, it looked into the contradictions that such practices 
sometimes create – especially those that meet strong resistance from local actors (civil 
society organizations), among other because EU policies create unintended 
consequences and harm locally. Article 3 was written especially for a workshop on 
security, borders and international development. Therefore, the data material was 
explored with regard to ‘borders’ in different understandings of the word. While the 
codes ‘border management/border security’, ‘cross-border/transfrontalière’, 
‘migration’ and ‘mobility’ were particularly helpful in this regard, there was, 
however, a need to go beyond the codes to look through the whole data material again 
as ‘border’ can be understood in multiple ways. Article 4 emerged, as noted earlier, 
from the fact that anti-colonial discourse was very strong among many people whom 
I met across the Sahel, including among several interviewees – especially with civil 
society organizations. As such, this article took an empirical point of departure to 
explore theory. As my interviews in Brussels took place after having started thinking 
about this analysis and read neo-colonial theory (including Langan 2015, 2018), I 
became aware of asking questions in the interviews that aimed at uncovering the 
micro-dynamics of tying of aid (e.g. internal security indicators in budget support).  
The limited space that articles provide for empirical analysis means that large parts of 
the data material are still unused. However, the plan is for as much of it as possible to 
become analysed in future publications.  
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4.7. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
I received oral consent for the interviews and the recording. International actors, who 
were mostly approached by email, would receive a pdf with information about the 
PhD project. All interviewees would be briefed on my project at the beginning of the 
interview before consenting. The data has been stored in notebooks that have been 
locked down and on a password-protected computer. All the interviews have been 
deleted from the voice recorder and are only on the password-protected computer.  
In the articles, interviewees have been anonymized. In one instance, I was unsure of 
the level of anonymization of a key interlocutor (Article 3). This interlocutor was 
contacted and given the finished article draft, on which he subsequently provided 
several rounds of thorough comments. As such, this constituted an additional layer of 
consent and an invaluable opportunity to correct misinterpretations and get 
‘respondent validation’. This instance also made me very aware of a problematique 
which perhaps specifically arises when interviewing policy-makers and 
implementers, namely the delicate and sometimes uncomfortable balance between 
critiquing policy and not hurting the feelings of the interviewee who has informed 
about (or even created) those policies. 
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CHAPTER 5. CONTRIBUTIONS 
Empirically, the contributions of this dissertation are broadly threefold: first, they 
constitute the first mapping of EU crime policy export over time and across regions; 
second, it provides in-depth empirical knowledge about the micro-politics and 
practices of the EU’s export of its crime control models to Senegal, Mali and Niger; 
and third, it empirically documents the (often paradoxical) meeting point between 
European crime control models and Sahelian realities, including resistance to 
misplaced Eurocentric forms of crime control.  
In terms of theory, the four articles make contributions across criminology and 
International Relations (IR). In other words, they explore the microphysics as well as 
structural forms of power in the EU’s export of crime control to West Africa and its 
wider neighbourhoods. Articles 1 and 3 develop Foucauldian notions of 
governmentality with regard to the rationalities and technologies of crime control that 
the EU seeks to export, how these technologies (borders in particular) are transformed 
when mixed and intertwined with rationalities of foreign and development policy, and 
the meeting point with Sahelian countries’ statehood, political power and forms of 
social control. Articles 2 and 4 rather draw on critical and/or neo-Marxist theory by 
first, analysing the EU’s export of crime control as geopolitical hegemonic 
domination that produces ‘paradoxical damage’, and second, as structural domination 
and neo-colonialization of the penal sphere. In doing so, the thesis simultaneously 
makes contributions to the criminological theoretical debate on the relationship 
between crime control/penal power and state/sovereignty.  
5.1. THE ARTICLES AND THEIR RESPECTIVE CONTRIBUTIONS 
Article 1, entitled ‘The External Dimension of the EU’s Fight against Transnational 
Crime: Transferring Political Rationalities of Crime Control’, co-authored with Dr. 
Alessandra Russo, explores the broad trend of the EU’s crime control export over time 
(15 years) and across regions (the extended Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods). It 
asks: How does the EU problematize ‘transnational (organized) crime’ as an object of 
governance in its (extended) neighbourhood, and how is this object rendered 
governable through particular political technologies of crime control? In terms of 
theory, the article argues that what is attempted transferred by the EU to third 
countries and regions is not merely a policy, norm, administrative arrangement, 
institution, or idea but also broader and culturally engrained modes of social control 
and specific ways of thinking and doing crime control. To further this argument, it 
develops a governmentality-inspired analysis suggesting that the EU attempts to 
transfer specific political rationalities and technologies of crime control. The 
empirical analysis is geared towards detecting and systematizing what political 
rationalities and technologies of crime control that the EU attempts to transfer to third 
countries, and the ‘action at a distance’ whereby it does so. The article’s main 
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contribution is empirical, as it constitutes the first comprehensive review of the EU’s 
export of crime control policies and ‘aid to internal security’ across regions. As such, 
the analysis also adds a regional comparative dimension that tends to be absent from 
analyses of EU export of internal security assistance. Its empirical basis is the review 
of 216 EU projects with objectives to combat transnational crime, amounting to 
almost €2.4 billion of EU aid: €877,5 million in the East and €1.5 billion in the South, 
which are coded according to the type of crime control. The article finds that a ‘model’ 
or ‘template’ of crime control is discernible as there are small variations in EU crime 
control exports across very different regions and countries. The main technologies of 
crime control that the EU tries to export typically include law enforcement (focused 
on intelligence-led policing, and less on ‘community’ policing) and border security 
(focused on technology/infrastructure, interdiction, interception). This means that 
other and de-securitized technologies and rationalities of crime control, such as 
rehabilitation, socialization, prevention, alternative development or harm reduction, 
are de-selected for export. The EU also puts much fewer efforts into third countries’ 
judiciary and penitentiary sectors. Moreover, the article finds that the types of crime 
that the EU aims to fight have changed according to its broader policy agenda and 
region-specific challenges. Also, the incremental conflation of migration and 
transnational crime has spurred a new role for EU member states’ Ministries of 
Interior as direct implementing partners of EU internal security aid in third countries. 
Generally, contracts tend to be awarded to EU member states’ agencies along the lines 
of internal security interests and postcolonial ties. The article concludes that 
‘transnational (organized) crime’ seems to constitute a ‘suitable enemy’ that can be 
moulded according to the EU’s security agenda, the fight against it presented as an 
allegedly ‘technical’ arena voided of political contentiousness which no one can 
reasonably oppose, yet one in which the EU can demonstrate its security and even 
military capabilities. In shaping third countries’ ability to criminalise, indict, convict 
and punish, the EU is simultaneously defining its own international security actorness, 
specifically consolidating its role as a ‘global crime fighter’. 
Article 2, entitled ‘The Rise of Crimefare Europe: Fighting Migrant Smuggling in 
West Africa’ explores the processes, practices and consequences of EU crime policy 
export to and implementation in the Sahel region of West Africa. It asks: What is the 
role of criminalisation and crime control in the EU’s policies in West Africa? How 
are European crime definitions and crime policy exported to West Africa, and with 
what consequences? In terms of theory, it expands Peter Andreas’ (1997) concept of 
‘crimefare’, originally developed for the USA context to denote the post-Cold War 
expansion of homeland security into the sphere of foreign policy that blurred notions 
of internal and external security, to that of the EU’s role as a ‘transnational moral 
entrepreneur’ vis-à-vis its extended neighbourhoods. Moreover, the article draws on 
criminological theory conceptualizing the reproduction of global inequalities and 
inherent hegemony in the north-south export of crime control (Aas 2011a), and the 
‘transnational criminology of harm production’ (Bowling 2011): bringing attention to 
the paradoxical damage and harm that repressive and misplaced crime control models 
 
77 
exported to the Global South often create. While focusing on the geopolitical 
dimension of crime control, the article’s main contribution is an empirical analysis of 
how EU action has recently changed on the ground in the Sahel countries due to a new 
focus on Justice and Home Affairs issues and combating crime-related threats: from 
liberal state-building (promoting peace, democracy and human rights) to illiberal 
practices (criminalization, policing, surveillance, border security and militarization). 
It first observes how the EU, both through its Delegations, JHA attachés, and CSDP 
missions, attempts to shape the penal legislation (promoting the criminalization of 
‘migrant smuggling’) and bolstering the internal security apparatuses of Niger and 
Mali, especially on short-term securitized crime-fighting capabilities to combat 
mobility-related crime and terrorism. Still, some of the crime definitions and control 
models exported by the EU are not only misplaced in the Sahelian reality, but they 
also meet strong resistance from local communities and civil society organizations. 
The criminalization of trans-Saharan mobility necessary for people’s livelihoods is 
seen as highly problematic and has suspended regional legal frameworks. It has been 
well documented by researchers and journalists how EU action in Niger created a 
range of severely negative effects, including more dangerous routes for migrants, the 
collapse of the regional economy of Agadez, and growing insecurity and instability. 
The article concludes that despite the rhetoric of partnership and compatibility of 
European and African security, wars on crime seem to produce collateral damage, 
aggravate micropolitical instability and produce harm – often among the poorest and 
most marginalized communities. 
Article 3, entitled ‘Borders as Penal Transplants: Reshaping Territory, Mobility, and 
Illegality in West Africa’, explores an increasingly significant trend in crime and 
mobility control that has yet received scant criminological attention, namely ‘border 
externalization’ and the export of western ‘penal aid’ to the Global South. In doing 
so, it makes both empirical and theoretical contributions to the emerging field of 
‘border criminology’. Empirically, it investigates in detail the visions and practices of 
Western donors (not only the EU but also other international actors such as the IOM 
and the US) who build border security in the Sahel region. The article also makes a 
threefold contribution to criminological theory, arguing that investigating border 
security-building as a ‘penal transplant’ (c.f. Garland 2006) to non-western countries 
more clearly elucidates western ways of thinking and doing crime control, the role of 
borders herein, as well as the relativity of notions of crime and crime control across 
social and geographical contexts. First, the article finds that the ‘penal transplant’ of 
the border post is envisaged by donors both as a crucial manifestation of the state and 
as a technology of crime control, simultaneously embodying penal power, risk 
management and social service provision. Moreover, the border is increasingly 
becoming the target sector for penal aid as it seems that donors acknowledge their 
limits in building western-style sovereign states in Africa (c.f. Garland 1996). Second, 
analysis aimed at ‘seeing from the periphery’ (Aas 2012a; Carrington et al. 2016) 
uncovers how these Western visions of ‘borders as state’ and ‘borders as crime 
control’ collide with the social reality on the ground, as notions of crime, mobility, 
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territory and sovereignty contrast to those of donors. The article then draws on 
theoretical insights from anthropology and African studies on statehood, political 
power and illegality, to expand the criminological understanding of the relationship 
between borders, crime control and the state. Third, it delves into a novel type of 
international border security-building that epitomize the border as ‘performance.’ 
Through theatralizing the border and its crime control functions, these projects seek 
to teach local border communities across West Africa risk awareness and territoriality: 
thus altering their border culture and habits, harnessing them as non-state partners in 
crime and mobility control. The article concludes that in their efforts at territorializing 
the body politic in West African states in order to fight crime, Western donors go 
beyond exporting border security as technical assistance by building border posts 
along lines in the sand; African state actors and communities are also to be engaged 
in their performance. Only then can the penal transplant of the border be fully 
internalized and contribute to redrawing the map of Africa. 
Article 4, entitled ‘Neo-Colonial Penality? Travelling Penal Power and Contingent 
Sovereignty’, explores the relevance of Kwame Nkrumah’s theory on neo-colonialism 
for criminology and the sociology of punishment, and its contribution to 
understanding why and how penal policy and models travel from the Global North to 
the Global South. It asks: how can neo-colonial theory shed light on the ways in which 
penal power travels and its relationship to state sovereignty? Neo-colonial theory 
focuses on the role of asymmetrical power structures and economic dependency in 
explaining why Western policies can still be imposed on African countries despite 
their juridical sovereignty. This article, however, suggests that the extent of neo-
colonial co-optation may also be analysed sector-wise. As such, it discusses the 
ramifications of neo-colonialism as a theoretical framework for studying external 
influence in the criminal justice and penal sector, which moreover lays at the heart of 
the Weberian concept of state sovereignty as the monopoly of force. The article begins 
by reviewing criminological theory on travelling penal power, its relation to state 
sovereignty, and the broader structural and historical power relations within which 
such travel is embedded. It then presents Nkrumah’s original theory on neo-
colonialism, discusses its more recent proponents within IR (Langan 2015, 2018; 
Gegout 2017), as well as similar poststructuralist perspectives on the ‘contingent 
sovereignty’ (Duffield 2007) of ‘governance states’ (Harrison 2004). Two empirical 
sections – which explore the EU’s ‘penal aid’ to shape West African countries’ penal 
policies and practices in order to stop illicit and irregular mobility to Europe – argue 
for and against ’penal colonialism’, thereby teasing out the theory’s strengths and 
limitations. The concepts of agency, power and sovereignty are then interrogated, 
highlighting how neo-Marxist and poststructuralist perspectives, and African 
statehood theories differently see how African statehood as hollowed out from above 
(the Westphalian inter-state system dominated by hegemonic Western states) and 
from below (from contesting political orders and the lack of monopoly of force). The 
article argues that neo-colonial theory’s provides an important focus on the role of 
asymmetrical power structures in explaining Western intervention into third 
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countries’ penal sectors. However, its analytical potential is limited by its binary 
conception of power as either neo-colonial – or not; something which poses serious 
problems in terms of operationalization. It therefore suggests that neo-colonial theory 
could be complemented by poststructuralist analyses of power as productive: seeing 
EU penal power projection as constitutive of African countries’ ability to criminalize, 
indict, convict and punish. Penal power is then seen as working ‘through sovereignty’ 
to control illicit mobility ‘at a distance.’ Still, neo-colonial theory importantly reminds 
us not to lose sight of the politically contested nature of external intervention, and the 
way in which it may subvert the accountability of penal power away from the people 
of the state. 
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has sought to answer the research question:  How are Western crime 
control policies and models exported to the Global South, and what are the power 
implications herein? It investigated especially, but not exclusively, how crime control 
models are exported by the EU to the Sahel region in West Africa.  
First, the thesis delved into the research question: How does the EU problematize 
‘transnational (organized) crime’ as an object of governance in its (extended) 
neighbourhood, and how is this object rendered governable through particular 
political technologies of crime control? It was suggested that what is travelling from 
Brussels to Europe’s (extended) neighbourhoods is something broader than crime 
policies, penal norms and institutions, namely ways of thinking and doing crime 
control – i.e., political rationalities and technologies of crime control. In other words, 
the political technologies of crime control transferred embody theorizations of what 
should count as crime, as well as the ways in which crime should be combated and 
controlled. The empirical investigation of EU ‘internal security aid’ showed that the 
EU’s category of ‘transnational (organized) crime’ beyond its borders has evolved 
over time, in line with the EU’s broader security agenda: from focusing on drug 
trafficking, later terrorism and/or corruption, to now having a main focus on mobility-
related crime such as migrant smuggling and human trafficking. The ‘internal security 
aid’ or ‘penal aid’ to third countries across the Eastern and Southern wider 
neighbourhoods to fight those threats thus selects certain crime control models to be 
exported while de-selecting others, increasingly favouring law enforcement 
capabilities focused on intelligence-sharing and interception as well as border security 
and technology, with much less focus on criminal justice or prisons.  
Second, it was asked: How are European crime definitions, policies and models 
exported to West Africa, and how are they transformed (or not) when intertwined with 
the logics and rationalities of foreign and development policy?  (Articles 2 and 3)? It 
found that it is rather EU external action that is transformed by the new focus on 
internal security objectives to combat mobility-related crime. The EU’s Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions in the Sahel, traditionally tools of 
peacebuilding, state-building and crisis response, are progressively re-directed from 
comprehensive long-term institution-building towards short-term illiberal practices 
aimed at bolstering the Sahelian countries’ internal security, policing and border 
management capabilities. Also, the EU’s development policy has been re-shaped by 
the EU Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) towards ameliorating the ‘root causes’ of illicit 
mobility – with aid directed at populations at risk of mobility and cross-border 
smuggling instead of poverty. This testifies to a rationality of crime control within 
which ‘sovereignty’ plays a growing role, thus reconfiguring liberalism to have a 
stronger focus on territorial control. Western border security-builders’ intentions are 
that borders as ‘penal transplants’ should reshape West African forms of crime and 
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social control by territorializing them: the land border post is envisaged as a crucial 
manifestation of the state in its remote territories and as a technology of crime control, 
simultaneously embodying penal power, risk management and social service 
provision. 
Third, the thesis aimed to answer the question: How are Western crime control models 
implemented on the ground in the Sahel, what happens in their meeting with local 
social realities, and what are the consequences of transplanted European models? It 
found that when border security is implemented in the Sahel context, the crime control 
functions of border security-building are distorted, as these ‘technologies of crime 
control’ are often not tailor-made for Sahelian realities, and locals tend to have 
different conceptions of crime, territory, mobility and sovereignty. Other ‘penal 
exports’, such as the crime categories that the EU transfers though shaping the penal 
legislation and crime control models of countries such as Niger, especially on ‘migrant 
smuggling’, are contested by local communities and civil society organizations, and 
produce harm locally. Not only does the crime category of ‘migrant smuggler’ not fit 
into Sahelian conceptions of illegality and illicitness, but the crack-down on 
‘smugglers’ has disrupted the local ways of life by criminalizing a longstanding 
coping strategy necessary for survival in a (semi)desertic region. By doing so, it has 
a destabilizing effect on the country, something which highlights that the fight against 
transnational crime might in fact counteract other EU foreign policy priorities such as 
stabilization and peace.  
Fourth, the thesis asked: Within what (historical) structural power relations are 
North-South exports of crime control models embedded, and how can neo-colonial 
theory shed light on the ways in which penal power travels and its relationship to state 
sovereignty? It argued that it is necessary for analyses of the flow of crime control 
models and penal power from Europe to West Africa to consider international political 
economy and (historically) asymmetrical power structures. Both neo-Marxist and 
neo-Foucauldian perspectives provide lenses to understand the ‘contingent’ nature of 
African countries’ sovereignty. Internal security aid and penal power flowing from 
the EU and other international donors can be seen as either constitutive of African 
countries’ penalities or as hollowing out their sovereignty. Thus, the power in north-
south travelling crime control can be understood as both embedded in structural power 
asymmetries, as well as dispersed microphysics working through shaping 
beneficiaries’ micro-practices of crime control.  
Empirically, this dissertation can be said to have taken a middle ground between two 
positions: studies of EU policy-making in Brussels on the one hand, and ethnographic 
studies of crime and crime control in Africa on the other. This middle ground was thus 
aimed at attaining a broad overview by exploring the entire crime control export 
process to several countries. However, future studies could build on this thesis to 
explore each of these areas more thoroughly.  
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On the one hand, more research is needed on how external crime policy is made in 
Brussels, including the interaction between actors from Justice and Home Affairs 
(JHA) and Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Such research is 
particularly topical given that the funding mechanisms that this thesis has explored 
will be replaced by a new foreign policy mega-instrument for the next multiannual 
financial framework (MFF) 2021-2027: the Neighbourhood, Development and 
International Cooperation Instrument, which comprises more than €86 billion.  This 
new funding mechanism will seek to address the UN Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs), one of which is to ‘combat all forms of organized crime’ (SDG 16.4.; see 
Blaustein et al. 2018). However, criminologists note that the SDGs give no indication 
of how the international community is supposed to respond to the threat of 
transnational crime (Blaustein et al. 2018: 775). Research on crime control responses 
will therefore continue to be crucial. Moreover, such studies should take into account 
mechanisms of accountability, oversight and (human) rights protection regarding EU 
external action on internal security.    
On the other hand, more ethnographic type of research would be required to explore 
whether, and the extent to which, European ‘rationalities and technologies of crime 
control’ are actually internalized and how by local beneficiaries and communities in 
West Africa. To what extent does European action contribute to changing the ways in 
which Africans think of and do crime control – and their ‘cultures of control’ (c.f. 
Garland 2001)? In particular, research should address a paradox uncovered by this 
thesis, which has also been highlighted by other research (e.g. Bowling 2011; Cohen 
1988), namely that the crime control interventions of Western actors often 
inadvertently fuel instability, insecurity and rising violence in the Global South. This 
counteracts the (often undocumented) assumption underpinning international crime 
policy discourse about the effectiveness of counter-crime responses in bringing forth 
peace and security. Studies should therefore more systematically explore how 
transnational crime-fighting both promotes as well as disrupts peace and development, 
favourably combining criminological knowledge with anthropology, area studies and 
peace and conflict studies.  
This thesis has provided an inter-disciplinary yet criminologically-grounded research 
that foregrounded ‘the political’ in studies of transnational crime control. Being at the 
intersection of the fields of ‘transnational criminology’ and ‘International Political 
Sociology’, it could therefore be seen as the starting point of an ‘International Political 
Criminology (IPC)’. 
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Appendix A. Sample interview guide 
questions  
Sample interview guide questions to international actors 
The following questions are samples from various interview guides. The interviews 
were semi-structured and sometimes even unstructured, so this is to provide an idea 
of the types of initial questions.  
• What is your organization’s approach to fighting transnational crime? 
• To what extent is your organization’s approach to fighting transnational 
crime similar/different as that of other international actors? And local actors?  
• The EU has been calling for the mainstreaming of JHA in EU external action. 
(How) do you notice this in your work? In particular with regard to: strategic 
priorities; resources/project portfolio; staff; guidelines; funding? 
• What has been the role of [your organization] with regard to X policy/legal 
change? Who was also involved, how, why, when?  
Design 
• How was the project you manage designed? And by whom?  
• To what extent did the design take into account local actors in the 
design/implementation/evaluation? Which ones? How?  
• To what extent is research (or other kinds of knowledge) taken into account 
in the design of the project? What research/knowledge? 
• Was an initial assessment made of the potential consequences of such a 
project?  
Implementation 
• What are the strategies of local ownership/appropriation? 
• Challenges in implementation?  
Monitoring/Evaluation 
• How do you monitor projects?  
• How do you evaluate projects? 
Impact 
• What indicators do you use to measure the success of the project? 
• To what extent are these indicators project-specific/context-specific or 
general? 
• What has been the impact of the project you manage? 
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• Unintended consequences? 
Crime/security 
• What do you perceive as the greatest challenges here in terms of crime? 
• How do you perceive the local state officials’ perceptions of the greatest 
challenges in terms of crime? Are they similar/different?  
• Would you say that the work of your organization (with regards to 
crime/security) has changed or remained the same in the past decade?  
• In your view, how does the “security-development nexus” play out on the 
ground?  
• To what extent is the agenda driven by the headquarter v.s. field? 
 
Sample interview guide questions to local actors  
 
• Can you tell me about your work? 
• What do you regard as the biggest challenges with regard to crime?  
• What are your priorities in terms of fighting crime?  
• Does your county/unit have a strategy and strategic priorities in terms of 
fighting crime?  
• What are the priorities of international actors in your country in terms of 
fighting crime? Are they similar/different from those of your 
country/unit/your own? 
• Have there been reforms in the criminal justice sector/your unit? Can you tell 
me about them? Who was involved, how?  
• What was the role of the international community/actors/EU in this reform?  
• What is your opinion about their involvement? How was it good/bad? 
• What are your needs? 
• Do you think that the support you receive from international actors 
corresponds to your needs?  
• What kind of support do they give to sector X?  
• What do you think about the EU’s engagement? In X policy/law change?  
• What kind of training did you get? How long time? 
• What kind of equipment did you get?  
• With this training/equipment – do you think you are well prepared for the 
challenges you face (in terms of crime)? Or would other training/equipment 
be needed?  
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Appendix B. NVivo codes  
• (Criminal) court 
• (Mis)trust in security forces 
• (Understandings of) crime (threats) 
• [Learning from Africa] 
• Anti-colonial 
• Border management_border security 
• CIVIPOL 
• Colonial legacies 
• Conditionality 
• Corruption 
• Criminal justice chain 
• Cross-border_Transfrontalière 
• Cultural change and differences 
• Development 
• Donor coordination and cooperation 
• EU cooperation with (sub) regional organizations and mechanisms 
• Europe (and France) as bad examples to follow 
• Expertise France 
• G5 Sahel 
• Gestion d´urgence 
• Governance 
• Human rights 
• Information and intelligence sharing and exchange. Databases 
• Intentions-implementation gaps and (unintended) consequences 
• Intermingling of security threats or forms of crime 
• Internal-external security nexus 
• International law 
• IOM 
• La France 
• Le grand criminalité (et banditisme) 
• Law enforcement 
• Learning from Europe 
• Legal_New criminalizations_re-drafting of criminal law (role of 
international actors) 
• Malian peace process 
• Migration 
• Mobility 
• Natural resources (exploitation) and economic policies 
• Niger 2015 law on migrant smuggling 
• Organized crime 
• Prison 
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• Realpolitik 
• Reforms_Criminal justice reform_Penitentiary reform_Police 
reform_SSR_DDR 
• Rights groups_social movements_advocacy action 
• Security 
• Security-development nexus 
• Social equality (inclusion, egality as ideals to strive for) as solutions to 
problems 
• Strategy and action plans 
• Terrorism_violent extremism_radicalization_etc 
• The EU 
o CSDP 
o EU visibility and profile 
o EUTF 
o Financing, funding lines etc 
o GAR-SI 
o IcSP 
o Staff 
o The EUs many faces_EU as a schizofrenic or unified actor 
• The making of policies and projects_political process and 
negotiations_project design, implementation, impact 
o Impact 
o Implementation 
o Implementing partners 
o Knowledge production underpinning policy-making (incl best 
practices) and projects 
o Monitoring_suivi 
o Needs assessment 
o Ownership 
o Project design (who,where,how) 
o Success indicators 
o Vetting 
• The presence of state (on its territory) 
• Trade liberalization_Libre circulation_infrastructure 
• Training, capacity-building, equipment provision 
• Transnational professional networks - of law enforcement or 
judiciary_cross-border cooperation, joint investigations 
• Transparency 
• Underlying causes_root causes_drivers 
• UNODC 
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Appendix C. Internal security aid  
Screenshot EU internal security aid to fight transnational crime 
in North Africa and the Middle East 
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